Do Catholic Knights Follow and Apply Their Own Commandments as Federal Judges in Judicial Orders and Opinions?
The shame for new law clerks today is they are entering a very corrupt judiciary who delegate a substantial amount of case opinion writing to these clerks. These judges train them in the art of how to write a manipulated opinion for the judges’ preferred party, not necessarily the party who should obtain judgment in their favor.
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Disgraced and Disbarred: Why Are Former Judges and Lawyers Working as Mediators in Our Courts?
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Lawyer Calvin Curtis Stole Over $13M Sentenced to 8 Years in Jail. He Wants a Favor from The Florida Bar.
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April 2022 Foreclosure Stay Raises Serious Questions as to ‘Divorce Status’ Of Tim and Jennifer Howard
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Rewind 2008: The Home Snatchers Stole Millions of Homes, Lives and Citizen’s Trust By Unimaginable Fraud
Catholic Law’s Judicial Clerkship Opinion Writing Conference
10 Federal Judges and 30 Rising Law Clerks Participate
MARCH 10, 2021 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MARCH 10, 2021
On Feb. 26-27, 2021, Catholic University’s Columbus School of Law hosted 30 rising law clerks from across the country who will be serving in the chambers of Federal Circuit Courts, Federal District Courts, and State Appellate Courts in the upcoming year. While many events have been affected by the pandemic, the conference provided a welcome opportunity for learning for those in attendance.
The two-day, virtual conference provided the conferees with an opportunity to learn the particulars of judicial opinion writing — a unique conference focus undertaken by the Law School to serve both bench and bar. The first day of the conference included instruction from Judge Kyle Duncan of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Paul Matey of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Chad Readler of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Judge Lawrence VanDyke of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, who reviewed opinions to illustrate what goes into the opinion-writing process and took questions from the clerks about their strategic choices.
On the second day, the clerks were divided into breakout sessions, in which Judge James Boasberg and Judge Dabney Friedrich of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; Judge John Gallagher and Judge Joseph Leeson of the U.S. District Court for the E.D. Pennsylvania; Judge Steven C. Seeger of the U.S. District Court for the N.D. of Illinois; and Judge Edward Meyers of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims reviewed and critiqued draft opinions the clerks had written on a problem derived from Catholic Law’s past Seigenthaler-Sutherland Cup National First Amendment Moot Court Competition problem. This activity allowed the clerks to apply the skills they were learning and receive feedback. Conferees are all eligible for the CSL Prize in Judicial Clerkship Opinion Writing.
The conference ended with a panel discussion of current and former judicial clerks — Professor Joel Alicea, Will Haun ’12, Anika Smith ’20, and Jack Vivian ’17 — who took questions from the conferees about clerkship tenures in general.
The conference ended with a panel discussion of current and former judicial clerks — Professor Joel Alicea, Will Haun ’12, Anika Smith ’20, and Jack Vivian ’17 — who took questions from the conferees about clerkship tenures in general.
This event is the inaugural venture of this type by Catholic Law and is planned to take place every spring semester. For more information, contact Catholic Law Faculty Director of Bench and Bar Programs, Professor A.G. Harmon: harmon@law.edu.
‘Not qualified’ rating and accusation from American Bar Association moves Trump nominee Lawrence VanDyke to tears
ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED: OCT 31, 2019 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MAR 10, 2021
A federal appeals court nominee broke down in tears during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing Wednesday, reacting to a scathing letter against his confirmation by the American Bar Association after it conducted 60 interviews and concluded that he was “not qualified” for the judicial branch.
Lawrence J.C. VanDyke grew emotional, with his face turning red as he defended himself against the letter’s conclusions that he could not treat LGBTQ litigants fairly.
“I do not believe that,” VanDyke said. “It is a fundamental belief of mine that all people are created in the image of God,” adding, “they should all be treated with dignity and respect.”
The rare outburst comes as the ABA is under continued attack from conservatives who question its methodology and argue that the group that has rated potential nominees for decades is biased against conservatives. It also comes as the President and Senate Republicans have pushed through a record number of judicial nominees as Democrats have questioned their qualifications.
President Donald Trump nominated VanDyke, who currently serves as a deputy assistant attorney general for the Environment and Natural Resources Division at the Department of Justice, last month for the post on the 9th US Circuit Court of Appeals. The President has repeatedly attacked the liberal-leaning 9th Circuit for rulings that have blocked administration initiatives, especially on immigration.
The ABA on Tuesday night issued a blistering analysis of the nomination.
“Mr. VanDyke’s accomplishments are offset by the assessments of interviewees that Mr. VanDyke is arrogant, lazy, an ideologue, and lacking in knowledge of the day-to-day practice including procedural rules,” William C. Hubbard, chair of the ABA’s standing committee on the federal judiciary, wrote. “There was a theme that the nominee lacks humility, has an ‘entitlement’ temperament, does not have an open mind, and does not always have a commitment to being candid and truthful.”
So far, at least six of the President’s nominees have received a “not qualified” rating as the Trump administration and the Republican-led Senate has transformed the face of the judiciary by placing nearly 160 nominees on the federal bench including two Supreme Court nominees. But the letter triggered an angry backlash from supporters of the Harvard-educated lawyer who called it a hit job from a liberal-leaning group.
“The ABA is a liberal dark-money group, fronting for trial lawyers who donate millions of dollars to Democratic politicians,” said Mike Davis, who served as chief counsel for then-Judiciary Chairman Chuck Grassley and now runs the Article III project, a group that supports Trump’s nominees. Davis calls the ABA process “fatally flawed, as it is intentionally structured to couple liberal activists with a subjective, black-box process that oftentimes results in unfair hits on conservative judicial nominees.”
And Carrie Severino of the Judicial Crisis Network, which advocates for conservative nominees, charged that the lead evaluator of VanDyke, Montana attorney Marcia Davenport, previously contributed to Van Dyke’s opponent in a 2014 election for a seat on the Montana Supreme Court.
That criticism from this Congress has been muted of late, however, because Senate Judiciary Chairman Lindsey Graham, a South Carolina Republican, has praised the group’s role.
VanDyke is former solicitor general of both Montana and Nevada, but the ABA letter about his fitness for the federal bench was particularly harsh on his temperament. It notes that some interviewees raised concerns about whether VanDyke would be “fair to persons who are gay, lesbian or otherwise part of the LGBTQ community. “Mr VanDyke would not say affirmatively that he would be fair to any litigant before him, notably members of the LGBTQ community,” the letter said.
At the hearing, VanDyke said he was “disappointed, shocked and hurt” when he received the letter Tuesday night. He testified that he was “still processing” it and said he’d since learned that one of the ABA raters involved had donated to his opponent when he ran for a state judiciary race and ultimately lost. He said that during a three-hour meeting with the ABA as the group studied his record in connection with the nomination to federal court, he tried to respond to some of the negative comments lodged against him but the rater told him that she was in a “hurry” and that she wouldn’t let him fully respond.
Graham turned to another nominee, Patrick J. Bumatay, who was sitting next to VanDyke, and is also up for a seat on the 9th Circuit. During his opening statement, Bumatay had introduced his husband and their two children. Graham asked Bumatay if he thought VanDyke could be fair to him. Bumatay said he could.
Democrats on the committee, meanwhile, reacted with concern about the allegations in the letter.
Sen. Patrick Leahy called it “one of the most alarming he’d seen” after some 45 years in Congress. Sen. Chris Coons noted that the letter was “fairly damning” because it was based on interviews with people who had worked with the nominee over the years. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse suggested that the ABA should be brought in to testify about the matter.
But Republican Sen. Mike Lee reacted furiously, claiming that the letter was “unfounded.” “If this man is not qualified, I don’t know who is,” Lee said. He added that the ABA no longer deserves a “seat at the table” because it has little transparency and cannot be seen as a neutral player when it comes to confirmation hearings.
“The time has come,” Lee said, for the White House and the committee to suspend the ABA’s involvement until there could be a thorough investigation. Texas GOP Sen. Ted Cruz said the group had found VanDyke to be guilty of “practicing law while conservative.”
Asked for comment, the ABA declined to comment on the record, but acknowledged that Davenport had made a $150 contribution to VanDyke’s opponent.
One ABA official said that the group was not going to comment on a $150 contribution made five years ago and pointed to the group’s rules that specify a member of the standing committee agreed not to participate in, or contribute to, any federal election campaign or engage in any partisan political activity on a federal level. The race in question was for the Montana state Supreme Court.
Importance of ABA ratings
The ABA ratings have been used to criticize Trump nominees who liberal critics fear, and conservatives hope that will provide major rulings on issues such as abortion, the Second Amendment and affirmative action. And if some of those cases make their way to the Supreme Court, conservatives will be content to know that the strong conservative majority with Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh will be there to rule in their favor.
As of last week, the Senate has now confirmed five judges the ABA deemed unqualified: Leonard Steven Grasz, Charles Barnes Goodwin, Holly Lou Teeter, Jonathan Kobes, and Justin Walker. Goodwin and Teeter received support from Democrats, while the other three were approved only with Republican votes.
Overall, the setbacks have been few as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has pushed through a record number of appellate judges and often praises a legacy that will last decades.
Two Trump judicial nominees who have been called unqualified by the ABA – John O’Connor and Brett Talley – have withdrawn from consideration. But the setbacks for McConnell and Trump have been far outweighed by their successes in confirming scores and scores of judges. Their effort to reshape the judicial branch with young conservatives is perhaps their longest-lasting legacy.
Last week, Graham shepherded the confirmation of Justin R. Walker, 37, an assistant professor of law at the Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville, who received a “not qualified” rating from the ABA, to be a judge on a US district court.
A spokesperson for the ABA said that its rating process is done by a standing committee of the federal judiciary which is independent of the ABA leadership and does extensive peer reviews of the nominees writings and interviews with people who have worked with them. They have three criteria: integrity, temperament and experience and say that ideology does not factor in the evaluation at all.
The ABA rated Walker not qualified, it said in a letter, because he “does not presently have the requisite trial or litigation experience or its equivalent.” The letter stressed that the committee had no questions on his temperament or integrity and that in the future it felt like he had “great potential to serve as a federal judge.”
McConnell, for his part, called Walker “unquestionably the most outstanding nomination that I’ve ever recommended to Presidents to serve on the bench in Kentucky.”
Another nominee the ABA has deemed unqualified is US district judge nominee Sarah E. Pitlyk, who serves as a special counsel at the Thomas More Society, a national public interest law firm that has litigated against Planned Parenthood and was nominated for the Eastern District of Missouri.
The Senate Judiciary Committee is scheduled to vote on her nomination Thursday.
The ABA also criticized her lack of trial and litigation experience.
“A nominee to the federal bench ordinarily should have a minimum of 12 years’ experience in the practice of law,” the committee wrote, although they said the guideline is “neither a hard-and-fast rule or an automatic disqualifier.” “However, Ms. Pitlyk’s experience to date has a very substantial gap, namely the absence of any trial or even real litigation experience.”
“Ms. Pitlyk has never tried a case as lead or co-counsel, whether civil or criminal,” wrote William Hubbard, chair of the ABA’s standing committee on the federal judiciary. ‘She has never examined a witness. “Though Ms. Pitlyk has argued one case in a court of appeals, she has not taken a deposition. She has not argued any motion in a state or federal trial court. She has never picked a jury. She has never participated at any stage of a criminal matter.”
That letter sparked a fight during Pitlyk’s nomination hearing before the Judiciary Committee. Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, said the ABA has a “ridiculous record of behaving as a partisan mouthpiece when it comes to judicial nominations,” and that some members have donated to Democratic lawmakers.
Illinois Democratic Sen. Dick Durbin then remarked that Hubbard had donated to Graham in the past.
“A good man,” joked Graham. He later defended the ABA’s recommendations as “helpful,” calling it a “fine group” that was politically left in his view, but employed people whose judgment he trusts. Graham added that it failed to appreciate Pitlyk’s “non-traditional practice.”
Judicial Nominee Paul Matey Exemplifies the Breakdown of Bipartisan Norms in the Senate
Originally Published: January 28, 2019 | Republished by LIT: March 10, 2021
Dear Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Feinstein, and Committee Members:
On behalf of our hundreds of thousands of members and activists across the United States, People For the American Way opposes the confirmation of Paul Matey of New Jersey to be a federal judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Matey served as a senior aide to Gov. Chris Christie from 2010-2015, offered Christie legal advice during a scandal-filled period that included Bridgegate, the use of Hurricane Sandy disaster relief funds for what was essentially a reelection commercial, and rewarding a major political donor with a $150 million no-bid contract.
With both home state senators Bob Menendez and Cory Booker opposed, Matey’s nomination exemplifies the breakdown in norms that once allowed the parties to work together while identifying highly qualified consensus nominees for the federal bench.
During the first two years of the Trump presidency, the Judiciary Committee held hearings for an unprecedented number of circuit court nominees opposed by one or both home state senators. When President Trump nominated Paul Matey, he did so without meaningfully consulting with Menendez and Booker. In addition, Chairman Grassley held a hearing over their objections, even though Booker was a colleague on the committee.
Home state senators often have knowledge of a nominee that might not be known to the White House, and that is certainly the case here. Matey worked as senior vice president and general counsel at University Hospital in Newark. During his tenure, the hospital had several major problems and scandals, including a safety grade that plummeted down to an F. As mayor of Newark at the time, Booker was deeply familiar with the situation, yet he was not meaningfully consulted by the White House. Grassley scheduled Matey’s hearing without first asking Booker to explain his opposition or giving his colleague a chance to meet with the nominee.
As the New Jersey senators wrote to Grassley on November 9, 2018,i after the hearing was scheduled:
[T]he Trump Administration never offered us a meeting with Mr. Matey. The Administration did not make an offer for such a meeting before his nomination in April 2018. The Administration did not do so during the period after his nomination. The Administration did not do so before a Judiciary Committee hearing on his nomination was scheduled. And it has not done so to date.
At Matey’s confirmation hearing,ii Booker urged Grassley to let him meet with the nominee to discuss his concerns in private before the public questioning:
I’m a member of your committee, sir. I know that you would want any judge from your great state that you would want at least the courtesy of having a meeting. Sir, I offer you right now, I will go with this nominee, sit with him in my office, to have that courtesy conversation.
Menendez, I don’t want to speak for my colleague, but I imagine that he would want that courtesy that any senator that is a member of your committee would want. We’ve never denied a meeting with this person.
As a duly elected senator from New Jersey, for a nominee that has served in my city that I was a mayor of is a matter of grace. I’m asking you to extend to me the opportunity before we have this hearing to have a more substantive conversation with this nominee. Would you please grant my — I will meet with him now in my office.
Grassley said no.
But the 116th Congress brings new leadership to the Judiciary Committee, and a chance to restore the norms shattered during these past two years. Chairman Lindsey Graham should not allow the committee to process Matey’s renomination without the consent of both home state senators.
Sincerely,
Marge Baker
Executive Vice President for Policy and Program
Democrats vow Judge Chad Readler will be 2020 issue
Murray and Schumer among Democrats blasting his role in targeting health care law
Originally Published: March 6, 2019 | Republished by LIT: March 10, 2021
Democrats say they will remember the Wednesday afternoon vote to confirm Chad A. Readler, one of President Donald Trump’s most contentious judicial nominees.
The 52-47 vote to install Readler on the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Ohio could easily be lumped in with many other Trump choices pushed through the Senate by Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky.
But Readler’s connection to the Justice Department’s decision not to defend the 2010 health care law and its pre-existing condition protections in litigation led by the state of Texas struck a particular chord, as Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions ranking member Patty Murray said ahead of the confirmation vote.
“People across the country haven’t forgotten how they had to speak up and stop Republicans from jamming through their awful Trumpcare bill, which would have spiked premiums, gutted Medicaid, and put families back at the mercy of big insurance companies, who could jack up prices for people with pre-existing conditions,” the Washington Democrat said. “Because let’s be clear. Chad Readler’s nomination is the latest test of whether Republicans are serious about fighting for people’s health care — and every Republican who supports him is failing yet again.”
Minority Leader Charles E. Schumer seconded the message that Democrats would not let this one go.
“Can you imagine voting for a man that is so cold hearted that he doesn’t protect a mother who has a daughter or son with cancer, and the insurance companies cuts them off, and they have to watch their child suffer? Will our Republican colleagues actually vote for a nominee who feels that way — not just in his word, but in his action? It’s going to be remembered — this vote — for a long time,” Schumer said on the Senate floor. “A long, long time.”
And this time, one Republican senator echoed the argument made by Murray, Schumer and other Democrats.
Maine Sen. Susan Collins announced Tuesday that she would oppose Readler’s confirmation, citing his “role in the government’s failure to defend provisions under current law that protect individuals with pre-existing conditions.”
“I strongly objected to DOJ’s position to not defend the law, and it is telling that this position also concerned some other career attorneys in the Department. In fact, three career attorneys withdrew from the case rather than support this position, and one of those attorneys eventually resigned,” Collins said in a statement, adding that the Justice Department’s position in the case was simply “wrong and implausible.”
A number of outside groups that support the health care law that came into effect under President Barack Obama have seized on the nominee as the latest example of the GOP’s hostility to health care access, as has the political operation of Senate Democrats.
“The Republicans who support his nomination learned nothing from the shellacking their party suffered during the midterms, and they continue to set the stage for their own defeat in 2020,” said David Bergstein, a spokesman for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.
Readler is the second of three Trump appellate nominees on track for confirmation this week, following confirmation of Allison Jones Rushing by a 53-44 vote to a seat on the 4th Circuit. She faced questions about her relative inexperience.
Senators also voted 53-46 to limit debate on the nomination of Eric Murphy to another 6th Circuit seat shortly after confirming Readler on Wednesday.
And the confirmations are coming ahead of what seems like an inevitable move by McConnell and Senate Republicans to use the “nuclear option” to enact new Senate precedents that could sharply curtail the debate time — to up to two hours — for lower-level federal district judges, as well as a host of executive branch nominees.
Former Judiciary Chairman Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont again criticized Republicans on Wednesday for not honoring the “blue slips” from Democratic senators when it comes to appeals court nominees, which had been used for decades to indicate consent of home state senators for the confirmation process to move forward.
Ohio Democratic Sen. Sherrod Brown has blasted the Readler nomination. Republicans have argued that such blue slips were not often enforced when it comes to appeals court seats.
Senate Rules and Administration Chairman Roy Blunt highlighted the debate on Tuesday, pointing out that former Rep. John Fleming of Louisiana has been reported out of committee on voice vote twice, but had not yet overcome Democratic objections to be confirmed to a sub-Cabinet position in the Trump administration.
“This week, our leader is required to allocate 30 hours of debate time to confirm the deputy assistant secretary of Commerce for economic development,” the Missouri Republican said. “Most Americans would have a hard time remembering that full title, including me.”
Appellate Circuit
Constance Daniels, Student of Hard Knocks, Admonished Florida Lawyer and Friend of The Eleventh Circuit
LIF cannot comprehend how the People of Florida and the United States of America are so accepting of Brazen Corruption.
LIF UPDATE
JUL 28, 2024
The case settles on remand from the 11th Circuit and Daniels signs a loan modification agreement with a commencement date of Jun 20, 2023 for a sum of $329k and a period of 144 months with a balloon payment of $267k due on maturity. Her property at 3927 Dunaire Dr, Valrico, FL 33596 is valued today at appx. $457k.
As an aside, admonished Florida lawyer Constance Daniels had around $400k worth of IRS Tax Liens released between 2023 and 2024 ($383k).
LIF UPDATE
OCT 26, 2022
Five months after the 11th Circuit saved a colleague and lawyer from foreclosure, the mandate issued (without en banc hearing) and as instructed (reversed and remanded) the lower court has reopened the case.
LIT will be tracking this case closely, stay tuned.
LIF COMMENTARY
The article below starts with Constance Daniels failure to pay for her law school tuition loan issued in 2003. She defaulted in 2005 per the complaint. The USA won a judgment of $164k+ in 2011.
In 2010, Wells Fargo commenced foreclosure proceedings in state court, Hillsborough County.
While all this was going on, Ms Daniels, a Republican, was attempting to become a State judge in 2014, which failed.
In late November of 2017 a settlement was reached, dismissing the Wells Fargo foreclosure complaint.
In 2017-2018, lawyer Daniels was failing to look after her client(s). Many moons later, in 2021, that would result in a slap on the wrist by the referee, Hon. Daniel D. Diskey for Fl. Bar.
Then we move onto the June 2018 complaint, filed by Daniels against the mortgage servicer. It was removed to the lower court in Middle District of Florida Federal Court.
The court, via one of the Moody clan of judges, sided with Select Portfolio Servicing, LLC and this formed the appeal which was decided this week by the 11th Circuit.
In Nov. 2020, Wells Fargo filed a renewed foreclosure complaint against Daniels and her homestead in State court. In Sept 2021, Wells Fargo voluntarily dismissed the case and terminated the lis pendens ‘due to loan modification’.
The issue for LIF in this case is quite clear. Who the 11th Circuit has chosen to upend it’s prior stance that mortgage servicers can do no wrong under the FDCPA, despite irrefutable facts confirming otherwise.
For example, LIF refers to the case we highlighted regarding a deficiency judgment (State case, March 2022):
“Florida Lawyer Stephanie Schneider Appeals a Mortgage Foreclosure Deficiency Judgment”
In that case, LIF investigated beyond the court opinions to discover the wife is a Florida Lawyer and her husband, Laurence Schneider is owner of S&A Capital, Inc., a mortgage investment company, has built a national portfolio of performing mortgages that have been written off by other financial institutions.
Our angst is clear. Lawyers are being treated preferentially by the courts over regular citizens and homeowners.
In the case of Daniels, whilst she may have legitimate arguments, there have been many citizens who have failed before her by the wordsmithing by the Federal and Appellate Court(s), which has refused to apply the correct legal interpretation of the FDCPA, or clarify the question(s) with the federal consumer agency, the CFPB.
Whilst LIF is unhappy with the anti-consumer watchdog, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) which is a revolving door for staff to leave the Bureau and go work for a creditor rights law firm without any restriction or time limit (non-compete), the Daniels case should have been referred to the CFPB for interpretation about the matters of ‘first impression’.
The Second Circuit recently did so for a RESPA question in Naimoli v Ocwen and we highlighted the case on our sister website, LawsInTexas.com (Laws In Texas). Instead of doing so in Daniels, there is a dissenting opinion by Judge Lagoa, who’s father in law is a senior judge in SD Florida (Paul C. Huck) and her hubby is a Jones Day Partner and apparently the leader of the Miami Chapter of the Federalist Society. Lagoa herself is a former Florida Supreme Court justice appointed by Gov DeSantis who ‘ensured he puts conservatives on the bench so that anyone coming to court knows how the court will rule’.
LIF anticipates the Daniels case will be subject to a rehearing petition and presented to the full en banc court for reconsideration. The opinion here is similar to the recent Newsom FDCPA opinion, which was too negative towards Wall St and the financial banking services community. As such, it was vacated by the en banc panel while they reconsider. The courts’ decision is currently pending.
In this case, there is still time for the 11th Circuit to correctly ask the CFPB to provide its opinion on the underlying facts raised on appeal and decided by the 3-panel.
However, what the judiciary won’t do is apply this retroactively to the thousands of cases which have been incorrectly tossed in the last 14 years, resulting in homeowners losing their homes to wrongful foreclosures.
United States v. Daniels (2011)
(8:11-cv-01058)
District Court, M.D. Florida
MAY 13, 2011 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MAY 26, 2022
USA Motion for Summary Judgment with Exhibits, Doc. 13, Aug 17, 2011
ORDER granting Motion for summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $109,813.74,
together with accrued interest in the amount of $54,097.10 as of February 28, 2011,
plus interested at the rate of 8.25 percent per annum and a daily rate of $24.80, until the date of judgment;
for post-judgment interest, at the legal rate, from the entry of final judgment until the date of payment;
and for such other costs of litigation otherwise allowed by law.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.
Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 9/22/2011.
(SN) (Entered: 09/22/2011)
U.S. District Court
Middle District of Florida (Tampa)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 8:11-cv-01058-EAK-AEP
| USA v. Daniels Assigned to: Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich Referred to: Magistrate Judge Anthony E. Porcelli Demand: $164,000 Cause: 28:1345 Default of Student Loan |
Date Filed: 05/13/2011 Date Terminated: 09/22/2011 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 152 Contract: Recovery Student Loan Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff |
| Plaintiff | ||
| USA | represented by | I. Randall Gold US Attorney’s Office – FLM Suite 3200 400 N Tampa St Tampa, FL 33602-4798 813/274-6026 Fax: 813/274-6247 Email: FLUDocket.Mailbox@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED |
| V. | ||
| Defendant | ||
| Constance Daniels | represented by | Constance Daniels PO Box 6219 Brandon, FL 33608 PRO SE |
| Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
|---|---|---|
| 05/13/2011 | 1 | COMPLAINT against Constance Daniels filed by USA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Civil Cover Sheet)(MRH) (Entered: 05/13/2011) |
| 05/13/2011 | 2 | Summons issued as to Constance Daniels. (MRH) (Entered: 05/13/2011) |
| 05/13/2011 | 3 | ORDER regulating the processing of civil recovery actions. Service must be perfected by 09/10/2011. Signed by Deputy Clerk on 5/13/2011. (MRH) (Entered: 05/13/2011) |
| 05/13/2011 | 4 | STANDING ORDER: Filing of documents that exceed twenty-five pages. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 7/15/08. (MRH) (Entered: 05/13/2011) |
| 05/19/2011 | 5 | NOTICE of designation under Local Rule 3.05 – track 1 (CLM) (Entered: 05/19/2011) |
| 05/20/2011 | 6 | CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE re 3 ORDER regulating the processing of civil recovery actions by USA (Gold, I.) Modified on 5/20/2011 (MRH). (Entered: 05/20/2011) |
| 05/25/2011 | 7 | CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by USA (Notice of Designation Under Local Rule 3.05) (Gold, I.) (Entered: 05/25/2011) |
| 07/06/2011 | 8 | RETURN of service executed on 7/5/11 (Marshal 285) by USA as to Constance Daniels. (MRH) (Entered: 07/06/2011) |
| 07/27/2011 | 9 | MOTION for default judgment against Constance Daniels by USA. (Gold, I.) Modified on 7/27/2011 (MRH). NOTE: TERMINATED. INCORRECT MOTION RELIEF. ATTORNEY NOTIFIED. ATTORNEY TO REFILE. (Entered: 07/27/2011) |
| 07/27/2011 | 10 | MOTION for entry of clerk’s default against Constance Daniels by USA. (Gold, I.) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Anthony E. Porcelli. (Entered: 07/27/2011) |
| 07/28/2011 | 11 | CLERK’S ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Constance Daniels. (MRH) (Entered: 07/28/2011) |
| 07/29/2011 | 12 | ANSWER to 1 Complaint by Constance Daniels.(BES) (Entered: 07/29/2011) |
| 08/17/2011 | 13 | MOTION for summary judgment by USA. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Gold, I.) (Entered: 08/17/2011) |
| 09/09/2011 | 14 | ENDORSED ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as to Constance Daniels.. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on 8/17/11. The defendant had up to and including 9/3/11 to respond to the motion. To date no response has been filed. Therefore, it is ORDERED that the defendant has up to and including 9/19/11 in which to show cause why the pending motion should not be granted. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 9/9/2011. (SN) (Entered: 09/09/2011) |
| 09/22/2011 | 15 |
ORDER granting 13 Motion for summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $109,813.74, together with accrued interest in the amount of $54,097.10 as of February 28, 2011, plus interested at the rate of 8.25 percent per annum and a daily rate of $24.80, until the date of judgment; for post-judgment interest, at the legal rate, from the entry of final judgment until the date of payment; and for such other costs of litigation otherwise allowed by law. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.. Signed by Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich on 9/22/2011. (SN) (Entered: 09/22/2011) |
| 10/12/2011 | 16 | ABSTRACT of judgment as to Constance Daniels. (DMS) (Entered: 10/12/2011) |
Order GRANTING Summary Judgment for $164k Student Loan Debt, Doc. 15, Sep 22, 2011
Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
LIF’s Post Reverse and Remand from CA11 Update, July 28, 2024
The case would settle.
(8:18-cv-01652)
District Court, M.D. Florida
NOTICE of settlement Pending by Constance Daniels (Diamond, Kaelyn)
(Entered: 05/10/2023)
60-DAY ORDER OF DISMISSAL re 52 Notice of Pending Resolution. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is directed to close the file. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 5/10/2023. (SMB)
(Entered: 05/10/2023)
| CLOSED,MEDIATION |
U.S. District Court
Middle District of Florida (Tampa)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 8:18-cv-01652-JSM-CPT
| Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. Assigned to: Judge James S. Moody, Jr Referred to: Magistrate Judge Christopher P. Tuite
Cause: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract |
Date Filed: 07/11/2018 Date Terminated: 05/10/2023 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 190 Contract: Other Jurisdiction: Diversity |
| Date Filed | # | Docket Text |
|---|---|---|
| 05/24/2022 | 32 | USCAS OPINION issued by court as to Appellant Constance Daniels. Decision: REVERSED and REMANDED as to 29 Notice of Appeal. EOD: 05/24/22; Mandate to issue at a later date. USCA number: 19-10204-GG. (AG) (Entered: 05/26/2022) |
| 08/31/2022 | 33 | USCA ORDER: Appellant’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees is TRANSFERRED to the district court for its consideration of whether Appellant is entitled to appellate attorney’s fees and the amount of appellate attorney’s fees to which Appellant is entitled, if any, as too 29 Notice of Appeal filed by Constance Daniels. EOD: 08/29/2022; USCA number: 19-10204-GG. (AG) (Entered: 08/31/2022) |
| 08/31/2022 | 34 | MOTION for Attorney Fees by Constance Daniels. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Declaration, # 3 Exhibits 1-4 to Declaration, # 4 Exhibit)(AG) (Filed in the 11th Circuit on 8/29/2022) Modified on 8/31/2022 (AG). (Entered: 08/31/2022) |
| 09/01/2022 | 35 | ENDORSED ORDER denying without prejudice 34 Motion for Attorney’s Fees. The record reflects that the Mandate from the Eleventh Circuit has not been issued. The Motion for Attorney’s Fees may be refiled after the mandate is issued and docketed. The Motion shall also be modified to comply with the Court’s local rules. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 9/1/2022. (JG) (Entered: 09/01/2022) |
| 10/26/2022 | 36 | MANDATE of USCA: REVERSED AND REMANDED as to 29 Notice of Appeal filed by Constance Daniels. Issued as Mandate: 10/26/22. USCA number: 19-10204-GG. (Attachments: # 1 Bill of Costs, # 2 USCA memo)(JNB) (Entered: 10/26/2022) |
| 10/26/2022 | 37 | ENDORSED ORDER: The Clerk is directed to reopen the case. The parties shall file a joint status report within fourteen days as to how they wish to proceed in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 10/26/2022. (SMB) (Entered: 10/26/2022) |
| 11/03/2022 | 38 | NOTICE of Appearance by Gabriela N. Timis on behalf of Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (Timis, Gabriela) (Entered: 11/03/2022) |
| 11/09/2022 | 39 | STATUS report by Constance Daniels. (Diamond, Kaelyn) (Entered: 11/09/2022) |
| 11/09/2022 | 40 | CASE MANAGEMENT REPORT. (Diamond, Kaelyn) (Entered: 11/09/2022) |
| 11/09/2022 | 41 | MOTION for Attorney Fees as to Entitlement to Appellate Fees and Costs Only by Constance Daniels. (Diamond, Kaelyn) (Entered: 11/09/2022) |
| 11/09/2022 | 42 | ENDORSED ORDER: Defendant shall file its answer on or before November 18, 2022. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 11/9/2022. (SMB) (Entered: 11/09/2022) |
| 11/14/2022 | 43 | CASE MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 5/26/2023; Dispositive motions due by 6/30/2023; Pretrial Conference set for TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2023, at 9:00 A.M. in Tampa Courtroom 17 before Judge James S. Moody Jr. Jury Trial set on the JANUARY 2024 trial term in Tampa Courtroom 17 before Judge James S. Moody Jr. Conduct mediation hearing by 6/16/2023. Lead counsel to coordinate dates. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 11/14/2022. (SMB) (Entered: 11/14/2022) |
| 11/18/2022 | 44 | ANSWER and affirmative defenses to 23 Amended Complaint by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.(Kohn, Joseph) Modified text on 11/21/2022 (MCB). (Entered: 11/18/2022) |
| 11/23/2022 | 45 | RESPONSE in Opposition re 41 MOTION for Attorney Fees as to Entitlement to Appellate Fees and Costs Only filed by Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (Kohn, Joseph) Modified text on 11/28/2022 (SET). (Entered: 11/23/2022) |
| 12/12/2022 | 46 | ENDORSED ORDER denying without prejudice as premature 41 Motion for Attorney Fees for the reasons stated in the Response 45. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 12/12/2022. (JG) (Entered: 12/12/2022) |
| 01/04/2023 | 47 | NOTICE of mediation conference/hearing to be held on June 14, 2023 at 1:30 P.M. before Gregory Holder. (Diamond, Kaelyn) (Entered: 01/04/2023) |
| 01/04/2023 | 48 | ORDER appointing Gregory P. Holder, Esq. as mediator in this action. Mediation is scheduled for June 14, 2023, at 1:30 p.m. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 1/4/2023. (SMB) (Entered: 01/04/2023) |
| 03/30/2023 | 49 | STIPULATION /Joint Motion to Extend Case Management Deadlines and Incorporated Memorandum of Law by Constance Daniels. (Diamond, Kaelyn) (Entered: 03/30/2023) |
| 03/31/2023 | 50 | ENDORSED ORDER granting in part 49 Joint Motion to Extend Case Management Deadlines filed by Constance Daniels. The pretrial conference and trial dates remain unchanged. No further extensions of time will be granted absent a showing of good cause. The Court will enter an amended scheduling order separately. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 3/31/2023. (SMB) (Entered: 03/31/2023) |
| 03/31/2023 | 51 | CASE MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULING ORDER: Discovery due by 7/25/2023; Dispositive motions due by 8/29/2023; Pretrial Conference set for TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2023, at 9:00 A.M. in Tampa Courtroom 17 before Judge James S. Moody Jr. JURY TRIAL is set on the JANUARY 2024 trial term in Tampa Courtroom 17 before Judge James S. Moody Jr. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 3/31/2023. (SMB) (Entered: 03/31/2023) |
| 05/10/2023 | 52 | NOTICE of settlement Pending by Constance Daniels (Diamond, Kaelyn) (Entered: 05/10/2023) |
| 05/10/2023 | 53 | 60-DAY ORDER OF DISMISSAL re 52 Notice of Pending Resolution. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is directed to close the file. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr. on 5/10/2023. (SMB) (Entered: 05/10/2023) |
| PACER Service Center | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Transaction Receipt | |||
| 07/28/2024 18:04:57 |
JUDGE ESKRIDGE
“ORDER re: By email to the Case Manager, the parties have provided notice of settlement of their dispute.”FIFTH CIRCUIT
“By informing the court that the case had settled, the plaintiff did not “instigate dismissal.” https://t.co/zq7t3oR77E pic.twitter.com/t5p1Tb5p80— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) July 24, 2024
Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
(2018-Present)
(8:18-cv-01652)
District Court, M.D. Florida
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 24) and Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (Dkt. 27).
The Court, having reviewed the motion, response, and being otherwise advised in the premises, concludes that Defendant’s motion should be granted.
Specifically, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint will be dismissed with prejudice because any further amendment is futile.
BACKGROUND
As the Court explained in its prior Order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss, (see Dkt. 22), Plaintiff Constance Daniels initially filed suit in Florida state court against Defendant Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”) alleging three Florida claims, which included a claim under Florida’s civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act.
On July 10, 2018, SPS removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction.
On August 6, 2018, SPS moved to dismiss the entire complaint.
In relevant part, SPS argued that the complaint failed to allege any of the elements of a RICO claim.
On August 27, 2018, Daniels filed an amended complaint, which mooted SPS’s motion to dismiss.
Daniels’ amended complaint alleged two claims: a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and a claim under the Florida Consumer Collections Practices Act (“FCCPA”).
Both claims relied on the same allegations.
To summarize, Daniels alleged that SPS had “improperly servic[ed]” her mortgage loan “in reckless disregard” of her consumer rights. (Dkt. 12).
The amended complaint did not attach any mortgage statements.
SPS moved to dismiss Daniels’ amended complaint based on her failure to allege that SPS ever attempted to collect the mortgage balance.
The Court granted SPS’s motion.
The Court noted that the amended complaint did not identify or attach any communication from SPS to Daniels.
The Court also surmised that the dispute was more akin to a dispute about an improper accounting of Daniels’ mortgage.
The Court dismissed the FDCPA and FCCPA claims and provided Daniels a final opportunity to amend her complaint.
Daniels filed a second amended complaint.
The allegations are largely unchanged.
But, significantly, Daniels attaches multiple monthly mortgage statements that SPS sent to her.
She now claims that these mortgage statements constitute debt collection activity under the FDCPA and FCCPA.
SPS’s motion to dismiss argues that the monthly mortgage statements comply with Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act (the “TILA”)—they were not communications in connection with the collection of a debt—and therefore do not constitute debt collection activity under the FDCPA and FCCPA.
As explained further below, the Court agrees with SPS’s position based on the Court’s detailed review of the monthly mortgage statements.
Therefore, the second amended complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint when it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations contained in the complaint as true.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
It must also construe those factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted).
To withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Pleadings that offer only “labels and conclusions,” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” will not do.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
DISCUSSION
The FDCPA and FCCPA prohibit debt collectors from using a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”
See e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (emphasis added);
Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (“In collecting debts, no person shall . . .”) (emphasis added).
It is axiomatic then that the “challenged conduct is related to debt collection” to state a claim under either statute.
Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012);
see also Garrison v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1286 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (“the FCCPA is a Florida state analogue to the federal FDCPA.”) (internal citations omitted).
“[T]he Eleventh Circuit has not established a bright-line rule” as to what qualifies as “in connection with the collection of any debt.”
Dyer v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
“As a general principle, the absence of a demand for payment is not dispositive,” and courts should “instead consider whether the overall communication was intended to induce the debtor to settle the debt.”
Wood v. Citibank, N.A., No. 8:14-cv-2819-T-27EAJ, 2015 WL 3561494, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 5, 2015) (citations omitted).
The second amended complaint attaches multiple monthly mortgage statements.1
Because the communications at issue here are all monthly mortgage statements, a discussion of the TILA is necessary.
The TILA requires SPS, a servicer, to send monthly mortgage statements.
12 C.F.R. § 1026.41. Specifically, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41(d) requires that servicers provide debtors with detailed monthly mortgage statements containing, among other things: the “amounts due;” the “payment due date;” “the amount of any late payment fee, and the date that fee will be imposed if payment has not been received;” “an explanation of amount due, including a breakdown showing how much, if any, will be applied to principal, interest, and escrow and, if a mortgage loan has multiple payment options, a breakdown of each of the payment options;” “any payment amount past due;” a breakdown of “the total of all payments received since the last statement” and “since the beginning of the current calendar year;” “a list of all transaction activity that occurred since the last statement;” “partial payment information;” “contact information;” and detailed “account information” and “delinquency information.”
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB”) has issued a bulletin providing that a
“servicer acting as a debt collector would not be liable under the FDCPA for complying with [monthly mortgage statement] requirements.”
Implementation Guidance for Certain Mortgage Servicing Rules, 10152013 CFPB GUIDANCE, 2013 WL 9001249 (C.F.P.B. Oct. 15, 2013).
Courts have largely followed this guidance.
See, e.g., Jones v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 18-cv-20389, 2018 WL 2316636, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 2, 2018) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41(d));
Brown v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 16-62999-CIV, 2017 WL 1157253 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2017) (noting the guidance and finding that monthly mortgage statements in compliance with the TILA were not debt collection).
The monthly mortgage statements at issue here were in conformity with the TILA requirements.
Moreover, the subject statements were substantially similar to model form H-30(B) provided by Appendix X to Part 1026 of TILA Regulation Z.
See also Jones, 2018 WL 2316636, at *4 (noting the similarities between a monthly mortgage statement and the model form in concluding no debt collection).
Although the monthly mortgage statements may not be identical to model form H-30(B), the differences are not significant deviations.
Notably, the plaintiff in Brown brought a nearly identical lawsuit against SPS.
The court explained in detail why the plaintiff was unable to state a claim under the FDCPA and FCCPA because the monthly mortgage statement was required to be sent pursuant to the TILA.
The complaint in Brown was dismissed with prejudice because “amendment would be futile” given that the basis for the claims was a monthly mortgage statement that was not actionable as a matter of law.
See 2017 WL 1157253, at *2-*4.
Also, the Jones court discussed in detail the numerous prior decisions addressing this issue, including multiple cases from this district that have held that monthly mortgage statements
“are almost categorically not debt collection communications under the FDCPA.”
2018 WL 2316636, at *5 (citing cases).
The particular monthly mortgage statements before the court in Jones were also sent by SPS and were substantively identical to the statements at issue in this case and in Brown.
Most recently, in Mills v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 18-cv-61012- BLOOM/Valle, 2018 WL 5113001 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2018), the court “agree[d] with the reasoning in Jones and [concluded] that the Mortgage Statements at issue [were] not communications in connection with a collection of a debt.” Id. at *2.
In conclusion, the substance of the monthly mortgage statements at issue in this case is substantially similar to model form H-30(B).
Any minor discrepancies in the language—when taken in the context of the document as an otherwise carbon copy of form H-30(B)—do not take the statements out of the realm of a monthly mortgage statement and into the realm of debt collection communications.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Dkt.
24) is granted.
2. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
3. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case and terminate any pending motions as moot.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on December 18, 2018.
Copies furnished to: Counsel/Parties of Record
Judge Bert Jordan’s “Reputation” Warning to New Florida Lawyers
Constance Daniels Admonished by the Florida Bar (2021)
Constance Daniels, P.O. Box 6219, Brandon, admonishment in writing and directed to attend Ethics School effective immediately following a November 24 court order.
(Admitted to practice: 1995)
Daniels failed to act with reasonable diligence and failed to communicate with her client in connection with a dissolution of marriage action.
Daniels also failed to timely respond to the Bar’s formal complaint.
Constance Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2022)
11th Cir., Published Opinion
(19-10204, May 24, 2022)
“A matter of first impression” 14 Years after the great recession and greatest theft of citizens homes in the history of the United States.
It’s quite incredulous how the 11th Circuit selects a Sanctioned Fl. Republican Lawyer, a failed judicial candidate and one who is facing foreclosure, for this ‘landmark’ published opinion in 2022.
Panel Author, Judge Bert Jordan, joined by Judge Brasher with a dissenting opinion by Judge Babs Lagoa
Selective Justice = Ochlocracy and Corruption.
WHY IS THERE NO CHARGES FOR LAWYERS STEALIN’ MILLIONS? https://t.co/gkMkVMboYZ@USAO_NJ @USAO_MDFL @SDFLnews @CityBocaRaton @AGAshleyMoody @flcourts @TheFlaBar @FLBarPresident @SWFLCourts @WSJ @nytimes @reason @MotherJones @ABC— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) May 26, 2022
11th Circuit revives FDCPA lawsuit over mortgage statement language
How Westlaw is Summarizing the Latest Eleventh Circuit Opinion
(May 26, 2022)
Resolving an issue of first impression, a divided federal appeals panel has held that mortgage servicers can be liable under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act for inaccuracies in monthly mortgage statements that contain additional debt-collection language.
Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing Inc., No. 19-10204, (11th Cir. May 24, 2022).
In a 2-1 decision, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on May 24 reinstated Constance Daniels’ lawsuit against Select Portfolio Servicing Inc., in which she alleges the company used faulty mortgage statements to try to collect payments she did not owe.
Writing for the panel majority, U.S. Circuit Judge Adalberto J. Jordan acknowledged that Select Portfolio was required to issue the mortgage statements under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1638.
However, the mortgage statements fell within the scope of the FDCPA’s prohibition on false or misleading representations, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e, because they included additional debt-collection language — “this is an attempt to collect a debt” — the opinion said.
Judge Jordan reasoned that “in determining whether a communication is in connection with the collection of a debt, what could be more relevant than a statement in the communication than ‘this is an attempt to collect a debt’?”
U.S. Circuit Judge Barbara Lagao dissented, saying the majority treated the language like “magic words” that could convert an otherwise routine mortgage statement into a communication covered by the FDCPA.
Judge Lagoa also argued that the decision created a circuit split, although the panel majority insisted that the facts of Daniels’ case distinguished it from others in which federal circuit courts seemed to reach a contrary result.
District Court tosses FDCPA claims
Daniels sued Select Portfolio in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in July 2018.
According to the suit, Daniels had prevailed in a state court foreclosure action brought by lender Wells Fargo in 2015, with the judge sanctioning Wells Fargo and enforcing an earlier loan modification agreement between the parties.
But Daniels’ mortgage servicer, Select Portfolio, later issued several monthly mortgage statements misstating the principal balance and amount due, and falsely claiming that her loan was in arrears, the suit says.
At least three of the mortgage statements included the sentence, “This is an attempt to collect a debt,” according to the suit.
Daniels accuses Select Portfolio of using false or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt, in violation of the FDCA and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.72.
Select Portfolio moved to dismiss, saying Daniels was attempting hold it liable for issuing mortgage statements that are required under the Truth in Lending Act.
U.S. District Judge James S. Moody Jr. agreed and dismissed the suit in December 2018. Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servs. Inc., No. 18-cv-1652, (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2018).
Judge Moody said that any discrepancies in language between Select Portfolio’s monthly statements and what is required under TILA “do not take the statements out of the realm of a monthly mortgage statement and into the realm of debt collection communications.”
On appeal, Daniels argued that compliance with TILA does not make a mortgage servicer immune from suit under the FDCPA and, even if it did, the monthly statements at issue included language beyond what is necessary under TILA.
Kaelyn S. Diamond and Michael A. Ziegler of the Law Office of Michael A. Ziegler represented Daniels.
Benjamin B. Brown and Joseph T. Kohn of Quarles & Brady LLP represented Select Portfolio.
By Dave Embree
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Appellate Circuit
Deutsche Bank and Nationstar Watch as 11th Circuit Discharge the Shotgun Despite Hunt’s Pleadings
There can be no doubt that this is a frivolous appeal and we would not hesitate to order sanctions if appellant had been represented by counsel.
Hunt v. Nationstar Mortg., No. 21-10398
(11th Cir. May 27, 2022)
MAY 27, 2022 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MAY 30, 2022
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
Christopher M. Hunt, Sr., proceeding pro se, appeals following the district court’s dismissal of his civil complaint arising out of his 2006 purchase of residential property located in Atlanta, Georgia (the “Property”).
Hunt purchased the Property using proceeds from a loan that he eventually defaulted on, which prompted Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”), then servicer of the loan, to seek a non-judicial foreclosure on the Property.
After filing or being named in a variety of related lawsuits,1 Hunt filed the instant pro se complaint in Georgia state court in June 2020 and named as defendants Nationstar, the Deutsche Bank National Trust
1 See, g., Hunt v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 684 F. App’x 938 (11th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (“Hunt I”);
[MARCUS, ROSENBAUM AND ANDERSON]
Hunt v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 779 F. App’x 669 (11th Cir. 2019) (unpublished);
[PRYOR,W., GRANT AND ANDERSON]
Hunt v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 782 F. App’x 762 (11th Cir. 2019) (unpublished);
[PRYOR,W., GRANT AND ANDERSON]
Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Am., as Tr. for Fifteen Piedmont Ctr. v. Hunt, 783 F. App’x 998 (11th Cir. 2019) (unpublished).
[TJOFLAT, JORDAN AND NEWSOM]
Companies (“Deutsche Bank”), and Jay Bray, the CEO of Nationstar.
He alleged that they had committed, inter alia, mortgage fraud and wrongful foreclosure in violation of federal laws, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act.2
The district court denied a variety of preliminary motions filed by Hunt;
dismissed, without prejudice, the complaint as to defendant Bray for failure to effect proper service;
and
dismissed, with prejudice, the complaint as to Deutsche Bank and Nationstar, because it was a “shotgun” pleading, was barred by res judicata, and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.3
After thorough review, we affirm.
I.
Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, including removal jurisdiction, is a question of law that we review de novo.
See McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2013).
We also review de novo a denial of a motion to
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (hereinafter “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”), and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con- sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (hereinafter “Dodd-Frank Act”).
3 Hunt also named Christian Sewing, the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Deutsche Bank, as a defendant, but he later voluntarily dismissed him.
And after filing the complaint, Hunt sought to add yet another defendant, the Albertelli Law Firm (“Albertelli Law”).
Bray, Sewing and Albertelli Law have not filed any briefs on appeal.
remand to state court. Conn.
State Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, 591 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2009).
A district court’s decision regarding the indispensability of a party is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Rigel Ships Agencies, Inc., 432 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005).
We will disturb a district court’s refusal to change venue only for a clear abuse of discretion.
Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 255 (11th Cir. 1996).
We also review the district court’s denial of a motion for recusal for abuse of discretion.
Jenkins v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2019).
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, under Rule 12(b)(5), by applying a de novo standard to questions of law, and a clear error standard to the court’s findings of fact.
Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
But when a party fails to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations in a report and recommendation, he “waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
Under the circumstances, we review a claim on appeal only “for plain error,” if “necessary in the interests of justice.” Id.
We review the dismissal of a “shotgun” pleading under Rule 8 for abuse of discretion.
Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018).
When appropriate, we will review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.
Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1056–57 (11th Cir. 2007).
We will also review a dismissal
REWIND 2022-2008 IS STILL HAPPENIN’ – FREQUENTLY – THE GREATEST THEFT OF HOMES IN HISTORY
Deutsche Bank /PHH Ocwen case frozen in time after LIT article was published, highlighting the homeowner’s plea to jurisdiction. https://t.co/IsKUrHZ84n @dwnews @ewarren @RandPaul #txlege— lawsinusa (@lawsinusa) May 29, 2022
based on res judicata de novo.
Jang v. United Techs. Corp., 206 F.3d 1147, 1149 (11th Cir. 2000).
We review de novo a district court’s conclusions on collateral estoppel, but review its legal conclusion that an issue was actually litigated in a prior action for clear error.
Richardson v. Miller, 101 F.3d 665, 667–68 (11th Cir. 1996).
While pro se pleadings are liberally construed, issues not briefed on appeal are normally forfeited and we will generally not consider them.
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
An appellant can abandon a claim by:
(1) making only passing reference to it;
(2) raising it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority;
(3) referring to it only in the “statement of the case” or “summary of the argument”;
or
(4) referring to the issue as mere background to the appellant’s main arguments.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681– 82 (11th Cir. 2014).
In addition, if a district court’s order rested on two or more independent, alternative grounds, the appellant must challenge all of the grounds to succeed on appeal.
See id. at 680.
When an appellant fails to challenge on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.
See id.
II.
Liberally construed, Hunt’s brief on appeal seeks to challenge the district court’s decisions:
(1) denying remand of his case to state court
and
denying his request to file an amended complaint adding another defendant, Albertelli Law;
(2) denying his request
to transfer the case;
(3) denying his request to disqualify the judge;
(4) dismissing, without prejudice, his complaint as to defendant Bray for failure to effect proper service;
and
(5) dismissing his complaint, with prejudice, as to Deutsche Bank and Nationstar.
To be sure, Hunt’s arguments about these decisions by the district court are not clearly stated.
But even if we were to assume that he has preserved his arguments on appeal, they fail on the merits.
First, we are unpersuaded by Hunt’s arguments that the district court should have allowed him to file an amended complaint to add another party to the suit, which would have deprived the federal court of jurisdiction, and should have remanded the case to state court.
Federal courts have diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction when the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
A corporation is a citizen of every state where it was incorporated and the one state in which it has its principal place of business.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 133, 137 (2014); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
A defendant may remove any civil action brought in a state court to a federal district court that has original jurisdiction over the action.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
The removing party bears the burden of proving that removal jurisdiction exists.
McGee, 719 F.3d at 1241.
Here, the district court did not err in denying Hunt’s motion to remand. As we’ve held in a previous appeal, his motion was based on his belated and fraudulent attempts to join Albertelli Law, in an effort to defeat the district court’s diversity jurisdiction.
See Hunt I, 684 F. App’x. at 942-44.
However, Hunt asserted federal
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claims in his complaint, so the district court had jurisdiction in any event.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Accordingly, the district court correctly denied Hunt’s requests to remand the case and acted within its discretion to deny joinder.
Rigel Ships Agencies, Inc., 432 F.3d at 1291.
We also find no merit to Hunt’s claims that the district court should have transferred venue of his lawsuit.
A district court may transfer a civil action to any other district or division where it may have been brought “for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice.”
Robinson, 74 F.3d at 260 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
But in this case, the district court did not err because Hunt did not provide any cognizable reason for a transfer.
It appears that Hunt’s transfer request was based on his belief that case law in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia would be more favorable to him – which is not a legitimate reason for transfer.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Similarly, we reject Hunt’s argument that the district court judge should have recused himself.
A judge must sua sponte recuse himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or “
28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1).
“The test is whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”
Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988).
“Ordinarily, a judge’s rulings in the same or a related case may not serve as
the basis for a recusal motion.”
McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990).
“The judge’s bias must be personal and extrajudicial; it must derive from something other than that which the judge learned by participating in the case.”
Id.
“The exception to this rule is when a judge’s remarks in a judicial context demonstrate such pervasive bias and prejudice that it constitutes bias against a party. Mere friction . . . however, is not enough to demonstrate pervasive bias.”
Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
As the record before us makes clear, no “objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying” these circumstances “would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”
Parker, 855 F.2d at 1524.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hunt’s request for recusal or disqualification.
Nor do we find any merit to Hunt’s argument that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint against defendant Bray for lack of proper service.
When a federal court is considering the sufficiency of process after removal, it does so by looking to the state law governing process.
See Usatorres v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguenses, S.A., 768 F.2d 1285, 1286 n.1 (11th Cir. 1985).
Georgia law provides that service made “outside the state” of Georgia is to be done “in the same manner as service is made within the state.”
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94.
Under Georgia law, service on natural persons is to be made “personally, or by leaving copies thereof at the defendant’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent authorized . . . to receive service of process.”
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(7).
Notably, Hunt does not dispute these proposed findings set forth by the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), that Hunt:
(1) mailed service to Bray;
and
(2) completed “corporate service” on Deutsche Bank, which Hunt asserted was also effective to serve Bray.
11th Cir. R. 3-1.
But, as the district court determined, Georgia law applied here and required personal service in these circumstances.
Albra, 490 F.3d at 829; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(7).
Bray therefore was not properly served under Georgia law, and, for that reason, the district court did not err in dis- missing Hunt’s suit without prejudice as to Bray.
Finally, we find no error in the district court’s denial of injunctive relief and its dismissal of Hunt’s complaint against the two remaining defendants, Nationstar and Deutsche Bank.
A district court has the inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits, which includes the ability to dismiss a complaint on “shotgun” pleading grounds.
Shabanets, 878 F.3d at 1295.
We have described four types of “shotgun” com- plaints:
(1) those containing multiple counts where each count adopts all allegations of all preceding counts;
(2) those replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action;
(3) those that do not separate each cause of action or claim for relief into different counts;
and
(4) those asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015).
“Shotgun” pleadings violate Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), by failing to, in one degree or another, give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.
Shabanets, 878 F.3d at 1294–96.
We generally require district courts to allow a litigant at least one chance to remedy any deficiencies before dismissing the complaint with prejudice, where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.
See id.; Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019).
But it need not grant leave to amend the complaint when further amendment would be futile.
Silberman, 927 F.3d at 1133.
Under federal law, res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a subsequent action if
“(1) the prior decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) there was a final judgment on the merits;
(3) the parties were identical in both suits;
and
(4) the prior and present causes of action are the same.”
Jang, 206 F.3d at 1148– 49 & n.1 (quotation marks omitted).
We have held that “if a case arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts, or is based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action, the two cases are really the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action’ for purposes of res judicata.”
Baloco v. Drummond Co., Inc., 767 F.3d 1229, 1247 (11th
Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted).
“In addition, res judicata applies not only to the precise legal theory presented in the prior case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the nucleus of operative fact” that could have been raised in the prior case.
Id. (quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted).
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of a matter that has been litigated and decided.”
Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984).
Thus, “collateral estoppel is appropriate only when the identical issue has been fully litigated in a prior case.”
In re McWhorter, 887 F.2d 1564, 1567 (11th Cir. 1989) (quotation marks omitted).
“The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the necessary elements have been satisfied.”
Id. at 1566.
“[C]hanges in the law after a final judgment [generally] do not prevent the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel, even though the grounds on which the decision was based [may be] subsequently overruled.”
Precision Air Parts, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 736 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1984).
To safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745.
See S. Rep. No. 107-146, pp. 2–11 (2002).
The Act contains several provisions, including a whistleblower protection provision which prohibits a publicly traded company or its officers from discharging an “employee” for providing information to a supervisory authority about conduct that the employee
“reasonably believes” constitutes a violation of federal laws against mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, any SEC rule or regulation, or any provision of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
The Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower provision provides protection to individuals who provide “information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the” Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
Thus, “[t]o sue under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision, a person must first provide information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the [SEC].”
Dig. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 772–73 (2018) (quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted).
In his brief on appeal, Hunt does not expressly address the lower court’s “shotgun” pleading determination, and, as a result, the district court’s dismissal of the complaint is due to be affirmed.
Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681–82.
But in any event, the district court did not err in finding that his complaint was a “shotgun” pleading.
As the record reflects, the complaint consisted of three numbered paragraphs that spanned paragraphs and pages; failed to isolate claims by defendants;
and largely failed to discuss any facts — thereby falling into several of our identified categories of prohibited “shotgun” pleadings.
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23.
The district court also was correct that amendment would have been futile.
For one, res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Hunt’s claims for breach of contract and fraud, since Hunt sued the same parties for the same alleged breach of contract and fraud in several prior cases.
See, e.g., Hunt I, 684 F. App’x at 944.4
These decisions were final judgments and were “rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction,” “on the merits,” against the same parties, and “the prior and present causes of action [were] the same.”
Jang, 206 F.3d at 1149.
Moreover, even if some of Hunt’s claims had not been explicitly presented in any of his prior cases, they would still be barred by res judicata because every claim arose from the same facts as each of his prior cases, and he could have raised them in any of the prior proceedings.
Baloco, 767 F.3d at 1247.
Also, despite Hunt’s arguments, there have been no “changes in the law” that would “prevent the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel” in this case.
Precision Air Parts, 736 F.2d at 1503.
In addition, Hunt’s claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Dodd-Frank Act were futile because they fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
As the record reflects, Hunt did not allege that he was an “employee” under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, nor that he “provide[d] information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the [SEC]” as required under the Dodd-Frank Act.
4 To the extent that Hunt challenges the district court’s decisions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), we conclude that he has not identified any “extraordinary circumstances” entitling him to relief, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in this respect.
Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).
Somers, 138 S. Ct. at 772–74.
Accordingly, Hunt did not state a cause of action under these statutes, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.5
5 All of Hunt’s pending motions, which he filed after we imposed a filing restriction on him, are DENIED to the extent they request any relief.
For their part, Nationstar and Deutsche Bank have filed renewed motions for sanctions, requesting monetary sanctions against Hunt for his numerous motions before this Court under 11th Cir. R. 27-4.
Hunt is pro se and we DENY the motions for sanctions at this time.
See Woods v. I.R.S., 3 F.3d 403, 404 (11th Cir. 1993)
(“There can be no doubt that this is a frivolous appeal and we would not hesitate to order sanctions if appellant had been represented by counsel. However, since this suit was filed pro se, we conclude that sanctions would be inappropriate.”).
Although we are reluctant to impose sanctions on pro se appellants, we warn Hunt that our Court has imposed sanctions in circumstances like these, even for pro se litigants, and he is strongly cautioned against bringing any further frivolous motions or claims.
See Ricket v. United States, 773 F.2d 1214, 1216 (11th Cir. 1985)
(imposing sanctions on a pro se appellant who had been warned by the district court that the issues on appeal were frivolous).
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Appellate Circuit
God Goes in Front of Me and Makes the Crooked Straight and I Get to Keep My Pension
Ex-Inmate and Former Congresswoman Corrine Brown is Confident of Her Plea Deal Keepin’ Her out of Jail and Ending Her Criminal Case.
Former congresswoman Corrine Brown Update
JUL 28, 2024
On May 17, 2022, Corrine Brown pleaded guilty on the charges to avoid a second trial.
Former Congresswoman Brown was sentenced to the time that she had already served in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, specifically two years, eight months, and nine days.
Brown was also ordered to pay $62,650.99 in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service.
As of June 2024, the former member of Congress from Northeast Florida is looking for an interest-free payment plan for her federal debt. If accepted by the court, it sets the stage for Brown on the installment plan past her 82nd birthday.
Former congresswoman Corrine Brown to take plea deal
Brown faced retrial this fall on federal fraud charges
May 17, 2021 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: May 17, 2022
JACKSONVILLE, Fla. – Former congresswoman Corrine Brown is set to change her plea Wednesday in a federal case that involves charges of fraud and conspiracy, avoiding a retrial that was scheduled to take place this fall.
Tuesday morning, News4JAX reporter Jim Piggott spoke with Corrine Brown by phone. She said everything will come out in court tomorrow.
“I want you to know, God has been good to me,”
Brown said.
“I just talked to my pastor and I know that He goes in front of me and make the crooked straight. That’s all I can tell you, He’s good.”
Former U.S. Rep. Corrine Brown is set to change her plea Wednesday in a federal case that involves charges of fraud and conspiracy, avoiding a retrial that was scheduled to take place this fall.
Brown was indicted in 2016 on charges that included conspiracy, wire fraud, and tax fraud, on accusations that she used contributions to the One Door for Education charity for personal expenses.
Brown was convicted on some of the charges in May 2017, and began a five-year prison sentence in January 2018. Brown was released in April 2020, due to coronavirus concerns.
Following her conviction, Brown appealed the guilty verdict, arguing the trial judge wasn’t justified in replacing a juror who said the Holy Spirit told him Brown was not guilty.
A three-judge panel of the 11th Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals initially upheld Brown’s conviction.
Brown’s attorneys then asked for a rehearing before the full 11th Circuit, known as an “en banc” hearing. In May 2021, the appellate court reversed the conviction with a 7-4 decision, sending the case back to the district court for a potential retrial.
In October 2021, we learned that prosecutors planned to re-try Brown on the felony counts she faced in her 2017 trial.
At the time, we learned prosecutors had already extended her a plea deal to avoid being retried and the possibility of a return to prison, an offer she rejected at the time.
Following the appointment of a new defense team, Brown’s retrial was set to take place in September of 2022.
News4JAX Jim Piggott spoke with attorney Curtis Fallgatter,
“(Jim) Are you surprised at all?
(Curtis) A little bit, but not terribly because of the age of the case, the complexity of the case, the number of issues, reversal on appeal issues about a retrial, can I get a conviction, the age of Brown.”
The court document indicating that Brown will be changing her plea does not indicate what charges she may be pleading guilty to, or what sentence could potentially be imposed.
Fallgatter doesn’t believe Brown will serve any additional time.
He said she would not agree to that, and the agreement should be an end to the case.
Brown is getting her pension, and that likely will not change.
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