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Judge Barbara Hobbs Son is Arrested for Attempted Murder. Her ExtraJudicial Intervention is Granted

JQC panel acquitted Judge Barbara Hobbs of attempting to “arrange unmonitored and unrecorded contact” with her son in jail.



LIF Update (May 21, 2022)

Judge Hobbs keeps her Robe but has to pay a $30G fine on top of the whole 60 day suspension and other sanctions as detailed herein. Let us know in the comments if you agree or disagree with the Florida Supreme Court’s decision and order.

We also wanted to take this opportunity to update you on the more important case, the son’s criminal case and 3 charges. Unsurprisingly, a plea deal was reached where the prosecutors agreed that firing an AK47 into a closed closet where his girlfriend was cowering – and would sustain two severe gunshot wounds, they would drop the attempted murder and animal cruelty charges.

In short, he would receive 10 years, with credit for time served and followed by 5 years probation, rather than the more appropriate life sentence he should have received.

Supreme Court of Florida

No. SC20-605


May 19, 2022

Interrogation of Justin Haynes with Judge Hobbs in Attendance


We review the findings and recommendations of the Hearing Panel of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (Hearing Panel) concerning Circuit Judge Barbara Kaye Hobbs.

See art. V, 12, Fla. Const.

Following an evidentiary hearing on seven paragraphs (including subparagraphs) of charges, the Hearing Panel found Judge Hobbs guilty of the three charges for which she had conceded guilt and one additional charge, and recommended that she be publicly reprimanded, suspended from office without pay for sixty days, and compelled to attend an employee management program.

Before this Court, the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) argues that the Hearing Panel should have found Judge Hobbs guilty as to all of the charges and that the seriousness of her misconduct warrants harsher discipline, up to removal from the bench.

As explained below, we conclude that the Hearing Panel should have found Judge Hobbs guilty of one additional violation.

Although removal is not appropriate, we agree with the JQC that the recommended discipline is insufficient for the serious misconduct at issue.

Consequently, in addition to imposing the Hearing Panel’s recommended discipline, we order Judge Hobbs to pay a fine in the amount of $30,000.


Judge Hobbs has served as a circuit judge for the Second Judicial Circuit since 2012 and has no history of prior judicial misconduct.

On February 19, 2021, the Investigative Panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission (Investigative Panel) filed the Amended Notice of Formal Charges (Amended Notice) against her that is at issue in this proceeding, alleging violations of article V, section 13 of the Florida Constitution and multiple Canons of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct addressed below.

The charges against Judge Hobbs stemmed in part from events relating to her adult son.

In 2018, Judge Hobbs’s son was charged with misdemeanor DUI in Leon County, which is located within the Second Judicial Circuit.

Judge Hobbs retained an attorney to represent her son.

Shortly thereafter, Judge Hobbs assumed another judge’s docket, and on that docket were two cases where her son’s attorney was the attorney of record.

When the cases and her son’s attorney appeared before her, Judge Hobbs did not recuse herself nor did she disclose her connection with the attorney.

In one case, she granted an agreed motion for continuance. In the other, the parties announced they had agreed to enter a deferred prosecution agreement, and she set a new court date to ensure the agreement had been signed.

On the evening of July 29, 2019, Judge Hobbs’s son was arrested after allegedly shooting a person in his home.

After learning of the arrest, Judge Hobbs went to the police station where her son was being held.

Upon arrival, she asked to see her son but was told that only her son’s lawyer could meet with him.

Judge Hobbs responded to this by saying that she was her son’s lawyer and was then permitted to enter the interrogation room where her son was being held.

Judge Hobbs and her son had a nineteen- minute conversation which was unrecorded due to its privileged nature.

Judge Hobbs also stayed with her son while he was interviewed by police, and at several points interjected to ask clarifying questions or to advise her son.

At the end of the interview, Judge Hobbs asked the officers to release her son into her custody and expressed concerns about his safety because she had sentenced inmates in the same jail where he otherwise would be detained.

The officers stated that it would be impossible to release her son into her custody due to the nature of the charges against him, but that they were aware of the potential safety issues.

After leaving the police station, Judge Hobbs contacted the attorney who represented her son in his DUI matter, and he agreed to represent him again.

Although Judge Hobbs’s representation of her son ended at that point, Judge Hobbs’s legal assistant attended, and sat at counsel table during, his first appearance.

After the Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit learned that Judge Hobbs’s son had been arrested, he contacted Judge Hobbs to arrange a meeting.

During this meeting, Judge Hobbs explained that she had acted as her son’s attorney on the night of his arrest, and the Chief Judge advised her to report herself to the JQC, which she did on the same day.

The Chief Judge also explained to Judge Hobbs that he had viewed the video recording of her son’s first appearance and directed her to counsel her judicial assistant regarding the appearance of impropriety created by her presence at counsel table.

He also suggested that Judge Hobbs take some time off, and she agreed to do so.

Before taking her leave of absence, Judge Hobbs attempted to arrange a visit with her son.

Believing that in-person visitation was neither wise nor practical, the Court Administrator offered—with the approval of the Chief Judge—to help Judge Hobbs find a means of visiting her son. During this process, a program that would allow for video visitation was discussed, and Judge Hobbs asked the Court Administrator if he thought the visits would be recorded.

Concerned by the question, the Court Administrator ceased assisting Judge Hobbs and alerted the Chief Judge as to what had happened.

The record shows that after these events, which occurred on August 1 and 2, 2019, Judge Hobbs began communicating with her son using a different program, which is monitored and available to other members of the public.

On August 4, 2019, Judge Hobbs took her leave of absence.

Before doing so, however, she failed to admonish her judicial assistant as directed by the Chief Judge.

The next day, August 5, 2019, the judicial assistant attended a second hearing in Judge Hobbs’s son’s case and sat at counsel table for a second time.

Upon Judge Hobbs’s return on August 12, both she and her judicial assistant were summoned to the Chief Judge’s office for counseling.

After the meeting, the Chief Judge told Judge Hobbs that she should counsel her judicial assistant. Judge Hobbs declined and asked the Chief Judge to do it for her, and he agreed.

During the counseling session between the Chief Judge and the judicial assistant, the judicial assistant made a series of remarks, including that the Chief Judge was only “pretend[ing] to be sensitive to Judge Hobbs,” but then later “kick[ing] [her] in the butt.” The Chief Judge told Judge Hobbs that he believed her judicial assistant’s conduct during the meeting was grounds for termination. Judge Hobbs declined to terminate her judicial assistant but did counsel her on her conduct during the meeting.

On August 20, 2019, the mother of Judge Hobbs’s grandson visited Judge Hobbs in her office at the Leon County Courthouse.

Such visits were common and typically of a social nature because this individual worked in the public defender’s office, which is in the same building as Judge Hobbs’s chambers.

However, this time, the visitor brought a petition for injunction, which she had already completed and intended to file against the victim in the attempted murder case that was pending against Judge Hobbs’s son.

Judge Hobbs’s judicial assistant accompanied the visitor to the clerk’s office and showed her where the petition could be filed.

While at the clerk’s office, the judicial assistant also explained to the deputy clerk that the matter would need to be forwarded to a judge in the Third Judicial Circuit because of Judge Hobbs’s personal connection with the case.

The last incident involving Judge Hobbs’s judicial assistant related to Judge Hobbs’s son occurred on October 3, 2019, while Judge Hobbs was in Orlando appearing before a JQC investigative committee.

On October 3, Judge Hobbs’s son, who was out on bail, came to Judge Hobbs’s office looking for his grandfather’s health insurance papers.

Judge Hobbs’s son stated that he believed the papers were in Judge Hobbs’s office, which was in a secure part of the building.

The judicial assistant then gave her all-access security badge to Judge Hobbs’s son, who used the private elevator to access the restricted area, where he encountered an “unnerved” clerk who reported the incident.

Upon her return, Judge Hobbs learned of what happened and counseled her judicial assistant on the seriousness of her mistake—but allowed her to keep her job.

The rest of the charges stem from Judge Hobbs’s handling of certain emergency matters in family law cases and her related interactions with a case manager.

Based on the events summarized above, the case proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on seven paragraphs of charges, which are detailed below.

Judge Hobbs conceded guilt with respect to three charges pertaining to her actions on the night of her son’s arrest, but she contested the remaining charges.

The Hearing Panel found Judge Hobbs guilty of the three charges for which she had conceded guilt and another charge related to her failure to supervise her judicial assistant with respect to the judicial assistant’s presence at counsel table, and for these violations, recommended the discipline set forth above.

In response to the JQC’s argument that harsher discipline, potentially up to removal, is appropriate, Judge Hobbs urges the Court to approve the recommended discipline. Judge Hobbs also argues that the evidence does not support a finding of additional misconduct.


In judicial disciplinary hearings, the charges and conclusions of the Hearing Panel must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1977).

Clear and convincing evidence is “a standard which requires more proof than a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ but . . . less than ‘beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.’ ”

In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997) (quoting In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994)).

If the Hearing Panel’s findings meet this standard of evidence, we will give them great weight.

Graziano, 696 So. 2d at 753 (citing LaMotte, 341 So. 2d at 516).

However, we “may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the commission.”

Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const.

Our analysis begins with a review of the Hearing Panel’s findings relating to the charges alleged in paragraphs 1-7 of the Amended Notice.

We then address the recommended discipline.

Charges 1-3

The charges alleged against Judge Hobbs in paragraphs 1-3 of the Amended Notice were as follows:

1. Your son was taken into police custody on or about the early morning hours of July 30, 2019 as a result of an incident that occurred in his residence, in which your son allegedly shot a female acquaintance multiple times through a closed door.

Your son was taken to the Tallahassee Police Department (TPD) headquarters for an interview with police investigators.

You came to TPD headquarters and asked to see your son.

You were told by police that you would not be able to see your son unless you were representing him as his attorney.

You then told police investigators that you were representing your son as his attorney.

2. Acting as your son’s legal counsel, you requested and were permitted to consult with your son in the police interview room outside the presence of investigators and with the audio recording turned off.

You were also able to be present with your son during his formal interview with investigators.

During the interview, you participated by asking clarifying questions, and eventually telling your son to stop speaking.

3. At the time you represented your son, you were serving as a Circuit Judge in Leon County (Tallahassee), where you were assigned to preside over felony criminal cases.

Your son’s case has subsequently been assigned to the Third Judicial Circuit, and the Third Circuit State Attorney’s Office has charged him with attempted second-degree murder.

Your legal representation of your son violates Canons 1, 2, 5A(1), 5A(2), and 5G.[1]

1. Canon 1 requires a judge to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. Canon 2 requires a judge to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities. Canons 5A(1) and (2) provide that “[a] judge shall conduct all of the judge’s extra-judicial activities so that they do not: (1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially as a judge; [or] (2) undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.” Canon 5G precludes a judge from practicing law, except for in limited circumstances not relevant here.

With respect to all three charges, Judge Hobbs conceded and the Hearing Panel found, that her representation of her son violated Canons 1, 2, 5A(1), 5A(2), and 5G of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct.

Judge Hobbs’s admission that her conduct violated these canons satisfies the clear and convincing standard of evidence.

See In re Andrews, 875 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that a judge’s admission of misconduct is clear and convincing evidence).

Accordingly, we approve the Hearing Panel’s findings with respect to these charges.

Charge 4

The fourth charge against Judge Hobbs was as follows:

4. In spite of being advised to avoid the appearance of preferential treatment, you later attempted to arrange unmonitored and unrecorded telephonic and/or video access to your son while he was in jail.[2]

With respect to this charge, we accept the Hearing Panel’s finding that the evidence presented below falls short of the clear

2. The Amended Notice does not specify which Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct Judge Hobbs allegedly violated in this charge.

and convincing standard of proof. See Davey, 645 So. 2d at 404 (accepting, as supported by clear and convincing evidence, findings based on “direct, unequivocal, and consistent” testimony that was “logical and supported by written evidence” where the conflicting testimony was “vague, indecisive, and unsupported”).

The evidence presented below was of a highly speculative nature and largely consisted of the Court Administrator’s assumption that Judge Hobbs might be attempting to obtain preferential treatment in visiting her son.

In contrast, the record shows that, with the exception of the events that occurred on the night of her son’s arrest addressed in charges 1 through 3, Judge Hobbs visited her son just like any other member of the public and was monitored when doing so.

Accordingly, we accept the Hearing Panel’s finding with respect to this charge.

Charge 5

The fifth charge against Judge Hobbs consisted of two parts, as follows:

5. At the time your son was arrested on July 30, 2019, he had a misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence (DUI) case pending in Leon county court.

Attorney Gary Roberts filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of your son in that case on Oct. 4, 2018.

After accepting representation of your son in the DUI case, Mr. Roberts appeared before you on behalf of clients in two separate felony criminal matters:

a. [In the first case,] . . . [o]n May 29, 2019, Mr. Roberts appeared before you, on behalf of [the defendant], at a Case Management Conference.

The court records indicate that at this hearing you set a trial date for September 16, 2019.

Shortly after the May hearing, on June 26, 2019, Mr. Roberts filed a motion to dismiss the charges.

Mr. Robert’s motion and proposed order were directed specifically to you, by name, as the presiding judge, however, prior to ruling on the motion you were transferred out of the criminal division on August 2, 2019, by amendment to Administrative Order 2018-04.

b. [In the second case,] . . . [the defendant] was charged with the felony offense of organized scheme to defraud.

She was also represented by Mr. Roberts, who appeared before you on June 10, 2019 for a Plea Hearing.

During this hearing, it was announced that the State Attorney and the defendant had agreed to enter into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA).

You set a new court date of July 10, 2019, to make sure the DPA had been signed.

On August 2, 2019 you were transferred out of the criminal division by amendment to Administrative Order 2018-04.

Your failure to recuse yourself from criminal cases where the defendant’s attorney of record was (at the same time) also representing your son in a separate criminal matter was improper, and violates Canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), 3E(1).3

The Hearing Panel found Judge Hobbs not guilty for failing to recuse herself from these two cases based on its conclusion that her actions in the cases were de minimis.

Because the alleged misconduct is based upon Judge Hobbs’s failure to recuse herself, but the record does not clearly and convincingly establish that recusal was required in either case, we approve the Hearing Panel’s finding.

However, we note that we would have decided this issue differently had the alleged misconduct been Judge Hobbs’s failure to disclose that the attorney appearing before her in the two cases at issue also represented her son.

The commentary to Canon 3E(1) explains that even where a judge’s disqualification is not automatically required, a judge “should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification even if

3. Canons 1 and 2 were addressed in note 1, supra. Canon 3B(1) provides that “[a] judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required.” Canon 3E(1) requires a judge to “disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification.”

Moreover, where disqualification is required, the plain language of the rule does not include a “de minimis” exception.

Charge 6

The sixth charge against Judge Hobbs alleged that she had failed to appropriately supervise her judicial assistant in three respects, as follows:

6. You have failed to appropriately supervise your Judicial Assistant (JA) in violation of Canons 1, 2, 3C(1), and 3C(2).[4] To wit:

a. Your failure to adequately supervise has allowed your JA to inappropriately interpose herself in your son’s pending criminal case and violate security protocols. For example:

i. Your JA was present at counsel table during a court hearing in your son’s case.

4. Canons 1 and 2 were addressed in note 1, supra. Canon 3C(1) provides that “[a] judge shall diligently discharge the judge’s administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and should cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of court business.” Canon 3C(2) provides that “[a] judge shall require staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of their official duties.”

ii. Your JA assisted the mother of your son’s child with filing an injunction against the victim in your son’s pending criminal case, during work hours.

iii. Your JA provided your son with her security badge, which permitted him access [to] secure and/or non-public parts of the courthouse.[5]

The Hearing Panel found that Judge Hobbs was guilty of charge 6(a)(i) related to her judicial assistant’s appearance at counsel table, but not guilty of charge 6(a)(ii) related to her assistant’s involvement with the filing of an injunction against the victim in the son’s attempted murder case or charge 6(a)(iii) related to her judicial assistant’s security badge.

Context is crucial for these charges.

The evidence was both clear and convincing that Judge Hobbs’s judicial assistant used her position of trust to preferentially promote the individual interests of the judge’s family and did not appear to understand that her duty and our ethical rules required that she neither attempt to influence the outcome of the criminal charges pending against the judge’s son

  1. The Amended Notice lists these charges as 6(a)(i)-(iii), even though there is no charge 6(b).

nor grant a privilege or courtesy to him that would not be equally extended to any other criminal defendant.

Judge Hobbs knew of the serious ethical breach by her judicial assistant and took no steps to counsel her, even after being directed by her chief judge to do so.

Because of this failing, our rules appropriately hold Judge Hobbs responsible for all of the actions of her assistant that could have been avoided if she had taken appropriate action—which was her ethical obligation.

See In re Murphy, 181 So. 3d 1169, 1177 (Fla. 2015) (explaining that the high ethical standard to which judges are held safeguards the public’s confidence in the judiciary).

Regarding charge 6(a)(i), clear and convincing evidence supports the Hearing Panel’s finding that Judge Hobbs failed to appropriately supervise her judicial assistant when Judge Hobbs failed to immediately admonish her judicial assistant regarding her presence at the first appearance in time to prevent the recurrence of the same conduct at a subsequent hearing.

Although Judge Hobbs did not concede misconduct below, she no longer disputes the finding of guilt as to this charge and instead urges the Court to accept the Hearing Panel’s findings and recommendations.

See In re Diaz, 908 So. 2d 334, 337 (Fla. 2005) (explaining that when “the JQC’s findings are undisputed [the] Court will ordinarily conclude that the JQC’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence”) (citing Andrews, 875 So. 2d at 442).

Regarding charge 6(a)(ii), the record also supports the Hearing Panel’s finding that Judge Hobbs is not guilty of misconduct related to the fact that her judicial assistant escorted a visitor to the clerk’s office to file a petition for injunction.

Judge Hobbs testified at the evidentiary hearing that when the visitor came to her chambers, she had already filled out the paperwork she planned to file.

The only action Judge Hobbs’s judicial assistant took was to accompany the visitor to the clerk’s office and point out with which deputy clerk the visitor should file the paperwork.

The court clerk testified below that she recalled no discussion with either Judge Hobbs or her judicial assistant regarding the petition for injunction.

We agree with the Hearing Panel that these facts do not present clear and convincing evidence of misconduct.

Cf. In re Holloway, 832 So. 2d 716, 728 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that a phone call to a detective by the judge did not amount to exploitation of judicial office because nothing improper was discussed on the call).

However, with respect to charge 6(a)(iii), the Hearing Panel wrongly concluded that there is not clear and convincing evidence to find Judge Hobbs guilty of misconduct based on her judicial assistant’s actions regarding the security badge.

The Hearing Panel based this finding on its conclusion that the judicial assistant’s conduct was “so beyond the mainstream and improbable as to be unforeseeable by anyone.”

We disagree with this reasoning.

Although it may not have occurred to Judge Hobbs that her judicial assistant would improperly prefer her son, then a criminal defendant, in this particular way, it was certainly foreseeable that her assistant’s failure to understand her own ethical obligations could result in other similar ethical breaches involving the judge’s son.

The record clearly demonstrates a lack of perspective, sense of propriety, and professional judgment by the judicial assistant where Judge Hobbs’s son is concerned.

Further, the record shows that Judge Hobbs was well aware of these problems and failed in her obligation to properly supervise her judicial assistant.

Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to hold Judge Hobbs accountable for her own failure to supervise, even if the specific preference given to her son may have seemed improbable before it occurred.

Charge 7

The seventh charge against Judge Hobbs consisted of four parts, as follows:

7. It is also alleged that you have failed to issue timely orders and decisions on certain emergency matters in violation of Canons 1, 2, and 3B(8)[6]:

a. In [the first case,] an emergency motion was filed in a paternity case on September 19, 2019 and an expedited motion was filed on September 20, 2019. As of October 21, 2019, you had not issued an order determining whether or not the motions qualify as emergencies.

b. In [the second case], an emergency petition for temporary custody was filed August 29, 2019, and no determination had been made as of October 21, 2019.

c. In [the third case,] [y]ou determined that the matter was an emergency and court staff contacted your JA to schedule the matter for an emergency hearing. This occurred on August 21, 2019. Court staff reported that your JA refused to schedule the matter, stating, “I don’t have time for this shit,” and

6. Canons 1 and 2 were addressed in note 1, supra. Canon 3B(8) requires a judge to “dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly.”

explaining that she was not going to look up or contact the petitioner to obtain addresses for all parties in order to set a hearing.

The JA indicated to staff that she would have you review this again and deem it a non-emergency for referral to a magistrate.

Subsequently, the same emergency motion was filed again with a stamp indicating that it was not an emergency.

d. After receiving the Commission’s Amended Notice of Investigation outlining the allegations in paragraph 7(a)-(c), you summoned a case manager to your chambers and interrogated her about the source of the Commission’s information.

The Hearing Panel found that the evidence presented against Judge Hobbs with respect to these charges did not clearly and convincingly establish violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as Judge Hobbs “was not seeking the source of the investigative charges, and was actually trying to determine what was happening in these cases.”

We acknowledge the closeness of these issues, particularly as they largely implicate additional questionable conduct by Judge Hobbs’s judicial assistant caused by Judge Hobbs’s failure to supervise her.

However, given the superior vantage point of the Hearing Panel in evaluating the testimony and weighing the evidence related to these charges, we accept its finding that Judge Hobbs is not guilty of any of the misconduct alleged in paragraph 7.


Having analyzed the Hearing Panel’s findings and conclusions, we now review its recommended discipline.

Although the Court “gives the findings and recommendations of the JQC great weight,”

In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 85 (Fla. 2003), “the ultimate power and responsibility in making a determination rests with [the] Court,” LaMotte, 341 So. 2d at 516.

In urging us to impose a harsher sanction than the Hearing Panel’s recommended discipline, the JQC suggests that Judge Hobbs’s misconduct demonstrates unfitness to hold judicial office that warrants removal.

We disagree.

Removal is the most severe form of discipline a judge may face, and it is typically reserved for when a judge intentionally commits “serious and grievous wrongs of a clearly unredeeming nature.”

Id. at 517; see, e.g., In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 566-67, 572-73 (Fla. 2001)

(removing a judge for violating the “fundamental principles of judicial ethics” when he explicitly and implicitly stated that he would show favor to certain groups and made false and disparaging comments about his opponent in the race for the judgeship);

Graziano, 696 So. 2d at 746-47

(removing a judge with a history of prior discipline when she used her office for personal gain and interfered with courthouse operations);

In re Henson, 913 So. 2d 579, 594 (Fla. 2005)

(removing a judge who agreed to represent a client while a sitting judge and then for advising that client to flee the country in order to evade justice);

In re Hawkins, 151 So. 3d 1200, 1213 (Fla. 2014)

(removing a judge who was found guilty of evading taxes, exploiting her judicial office to promote her business, and making false and misleading statements during a deposition while being investigated for judicial misconduct).

However, we do agree with the JQC that the recommended discipline is insufficient.

Although we are not unsympathetic to Judge Hobbs’s family situation, her violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct demonstrate a failure of judgment and a lack of appropriate boundaries between her judicial office and her personal life that cannot be tolerated in members of our judiciary.

See In re Frank, 753 So. 2d 1228, 1241 (Fla. 2000)

(“[A] ‘judge is a judge 7 days a week, 24 hours a day.’ ” (quoting JQC’s findings)).

Our constitution affords us great leeway in determining the appropriate discipline, see art. V, § 12, Fla. Const., and we have previously imposed fines in addition to suspensions in other cases where serious misconduct warranted “something less than removal from office.”

In re Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d 857, 861 (Fla. 2002);

see also James R. Wolf, Judicial Discipline in Florida:

The Cost of Misconduct, 30 Nova L. Rev. 349, 391 (2006)

(“Suspension and fines are imposed in those tough cases where the misconduct is serious but where the standards for removal have not been met.”).

As Judge Hobbs’s misconduct goes to the heart of the public’s ability to trust Florida’s judges to separate their personal lives and relationships from their official duties, in addition to imposing the Hearing Panel’s recommended discipline, we order Judge Hobbs to pay a fine of $30,000.


We approve the findings of misconduct made by the Hearing Panel. Additionally, contrary to the Hearing Panel’s finding, we further conclude that clear and convincing evidence establishes that Judge Hobbs failed to properly supervise her judicial assistant, which resulted in the judge’s son improperly accessing restricted areas of the courthouse while serious criminal charges were pending against him.

Regarding discipline, in light of the serious nature of the misconduct at issue, we add a fine to the Hearing Panel’s recommendation.

Specifically, Judge Hobbs is suspended for sixty days without pay and ordered to pay a fine of $30,000.

The fine shall be paid to the Office of the State Courts Administrator within 180 days from the issuance of this opinion.

The effective date of the suspension shall be on a date within thirty days of the issuance of this opinion as determined by the Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit.

Once the effective date of the suspension is determined, the Court Administrator for the Second Judicial Circuit shall submit a personnel action request (PAR) form to the Personnel Office of the Office of the State Courts Administrator for processing.

We further order Judge Hobbs to attend an employee management program to be completed within one year of the date of the issuance of this opinion. We also command Judge Hobbs to appear before this Court for the administration of a public reprimand at a time to be set by the Clerk of this Court.

It is so ordered.



Original Proceeding – Judicial Qualifications Commission

Honorable Michelle Morley, Chair, and Alexander J. Williams, General Counsel, Judicial Qualifications Commission, Tallahassee, Florida; and Lauri Waldman Ross of Ross & Girten, Counsel to the Hearing Panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission, Miami, Florida, for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner Roosevelt Randolph and Errol H. Powell of Knowles & Randolph, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Judge Barbara Kaye Hobbs, Respondent

Tallahassee Judge Barbara Hobbs urges state Supreme Court to stick with 60-day suspension

Hobbs has been accused of improperly getting involved after her son’s arrest.

AUG 9, 2021 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: SEP 5, 2021

Tallahassee Circuit Judge Barbara Hobbs is suggesting the Florida Supreme Court stick with a recommendation that she be suspended for 60 days and face a public reprimand for ethics violations.

Hobbs has been accused by the Judicial Qualifications Commission of improperly getting involved after her son Justin Haynes arrest in Tallahassee on attempted second-degree murder charges, among other charges.

Her attorney, Roosevelt Randolph, wrote in a filing last week that a hearing panel recommended a harsher penalty against his client than had been administered in other cases.

The panel in June found her guilty of inappropriately “representing” her son while he was being interrogated by the Tallahassee Police Department, an issue called a “serious ethical question” by Chief Judge Jonathan Sjostrom during Hobbs’ hearing.

But the same panel also acquitted her of other ethics charges, including that she tried to “arrange unmonitored and unrecorded contact” with her son in jail.

Nonetheless, the commission’s general counsel, Alexander Williams, wrote in his own filing that

“Hobbs’ conduct was inappropriate (and) did not promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”

Hobbs was first elected in 2012 to the 2nd Circuit bench, which covers Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty and Wakulla counties. She currently handles family law cases in Leon County, according to an administrative order.

The court is on its summer hiatus, with the regular release of opinions resuming Aug. 26, 2021. Time-sensitive cases still can be released at any time, spokesman Craig Waters has said.


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Editors Choice

A Message for Felon Francis Santa: We Cannot Be Bribed. Stop the Harassment

Once a person has been convicted of a felony, he or she can be considered a felon for life, according to the strict meaning of the word.



Dear Santa…..

DEC. 12., 2022

We’ve set aside your plethora of harassing emails and bribes for many months. Indeed, we have never contacted the ex-wife below, who is desperate to provide more unfavorable information about you, Francis “Frank” Santa.

But now your emails are becoming both incessant and threatening, which means we have to publish all the information for our own safety.

You are a convicted felon Francis “Frank” Santa. Considering your stalking behavior, that makes you a very dangerous and untrustworthy person.

We are stating in this public forum: cease and desist from your writings, threats and stop tryin’ to bribe us with “donations”  – which are not donations as they are based on LIF and LIT removing an article about you, which is based on the real truth, no bull.

And remember Francis Santa, you are the one who came charging at us with a takedown request for the Ringel’s, indicted in NYC.

In return, all we did was google you and your business to find out who we were dealin’ with.

That’s when we discovered the information about your criminal past, which was recovered from publicly accessible information.

LIF and LIT didn’t ‘destroy’ you Frank, you did that all by yourself.

May 17, 2022


Francis Santa



I am coming hat in hand to you for help.


Dear Sir/Madam,

I am sincerely and humbly asking you for help. I do not know who I upset to find myself being personally punished on your website but there my be a good reason for which an apology on my part may be need.

If I have wronged someone there I am deeply sorry.

I am a spiritual person and have worked very hard to get to where I am in my life after having my world destroyed 11 years ago.

I have changed and I take responsibility for all my past issues, but more important to me now in life is that if I have done something to someone to offended them even without knowing why, I apologize and more forward.

Please contact me back by email or phone (305)967-3168 so I can make amends.

I do know who has so much dislike for me and took the time to hurt my wife, children and grandchildren and me and but I must have hurt them deeply for the posting to be put up about me.

Last, please understand I am not asking for sympathy or asking you to remove it.

If I have harmed someone in the last 6 years and I am wrong for something I personal did then I deserve it but also if I did nothing I don’t.

Again, please contact me and tell me what I have to do to make things right and discuses this.

Very Respectfully,


Jun 9, 2022


Francis Santa



Need your help


Dear Sir/Madam,

I sent an email to and did not receive a response.

I really need your help, please see attached.


Jul 22, 2022





Francis Frank Santa


I read with great interest your article on my former spouse – what you don’t know is that Mr. Santa is currently in arrears for child support in the amount of $196,000.

I can provide documentation for proof.

I find it quite amusing that this man cries poor mouth, continues to hide assets, resides in a gated community in Boca Raton and has started this bogus foundation.

Leopards do not change their spots –

You do realize he also spent 5 of a 15 year bid in NYS prison for a credit repair scam in which he stole 2.5 MILLION; was prosecuted by DA Morgenthau’s office and was ultimately released to the state of Florida for his parole and probation.

Probation doesn’t give a rat’s ass about what he is doing.

Child Support enforcement doesn’t give a rats ass and good luck trying to get in touch with someone.

I will never see that money he owes – – I can’t even get a life insurance policy on him – something he was to provide for his FIRST born – not the other children he has – one of which is a convicted counterfeitter.

I encourage LIF to contact me.

October 13, 2022


Francis Santa



Need your help ( )


I sent you an email many months ago.

I have put my life back together.

The past 11 years I have paid dearly for what happen.

My family has suffered the most because of the issue.

As for myself I feel that what I went threw changed me and made me a better person and took me off a bad path.

I am trying so hard to move on.

Your article about me is destroying my family.

Please contact me back to see if you can help me in some way to remove or de-index this.

I do understand that you spent a tremendous in research and time posting this.

I have no problem paying and administrative fees that you need.

I am coming to you with hat in hand for your help

Where Is He Now? Fraudster Francis Santa Was Sentenced to 88 Months for Conspiracy



December 1, 2022

Donor Comment: I wanted to donate more and will each month when I have extra money.

December 1, 2022

Donor Comment: I would like to also advertise with you.

December 8, 2022


francis santa where is he now


the former mrs santa <>

Submitted on: Dec 8, 2022 at 20:26


the former mrs santa



francis santa where is he now



ha ha now he is offering a scholarship???

lol scam people into giving money to his “foundation” that isn’t a 501c3 – so he can give it to “other” charities. Why don’t I just donate to them myself and get the tax write off?

are people that stupid?

December 8, 2022










December 12, 2022

 I am waiting patiently to talk to you regarding your posting on LIF.  I am being as respectful as I can at this time.

 I know you own the site along with LIT and you are responsible for the posting.

You have turned my life upside down for no reason.  The internet can be very cruel.

I have suffered enough with my family and you have put my life in danger.

I could understand if I did something wrong but that is not the case.

Please remove the posting or de-index it from the search engines.  I am not the only person you did this to for no reason.

 What I find interesting is that you are a media company helping people and you are also a company that destroys people.

Do your clients know this?

All I want is for you to remove the posting.

You have hurt me for more than 9 months.

I think that you made your point (whatever it was)

Donor Comment: Thank you

Boca man pleads guilty to conspiring to bribe bankers and fake financial documents

AUG 9, 2011 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: APR 22, 2022

WEST PALM BEACH — The owner of a Boca Raton company pleaded guilty Wednesday to conspiring to bribe local bankers and falsify financial documents to secure more than $1.5 million in fraudulent small business loans and lines of credit.

Francis Santa admitted orchestrating what federal prosecutors have described as an unique form of fraud: enlisting corrupt bankers to approve business loans for clients with poor credit histories. Santa and his employees at Palm Beach Business Consultants attempted to push through more than $10 million in bogus loans and lines of credit since the firm opened in 2003, according to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

After federal authorities caught on to Santa’s scheme, he began working with them and agreed to introduce an undercover FBI agent to the bankers. The sting culminated in January with the arrests of 15 people, including Santa, a Broward Schools assistant principal, a former Broward Sheriff’s investigative aide and seven Broward and Palm Beach bankers.


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Editors Choice

We’re Circlin’ Back Re the Many Complaints Against Storm Damaged Florida Lawyer Scot Strems

The clients of Strems may have discovered that the insurance company was not denying their claim and they could resolve it themselves without paying 25% of the undisputed amounts to the law firm.



LIF Commentary

Our sister website, initially followed the Strems cases from 2020 and his surprising loan of over $1.2M from JPMorgan Chase, which we are unable to confirm has been forgiven or not (the lack of detail in this regard makes us believe it HAS been 100% forgiven).

This is galling when you take into account the type of business Strems was conducting and the 25% fee he was charging clients for sums these clients could obtain directly from the insurer without a lawyer, or more importantly the 25% fee.

The complaint below is detailed and very long.

The referee, which is a judge by the name of Dawn Denaro of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida is a huge fan of Scot Strems.

So much so, the once available youtube video (via the court’s own channel) of the disciplinary proceedings via zoom re Strems has been taken offline, and is labeled a ‘private video‘, despite all the incessant claims of TRANSPARENCY by the judiciary.

Y’all are lyin’ Outlaws in Dirty Black Robes at the Judiciary, that’s for sure.

Moving on, after reading this complaint, it’s pretty much a copycat of the Allan Campbell complaint we highlighted recently.

LIF is still penning more articles about Campbell’s case, and the rogue legal associates and felons he was involved with.

In that case, the Supreme Court incorrectly sanctioned Campbell to a short 3-year suspension.

We believe his actions warranted disbarment.

Here, like Campbell, Strems has several complaints ongoing, so we’ll see how the judiciary react in due course.  However, in our opinion, we agree with the Bar, it should be disbarment for Scot Strems, if justice is to be served.

Suspended attorney Strems at disbarment trial; New Bar petition says he violated suspension order – Again, this time pertainin’ to ‘Sale’ of Business.

Originally Published; Feb 1, 2022 | Republished by LIT; May 31, 2022


The Bar seeks review of the Referee’s report that recommends this Court deny a petition for contempt filed against Mr. Strems.

This Court entered an emergency suspension order on June 9, 2020, in Case No. SC20-808. (ROR p.3).

That case is currently pending on review with the Referee recommending a two-year suspension.

The Bar is seeking disbarment.

Two other subsequent disciplinary cases are also pending in SC20-842 and SC20-1739.

At the time of this suspension, Mr. Strems was the sole stockholder in The Strems Law Firm.

He had 5000 to 7000 clients and more than 100 employees, including about 30 lawyers.

(ROR p.3, T145, 319).

During the thirty-day window provided in the suspension order before he had to cease representing clients, with the help of outside counsel, Mr. Strems changed the name of his law firm to The Property Advocates, P.A.

(ROR p.69).

He had his professional association issue new, additional stock, which was sold on July 9, 2020, to three of his employee-attorneys.

(ROR p. 69).

They became the new officers of the professional association.

Simultaneously, he entered into a stock redemption agreement with the professional association

(ROR p. 70, TFB-Ex. B, p. 84).

Mr. Strems sent a letter to his clients, dated July 1, 2020, describing these events and attaching the suspension order.


The letter did not advise them of their right to seek other counsel, and it provided notice of his suspension in a manner that the Bar maintains was misleading.

The Referee is recommending that the petition for contempt be denied because she concluded that Mr. Strems did not sell his law practice for purposes of Rule 4-1.17 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Bar maintains this is a sale for purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and that the July 1 letter also violated the suspension order and Rules 4-1.4 and 4-8.4(c).


The Bar filed a petition for emergency suspension in Case No. SC20- 808 on June 5, 2020.

It alleged that Mr. Strems had violated numerous rules of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.

The focus of this first petition was misconduct during litigation by Mr. Strems and his associates.

It alleged several violations of Rule 4-5.1 relating to his duties to supervise the lawyers in his law firm and to take reasonable steps to assure those lawyers conformed to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Referee has recommended that Mr. Strems be found guilty of those violations and has recommended a two-year suspension.

That proceeding is still pending on review with Mr. Strems challenging the findings of guilt and with the Bar seeking disbarment.

This Court entered the emergency suspension order on June 9, 2020.

(ROR p.3).

The standard language of this order states that “Respondent is suspended from the practice of law until further order of this Court.”

But the standard language also states that he must “cease representing any clients after thirty days of this Court’s order.”


It requires that he “immediately furnish a copy of Respondent’s suspension order to all clients.”


It is undisputed that Mr. Strems was the sole owner of Strems Law Firm, a professional association.

This firm had expanded rapidly from 2016 to the time of the emergency suspension.

The estimates of the number of clients that needed to be furnished a copy of the suspension order varied between 5000 and 7000.

(T145, 319).

The professional association employed about 30 lawyers and had a much larger number of unlicensed employees at the time of the suspension.

(ROR p. 3).

These employees worked under Mr. Strems’ supervision in a highly computer-dependent structure of separate teams to on-board clients, handle claims before suit, and handle claims after suit.

Mr. Strems’ standard “contingency fee retainer agreement” defined “attorney” as “The Strems Law Firm, P.A.”


Mr. Strems’ signature was normally the signature on the agreement that was sent to the client by the on-board team because he was the only lawyer who was actually a member of the law firm.


The contract does not specify any lawyer who will handle a matter, and no lawyer was in direct privity with the client under the terms of the contract.

But Mr. Strems recognized that he needed to notify all of these clients of his suspension.


1 During the final hearing, the fee agreement that was primarily discussed was the Evans contract, which is actually Respondent’s Exhibit 1 in SC20- 1739.


When a member of a professional association becomes “legally disqualified to render such professional services,” that member must “sever all employment with, and financial interests in, such corporation.”

See § 621.10, Fla. Stat.

Thus, it is undisputed in this case that Mr. Strems had to sever his ties with the Strems Law Firm to comply fully with this Court’s order.

Mr. Strems and Strems Law Firm hired two professionals to assist in this process.

Mr. Scott K. Tozian, who is an attorney who specializes in representation of attorneys in disciplinary proceedings, was actually hired a month before this Court issued its suspension order.


He recommended that Mr. Strems divest his interest in Strems Law Firm.


He also recommended that Mr. Strems and the Strems Law Firm hire Mr. William Kalish to help with this process because Mr. Kalish is a tax lawyer who also has experience with compliance with the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.

(T296-98, 406).

Mr. Kalish was retained to be the receiver to handle funds in the trust accounts and other accounts that Mr. Strems could no longer handle as a suspended lawyer.


He was also retained to address the need to sever Mr. Strems ties to the Strems Law Firm.


Mr. Kalish recommended that Mr. Strems divest himself of ownership in the professional association, and that the ownership should be placed “simultaneously” with three lawyers who had worked for the firm for at least a few years.

(T428-29, 500).

He did not recommend selling Mr. Strems’ stock directly to the three lawyers.

Instead, the full transfer of ownership was structured by having the professional association “redeem” Mr. Strems stock

(T426, TFB-Ex. B p. 84).

(TFB-Ex. B p. 84).

The professional association also issued new shares of stock that were simultaneously delivered to the three new owners of the association so that there would be no gap in ownership, membership, or in the officers required for the corporate entity.


(TFB-Ex. B p. 6-3, 33-35, 70-77, 129-34)

A few days before this transaction, the professional association changed its name to eliminate the reference to Mr. Strems and to substitute the more generic,

The Property Advocates, P.A.


To be clear, the Bar is not challenging this structure as a method for Mr. Strems to transfer ownership from himself to the three new owners.

Although in the petition and at the hearing, the Bar questioned the authority of Mr. Strems, as a suspended lawyer, to take actions for Strems Law Firm during the 30-day window in which he could have performed limited representation of his clients, the Referee ruled against the Bar on that issue.

Likewise, the Bar challenged whether “immediate” required faster action on some steps, but the Referee ruled against the Bar on that issue as well.

The Bar is not challenging those rulings in this review.

The Bar is challenging whether this transaction is a “sale of a law practice” for purposes of the requirement to notify clients under Rule 4- 1.17(b).

Mr. Strems did not comply with those requirements.

The Referee considered the conflicting legal opinions of two experts, (ROR pp. 79-106), as well as the conflicting legal arguments of the lawyers, and concluded that this transaction did not qualify as a sale for purposes of Rule 4-1.17.

The Referee found that it was a “mere changing of the guard” that “did not implicate Rule 4-1.17 or constitute a ‘sale of a law firm’ (sic) for purposes of Rule 4-1.17.”

(ROR p. 118)

This issue will be further addressed in the argument section because the facts are not really in dispute and the question is one of law for this Court to decide.

When Mr. Strems received the suspension order, his employees began working to obtain an accurate mailing list for the many clients.


By July 1, 2020, Mr. Strems had drafted a letter to send to the list of clients along with this Court’s order.

(TFB-Ex. C Contempt).

The one-page letter is an exhibit in evidence and in this brief’s appendix, but it is copied here as well:

Mr. Kalish testified that he had no role in creating this letter.


He explained that, while he did not think it was compelled by the rules, he probably would have added language about the possibility of a client changing firms.


He believed the clients “should know what’s going on.”


As he explained:

But the proper way would be that the clients would also assent to any arrangements of the various lawyer too, I believe.


Mr. Tozian testified that he did not believe his office drafted this letter, but he was relatively certain that he saw it before it went out.


He did not think the letter was an issue.

But, suffice it to say, the letter was not a plain, simple statement:

I regret to inform you that I was suspended from the practice of law on June 9, 2020. To comply with the Florida Supreme Court’s order, attached to this letter is a copy of that suspension order.

Although I can no longer represent you and will no longer be a member of this law firm after July 9, efforts are being taken so that the lawyers who work for this law firm can continue to represent you. They will contact you in the very near future. You, of course, also have the right to retain other counsel if you choose to do so.

The Bar maintains that Mr. Strems’ letter was not full compliance with this Court’s order and that it provided misleading and incomplete information to the clients in an effort to keep them with the reconstituted law firm that was obligated to make payments to Mr. Strems for a decade.

The Referee rejected the Bar’s position and ultimately is recommending that this Court find Mr. Strems not guilty of contempt and not guilty of the several violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct that are inherent in the conduct alleged in the petition for contempt.

The Referee recommends that each party bear their own costs.

Similar to the Reports of Referee in SC20-842 and SC20-1739, the Referee’s lengthy report in this case ends with a hypothetical recommendation for a penalty if this Court rejects the Referee’s recommendation of not guilty.

That recommendation is either an admonishment or a public reprimand, “concurrent with the previously recommended sanctions,” and the payment of costs.


The Bar maintained in the petition and at the hearing that Mr. Strems violated this order because he did not file a motion to withdraw in any of the cases filed by his law firm.


Instead, the reconstituted law firm filed a “notice of change of firm name and email addresses” that included the sentence:

“Any other Attorneys of Record should be removed as counsel of record on behalf of Plaintiff.”

(TFB-Ex. H Contempt).

Although this notice and the response of defense counsel resulted in stays and delays of litigation, these events occurred after Mr. Strems had withdrawn from the firm.

There is evidence of at least two cases that remained pending with Mr. Strems listed as counsel of record,

(T176, TFB-Ex-K & L Contempt).2

The Referee rejected the Bar’s position on this issue, and the Bar has chosen not to seek review of that decision.

It wishes to focus this review on the two issue that can arise in other emergency suspensions: whether such a transfer of a one-lawyer professional association is a sale for purposes of Rule 4.1-17, and whether the letter providing the suspension order complied with the suspension order and the Rules of Professional Conduct.

2 One case is Eduardo Mora v. United Property & Casualty Ins. Co., Case No. 17-010198 CA 13 in the 11th Circuit.

Judge Bokor held a hearing in that case on August 12, 2020.

The transcript on page 29 reflects that the judge was concerned that Mr. Strems was still counsel of record.

The transcript was used here in cross-examination, but is filed in SC20-806 as a portion of Composite Ex F.


Mr. Strems did not choose to build a law firm with a hierarchy of partners with years of experience working with younger associates on matters that had come into those partners due to their own professional experience.

He did not build a firm where clients often came to the firm because of the firm’s reputation but were then introduced to a partner who they agreed would represent them with the help of his or her associates and paralegals.

Instead, he built a one-man professional association with a maze of employees who handled matters for thousands of clients who had received an engagement letter signed by the only actual member of the law firm – Mr. Strems.

His was the only name in Strems Law Firm and his extensive marketing was based on that name. His clients were simply distributed among his pre-litigation teams and his litigation teams.

Thus, when he received his emergency suspension on June 9, 2020, he was faced with a serious problem. He had to leave the law firm immediately, no later than July 9. But the professional association was simply the corporate manifestation of Mr. Strems.

If he removed himself from the professional association, it ceased to exist.

He knew that if he sold his practice to another lawyer or law firm that Rule 4-1.17 would require that he notify his clients and give them the option to find another lawyer who was not burdened with the problems he had created for himself and his employees; a lawyer who actually had her practice organized so that she could talk to clients in person when needed.

That could dramatically reduce the value of the law practice he wanted to sell.

So instead of a direct sale, he accomplished precisely the same thing by issuing new stock for the three purchasers of his law practice, and then entering into a redemption agreement with the professional association so that the payments to him would be channeled through the law firm and not paid directly by the three lawyers.

By technically selling the stock in the professional association, the legal vessel that held the contracts with his clients, he claimed that the client’s professional relationship was unchanged with the professional association.

While the business relationship created by the thousands of contingency retainer agreements may have remained with the professional association, the clients ceased to have a professional relationship with Mr. Strems and that professional relationship was transferred to the three new members of the professional association.

The Florida Rules of Professional Conduct regulate the conduct of lawyers, not professional associations.

The redemption agreement may have been important to the IRS for tax purposes, but to fulfill his duties to his clients, he still needed to comply with Rule 4- 1.17.

But he did not comply with that rule.

Instead, in order to notify his clients of his suspension order, he sent them a letter, primarily in the third- person, telling them about the change in ownership and explaining that this change was why he would no longer be involved at the firm.

The Bar submits this letter is deceptive, a failure to communicate the information needed for informed consent, and a violation on the emergency suspension order.

Mr. Strems has argued that his actions are protected by advice of counsel. But this Court has clearly explained that this defense does not apply to compliance with the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, as contrasted with some underlying legal issue with which a respondent is unversed.

In any event, the evidence in this record does not support this defense.

Because the Referee misunderstood the applicable law, this Court should reject the Referee’s recommendations and find Mr. Strems guilty of violating Rule 4-1.17, Rule 4-1-4, and Rule 4-8.4(c), and find him in contempt of the suspension order.

The sanction for these violations should be imposed with the other pending cases. Mr. Strems should be disbarred.

Two Untouchable Attorneys Who Stole Millions – Lovin’ Life in Florida


“This Court’s standard of review in a contempt case is the same as that applicable to attorney discipline cases in general.”

The Florida Bar v. Bitterman, 33 So. 3d 686, 687 (Fla. 2010).

1. Issues of Law.

This Court reviews issue of law de novo when the only disagreement is whether the material facts constitute unethical conduct.

The Florida Bar v. Brownstein, 953 So. 2d 502, 510 (Fla. 2007);

The Florida Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240, 243 (Fla. 2005).

2. Findings of Fact

As this Court explained in The Florida Bar v. Picon, 205 So. 3d 759, 764 (Fla. 2016):

“This Court’s review of a referee’s findings of fact is limited.

If a referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, this Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the referee.

The Florida Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000).”

See also The Florida Bar v. Schwartz, 284 So. 3d 393, 396 (Fla. 2019);

The Florida Bar v. Parrish, 241 So. 3d 66, 72 (Fla. 2018);

The Florida Bar v. Vining, 721 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Fla. 1998);

The Florida Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998);

The Florida Bar v. Spann, 682 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (Fla. 1996).

3. Recommendation of Discipline

The Referee’s recommendation of discipline is subjected to greater review by this Court because of this Court’s ultimate responsibility to make that decision:

In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.

See The Florida Bar v. Picon, 205 So. 3d 759, 765 (Fla. 2016) (citing The Florida Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989)).

At the same time, this Court will generally not second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline, as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the standards.

See The Florida Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 83 (Fla. 2018);

The Florida Bar v. De La Torre, 994 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2008).

The Florida Bar v. Altman, 294 So. 3d 844, 847 (Fla. 2020).

It is also important to consider that this Court has given notice to the members of the Bar that it is moving toward harsher sanctions than in the past.

See The Florida Bar v. Rosenberg, 169 So. 3d 1155, 1162 (Fla. 2015).

In Rosenberg, this Court explained that since the decision in The Florida Bar v. Bloom, 632 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1994), the Court has moved toward imposing stricter sanctions for unethical and unprofessional conduct.

See also Altman at 847. As a result, case law prior to 2015 needs to be examined carefully to make certain that the application of sanctions in these earlier cases comports with current standards.



The complete transfer of ownership of Strems Law Firm from Mr. Strems to three other attorneys is a “sale of law practice” under Rule 4-1.17 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct for which the clients were entitled to notice.

A. The central legal question within this issue, and the holding the Bar requests from this Court.

Until about forty years ago, a lawyer could sell the building from which she practiced, and the furniture and the law books connected to the practice, but the practice itself was regarded as a professional relationship that could not be sold.

In 1992, Florida adopted Rule 4-1.17, which was based on the recently developed ABA Model Rule 1.17.

See In re Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 605 So. 2d 252, 253 (Fla. 1992). It allowed a lawyer to sell an entire practice to one lawyer.

The rule conditioned this new ability to sell a practice on requirements that the clients be notified and be given an opportunity to consent to the substitution of counsel or to terminate the representation.

Then, as now, the comments began with the explanation that “[t]he practice of law is a profession, not merely a business,” and “clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will.”

In 2006, the rule was amended to permit a sale of the entire practice or an entire area of a practice to one or more lawyers.

See In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 933 So. 2d 417, 457 (Fla. 2006).

Although in the first sentence of the rule, this Court made clear that the item sold is a “law practice,” and a not “law firm,” because either a “lawyer” or a “law firm” could sell a “law practice,” the rule has never defined exactly what a “sale” entails when one is selling a law practice. There is no case law defining “sale” in this context.

It is not a rare occurrence that a one-lawyer law practice is organized and doing business as a professional association or other form of legal association authorized to practice law.

If Lawyer A is practicing without the use of such a separate legal entity, and she wishes to sell either the entire practice or an area of practice to another lawyer or to some other professional association, there is no question that Rule 4-1.17 applies.

Lawyer A’s “practice” is to the largest extent a collection of existing relationships with clients and the goodwill created by past and present clients.

Before Lawyer A sells her practice to Lawyer B or to “Lawyer B, P.A,” she must give notice to her clients because the clients are not “commodities.”

But Mr. Strems successfully argued to the Referee that he did not sell a practice;

the corporation merely redeemed his stock in the corporation

Because the corporation did not cease to exist and it continued to own the legal contracts with the clients that created the business relationship, he claimed he had no duty to communicate with his clients to give them notice of the total 100% transfer in ownership of the professional association and their right to retain new counsel.

But it is the complete transfer of his professional relationships with his clients to the new owners of the professional association that invokes Rule 4-1.17 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Bar submits that Rule 4-1.17(b) exists to protect the client’s rights.

It was not created by this Court to protect the commercial rights of a professional corporation.

The argument presented to, and accepted by, the Referee in this case would dramatically reduce the client’s right to be represented by a licensed lawyer of his or her choice, and to understand that he or she had that right.

No matter what legal entities are involved, when 100% of the control of a “legal practice” is transferred from one lawyer to another lawyer or group of lawyers, this is a sale of a “law practice” that invokes the right of the clients to be informed under Rule 4-1.17.

In this case, the Bar is asking this Court to hold that when a lawyer facing an emergency suspension transfers his entire practice for consideration to other lawyers, either directly from lawyer to lawyer, or indirectly through a transaction involving a transfer of a professional association that is used as the legal vessel containing the lawyer’s professional relationships with his clients, that transaction for consideration is a “sale of law practice,” requiring compliance with Rule 4-1.17(b).

B. Rule 4-1.17 governs the sale of a law practice, not the sale of a law firm.

Rule 4-1.17 plainly states that it applies to the sale of a law practice and not the sale of a law firm.

Its first three subsections state:

A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, or an area of practice, including good will, provided that:

a) Sale of Practice or Area of Practice as an Entirety. The entire practice, or the entire area of practice, is sold to 1 or more lawyers or law firms authorized to practice law in Florida.

b) Notice to Clients. Written notice is served by certified mail, return receipt requested, on each of the seller’s clients of:

1) The proposed sale

2) The client’s right to retain counsel;


3) The fact that the client’s consent to the substitution of counsel will be presumed if the client does not object within 30 days after being served with notice.

The “practice” in this context includes the professional relationship with the clients and the good will that has been created over the life of the practice.

The purchaser may keep some or all of the employees of the predecessor lawyer and may be purchasing physical or computer files and programs that help service the clients.

But the “practice” has little value without the ongoing professional relationship with the clients.

The adoption of this rule ended the complete prohibition on selling a practice, but the compromise requires the lawyer benefiting from the sale to take very specific steps to protect the clients.

Admittedly, a practice is normally sold in a more direct sale of the business relationship than occurred in this case. But this is not a rule about the taxation of the sale or the basis for a new asset.

The clients had an established attorney-client relationship with Mr. Strems.

He was the only lawyer who was an actual member of the law firm, and he was also the lawyer signing the contracts and making first communication with the clients.

It was his credentials in all the advertising that gave them assurance (albeit inaccurately) that their claims would be carefully supervised by a very experienced lawyer.

It is lawyers who must obey the Rules of Professional Responsibility, not professional associations.

It is the lawyer who has skill as an advocate, not the professional association. The lawyer may delegate some of the work on a matter to an employed associate or even a paralegal, especially with the client’s knowledge and consent, but the lawyer is still the responsible supervisor.

The corporation cannot assume that professional function.

By the entire transfer of his practice to the three new owners, Mr. Strems was attempting to transfer that attorney-client relationship without providing the notice required by Rule 4-1.17(b).

He was not telling his clients that they had the right to find another lawyer under these circumstances.

C. The Referee misunderstood the concept of a sale of the legal practice, in part, because of the language of Mr. Strems’ standard “Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement.”

As Rule 4-5.8(a) explains, “the contract for legal services creates a legal relationship between the client and law firm and between the client and individual members of the law firm. . . .”

It further explains that “[n]othing in these rules creates or defines those relationships.”

In other words, the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct address the professional relationship between a lawyer and a client – not the business relationship between the client and the law firm.

Admittedly, there is some overlap between those relationships, especially in the area of reasonable fees. But the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct exist to protect clients and to protect the reputation of the profession of law and the courts that profession serves.

They are not trumped by the business interests of the lawyer or the law firm.

The standard “Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement” utilized by Mr. Strems was odd in a number of respects.3

But for purposes of this review, the major oddity is its use of the word “Attorney” as the shorthand reference for “The Strems Law Firm P.A.” (A. 4-7).

The contract’s heading does not reference the law firm, but the first line of the contract explains that the client is retaining and employing THE STREMS LAW FIRM, P.A. (hereinafter “Attorney”).

Mr. Strems signs the contract on the line for “Attorney” to sign.

The word “Attorney” occurs throughout the document.

This retainer agreement does not retain “Lawyer X and Lawyer X, P.A.’ In fact the body of the contract contains no reference to “lawyer” or to the word “Attorney” meaning anything except the professional association.

The contract authorizes “Attorney” to file a lawsuit for the client, but there is no discussion of what lawyer, other than Mr. Strems, will represent the client.

In this bulk practice, the client is represented by a pre-litigation team, and if necessary, by a subsequent litigation team. But the contract does not specify the team, much less the lawyers in the team.

The client is given no right to select a particular lawyer.

3 Different portions of the contact create issues addressed in SC20-842 and SC20-1739.

The required “Statement of Client’s Rights” is, of course, appended to the firm’s contract.

It discusses “lawyers.”

It explains in paragraph 3 that the client has the right to know about a “lawyer’s education, training and experience” before hiring a lawyer.

The contract has an auto-fill checkmark explaining that the client understands, but the only lawyer the client typically knows about when entering into the contract is Mr. Strems.

This contract is undoubtedly owned by the professional association.

As a business relationship, it presumably continues to be owned by the professional association when 100% of that entity is transferred from one lawyer to another lawyer or group of lawyers.

But calling the professional association “Attorney” in the contract does not make that association a “lawyer” for purposes of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.

The question here is about the professional relationship between the client and the lawyer—and the duty to communicate with a client when the lawyer who signs the retainer agreement can no longer be in the professional relationship with his client because he has sold the law firm that owns the business relationship.

Mr Strems argued, and the Referee concluded, that the unchanged business relationship through the ownership of the contract by the professional association (when the entire practice is transferred from one lawyer to another group of lawyers) prevents the operation of Rule 4-1.17.

Respectfully, that is simply an error of law.

It conflates the business relationship with the professional relationship to the detriment of the client and to the detriment of the judicial system.

D. The fact that the lawyers purchasing the practice were three of the many lawyers employed by the professional association did not alter the requirements of Rule 4-1.17.

The three attorneys who owned all the stock, and thus the “practice” after the simultaneous closing were Orlando Romero, Hunter Patterson, and Christopher Narchet.


Mr. Romero has since died.


Mr. Narchet only became employed by the Strems Law Firm in its Coral Gables office in July 2017.


He never worked on one of the pre-litigation teams.


His first litigation job was as a member of one of the Strems litigation teams.


He was promoted to a team leader on one of the litigation teams prior to purchasing his interest in the law firm.


He explained that the three purchasers “decided that the best course of action for our clients was to obviously maintain the same representation for them.”


He further said:

“Obviously, the choice was left in their (the clients’) hands as well, you know, whether they wished to continue with our services as their counsel or not.”


But he does not claim they reached out to the thousands of clients to discuss this with them.

Thus, Mr. Strems did not provide notice to his clients under Rule 4- 1.17(b) of their rights, and the new owners unilaterally decided the best interest of the clients as well.

But the clients may not have wished to be represented by a lawyer with so little experience as Mr. Narchet.

They also may have discovered that the insurance company was not denying their claim and they could resolve it themselves without paying 25% of the undisputed amounts to the law firm.

Respectfully, keeping the clients with the new owners of the law firm was in the best interests of Mr. Strems and the new owners, but in light of the conditions that brought on the emergency suspension and the methods used to sign up some of the clients, the clients may very well have been better off to select different representation if that option had been presented to them with fair disclosure.

The Bar submits that there is no exception to Rule 4-1.17(b) when the sale is to three lawyers currently employed by the professional association.

Admittedly, at least a few of these clients were involved in litigation in which one of the new owners may have been their lead attorney of record.

But even then, the clients had entered into engagements to be represented by the Strems Law Firm when the only managing and supervising lawyer was Mr. Strems.

The many clients whose files were in pre-litigation would have had no prior contact with the new owners.

Whether the new attorneys in charge of managing and supervising the employees of the law firm had been employees of the firm or had come from outside the law firm, the clients still had a right to be told that they were no longer in privity with Mr. Strems’ law firm, but with a reconstituted law firm with entirely new owners.

Mr. Strems argued to the Referee that the position of the Bar would mean the Rule 4-1.17(b) would need to be invoked every time a partner left a law firm with multiple members.

That really is not a fair reading of the rule.

The rule covers the sale of an “entire practice” or an “entire area of practice.”

When new partners buy their shares in an existing law firm with multiple shareholders or old partners sell their shares, the event is normally not a purchase or sale of even an “area” of the practice.

The Bar is only arguing here that a sale occurs when there is a 100% change in the ownership of the professional association.

The disclosure requirements of Rule 4.1-17 are actually just an extension of the duty to communicate with your client under Rule 4.1-4.

In the remaining thirty days before Mr. Strems could no longer represent a client, he still had a duty to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”

See Rule 4-1.4(b).

As we will see in the next issue, he did not accomplish that requirement.


Mr. Strems’ July 1, 2020, letter was not the notice required by Rule 4-1.17, but rather was a document providing misleading information for Mr. Strems’ benefit.

Mr. Strems did not begin sending out notices of his suspension in June to clients who had an immediate need for this information.

For example, the clients who had just sent in their signed retainers and had not been processed by the on-boarding team were not sent notice of his suspension prior to the completion of that process.

Instead, that team simply continued to send out Mr. Strems’ standard notice of representation to the insurance carriers.

(T803) (TFB-EX- Composite A Contempt) .

When he did provide notice to the clients, Mr. Strems did not send out a personal letter simply informing each client that he had been suspended by the Florida Supreme Court and providing a copy of the suspension order.

Instead, he mailed out a letter about “Your Insurance Claim” to “Dear Client.”

(TFB-Ex. C Contempt).

The letter begins with a one-sentence paragraph:

“Our work continues on your file, but we write this letter to advise of changes at the law firm and matters regarding me.”

Thus, although the letter is going to tell the client about his “matters,” it is carefully crafted as a letter from the whole law firm – from us, not from me.

The next paragraph explains that the “ownership” of the law firm is changing (even though this is not a sale).

It is changing by “advancing three of our present lawyers as shareholders.”

Mr. Strems explains that he will “no longer be the owner of the law firm or involved at the firm because of this change of ownership.”

But the truth is that he will no longer be involved because he has been suspended and he must divest himself of ownership in the firm because he has been suspended.

The next paragraph explains that the clients claim has been handled by a “specifically assigned attorney at the law firm and support staff,” which will not be affected by these changes.

That lawyer is not identified in the letter.

Mr. Strems claims that he had not been “directly responsible for your matter,” even though he had signed the contingency agreement with them and was the only shareholder in the firm.

He was not “directly” involved in the sense that he had delegated the matter to his employees, but he had been suspended because of the evidence that he had mismanaged those employees.

Despite the reasons for his suspension, he assures his clients that “the lawyers responsible for your matter will continue without any change to seek the best settlement or judgment for your case.”

(emphasis supplied).

Then, in the middle of the document in a paragraph containing one compound sentence, he states: “I will no longer be involved in the firm and I have been suspended from the practice of law, as per the attached Order.”

The next paragraph explains that the “new name of the firm will be The Property Advocates, P.A. and if you see that name on further papers we send to you there is no reason for your concern.”


Mr. Strems, of course is not part of that “we.”

Instead of telling the client that they may seek to retain other counsel in light of his suspension and the sale of the firm, he tells them “there is no reason for your concern.”

The next paragraph says:

“Again, we greatly value your confidence in us as your attorneys to complete your claim and get the best result for you possible for the damage to your house.”

This letter is signed only by Scot Strems, and it is not signed by him for Strems Law Firm, like the first letter he sent to the clients.


But he will not be completing their claims and negotiating the final settlement amounts.

Then the next two paragraphs state:

“We will stay in touch over the next few weeks and bring you up to date on our continuing efforts on your behalf.”

“Please feel free to contact our office with any questions you may have.”

Of course, Mr. Strems will not and cannot stay in touch with them.

And one of the reasons that Mr. Strems was suspended was because it was so difficult to get through to a lawyer if you contacted the office.

Ms. Mendizabal, who had worked with the firm since 2017 and was the managing attorney in the Miami office, explained that the firm had the same protocol for communicating with clients after this letter was sent out as before.

(T61, 64, 84).

They had a separate “team” that answered the telephones and a call center to handle overflows.


Mr. Strems knew when he signed this letter that the firm was not structured to allow these clients to call the unidentified lawyer “specifically assigned” to their case to obtain the information needed to make an informed decision about staying with the law firm.

The Bar maintains that, once Mr. Strems decided not to send a simple letter notifying his clients of his suspension, but rather decided to send a firm letter announcing the complete change in ownership of the law practice, he needed to comply with Rule 4-1.17(b).

He needed to tell his clients that they had a right to retain other counsel.

Instead, he used the letter as a marketing tool for the new owners to assure that they would be able to keep those clients and receive the contingency fees needed to fund his buy-out.

Once Mr. Strems decided to inform his clients of the status of representation, under Rule 4-1.4(a), entitled “Informing Client of Status of Representation,” he needed to provide the clients with accurate information needed for the client to make an informed decision.

Under Rule 4-1.4(b), he needed to “explain [the] matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”

He knowingly sent out a letter that did not fulfill these requirements. He intentionally avoided providing a full disclosure for his own self-interest.

Instead of recognizing the problems within the firm and sharing with the clients that he had allowed the firm to grow too quickly, that the firm had problems communicating with its clients, and that it had difficulty timely complying with discovery rules and court orders—and perhaps explaining how the new owners planned to address these problems – he told them that things would go on “without any change” and that there was “no reason for your concern.”

Under Rule 4-8.4(c), a lawyer has an obligation not to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation.

This letter is not honest with his clients.

It misrepresented why he would no longer be the owner of the law firm or involved at the firm.

It misrepresented many things by omission that he needed to explain once he decided to send the content of this letter to his clients.

He did this in an effort to assure that the clients stayed with the new lawyers who now owned the law practice.

There is no factual dispute about the content of this letter or the facts surrounding the sending of this letter.

And Mr. Kalish and Mr. Tozian did not write this letter or provide any advance opinion that this was an appropriate letter – even assuming that “advice of counsel” has become a defense for this type of violation.

But the Referee nevertheless concluded that these facts did not violate these rules.

(ROR 149-150).

The Bar submits that the Referee made an error in law when she concluded that these facts violate none of the applicable rules.


“Advice of Counsel” should not be a defense when the advice concerns the Rules themselves and not some underlying area of law with which the lawyer is unfamiliar.

Mr. Strems repeatedly emphasized to the Referee that he had relied upon the advice of the two lawyers he hired to assist with the suspension order.

Just like he wished to blame his mismanagement on his associates in Case No. SC20-808, he seeks to shift responsibility for complying with the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct to his lawyers.

He is seeking to expand the scope of this Court’s recent decision in The Florida Bar v. Herman, 297 So. 3d 516 (Fla. 2020), which recognized a very limited version of the advice of counsel defense.

In Herman, the issue concerned the truthfulness of Mr. Herman’s financial disclosures in his bankruptcy filings.

Mr. Herman was not a bankruptcy lawyer, and he had experienced bankruptcy counsel representing him in that proceeding.

His disclosures had been thoroughly discussed with his lawyer and the information Mr. Herman provided to his lawyer was accurate and sufficient for his lawyer to make a legal decision for his client.

The bankruptcy court found that the filings were so inaccurate as to warrant a denial of discharge, but this Court explained:

“To establish that Herman is guilty of misconduct, the Bar would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence not only that Herman’s bankruptcy disclosures were false or misleading, but also that Herman knew that they were false or misleading.”

Id. at 520.

This Court decided that it was the advice of his counsel about bankruptcy law that kept Mr. Herman from knowing his answers were misleading.

But in Herman this Court explained:

The reason an advice of counsel defense is usually unavailable in Bar discipline proceedings is that the Bar rules themselves charge Florida lawyers with knowledge of the rules and of “the standards of ethical and professional conduct prescribed by this court.”

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-4.1.

But here, Herman does not claim that he relied on the advice of counsel as to the meaning and requirements of any Bar rule.

Nor does this case have anything to do with Herman’s work as an attorney serving clients

Id. at 520.

Thus, Herman is not precedent for the proposition that Mr. Strems can hire lawyers to handle his suspension order and wash his hands of his own need to comply with the order and the rules.

Expanding Herman to this context would create the most slippery of slopes.

The responsibility for each lawyer in Florida to comply with the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct must not be a delegable duty.

The Bar recognizes that reliance upon the formal opinion of a lawyer who specializes in Bar matters, after complete and accurate disclosure, might very well be a mitigating factor for conduct committed in reliance upon that opinion.

See The Florida Bar v. St. Louis, 967 So. 2d 108, 118 (Fla. 2007)

(“Thus, a defense based on advice of counsel is not available to respondents in Florida Bar discipline cases unless specifically provided for in a rule or considered as a matter in mitigation.”).

But the notion that a lawyer can be exempt from the rules because he may have discussed aspects of the rules with the counsel selling his practice to other lawyers by means of a sophisticated corporate transaction is a dangerous and unwarranted expansion of Herman.

Even if advice of counsel were expanded to these circumstances, Mr. Strems did not establish this defense.

The evidence related to this issue is summarized in the following paragraphs.

The Evidence.

Mr. Strems retained Mr. Tozian, an experienced lawyer who regularly defends lawyers in disciplinary proceedings, to assist him about a month before this Court entered the emergency suspension order.


Because Mr. Tozian was concerned about performing the transfer of the law firm correctly, Mr. Tozian advised Mr. Strems to retain a second lawyer, Mr. Kalish, who is a tax and transaction lawyer.


Mr. Tozian explained that he recommended this, in part, because had had a prior case where the Bar had questioned the method by which the transfer occurred.


Mr. Tozian contended in his testimony that Rule 4-1.17(b) did not apply in this case.


He did not recall if he specifically discussed Rule 4- 1.17(b) with Mr. Strems.


But he thought it was discussed that this was equivalent to the death of a lawyer.4

He explained:

“We looked at it as one person in the firm is gone, and the rest of the firm was going to soldier on.”

(T378). He did not see the transaction they created to be a “traditional sale.”

(T378). Instead, he explained:

“I mean, if you’ve got a firm with 30

4 The comments to Rule 4-1.17 explain that “[t]his rules applies, among other situations, to the sale of a law practice by representatives of a lawyer who is deceased.”

people and one person is out of the mix, whether they die or they’re suspended or they decide that selling shoes at Nordstrom’s would be a better vocation, it doesn’t really matter how the person left the firm.”


He did not seem to take into consideration that only one lawyer in this case owned the firm.

He saw the transaction as “a much more efficient way to divest Mr. Strems of his interest – and , you know, a client can fire you at any time.”


He personally thought the only time a lawyer has a duty to disclose to a client that they have the right to retain another lawyer was when the client was “unhappy with the decision-making” or “unhappy with the results.”


On redirect, in a series of leading questions, Mr. Tozian testified that he approved of the transaction as fashioned by Mr. Kalish “[t]o the extent that I understood it and to the extent to which the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar applied.”


He confirmed that he had advised Mr. Strems that “the notification was done in compliance with the Supreme Court’s order.”


Mr. William Kalish testified that he was retained by Mr. Strems and the Strems Law Firm in June 2020.


One of his roles was to serve as the receiver for the trust account issues.


That role is not significant to this review.

He also provided advice to Mr. Strems and Strems Law Firm concerning compliance with the suspension order.


The three employed attorneys who purchased the stock for the reconstituted law firm were not represented by him.


He has experience providing tax and transactional advice to clients, especially lawyers and law firms.


He was the main person involved in deciding to use the device of the redemption agreement and the newly issued stock for this transfer because, in his opinion, it avoided issues of quantum meruit if a new law firm took over from Strems Law Firm.


Even though Mr. Strems claimed not to have been directly involved in these cases, Mr. Kalish was concerned that other approaches would involve 7500 quantum meruit decisions, which the redemption agreement avoided by buying Mr. Strems’ stock for a fair market value of

(T419, 426-427).

He testified that Mr. Strems was following his advice.


In his opinion, every part of his advice to Mr. Strems was in the best interests of the clients.


He understood that Rule 4-1.17 would require giving notice to the clients that they were free to get another lawyer, but he believed “that could cause a disruption.”


He believed his solution to the transfer of ownership was not a “sale” and that it did not require compliance with Rule 4-1.17.


He reasoned that, as a matter of corporate law, the law firm was not sold;

it was renamed and the stockholders were traded out.

(T422- 424).

He opined that a redemption was not a sale.


His opinion appears to be influenced by his training as a tax lawyer, and he was not asked whether the transaction was a sale of a “law practice” for purposes of considering the interests of the clients.


In answer to a question by the Referee, he admitted that “it is conceivable if read as a sale, that it would be governed by Rule 1.17.”


But he seemed to believe, if that were true, it would apply every time that Mr. Strems hired a new lawyer as an employee.


Mr. Kalish reasoned that, if the sale of stock and the redemption were simultaneous, there was no disruption in the professional association, and since the clients probably regarded the employed lawyer who was currently the team leader assigned to their case as their lawyer, it was not a sale that required notice to the clients of their right to retain alternate counsel.

(428- 429).

He seemed to equate this with a situation where existing shareholders invite a practicing lawyer to join the firm.


He read from his affidavit explaining that Rule 4-1.17 did not apply because this did not involve “two separate entities engaged in a transfer of clients.”

(T452, R-Ex. 12).

As explained earlier in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Kalish testified that he had no role in creating the July 1 letter.


He explained that, while he did not think it was compelled by the rules, he probably would have added language about the possibility of changing firms.


He believed the clients “should know what’s going on.”


As he explained:

But the proper way would be that the clients would also assent to any arrangements of the various lawyer too, I believe.

The Law

It is clear that Mr. Strems never asked either lawyer for a formal opinion on this. Mr. Tozian did not fully appreciate the fact that Mr. Strems was the only member of the professional association, and he equated this situation with a more typical law firm with multiple partners or shareholders.

Mr. Kalish would have advised Mr. Strems to explain the arrangement to the clients in the July 1 letter, if asked.

Thus, the evidence on advice of counsel is not a basis to find that Mr. Strems did not violate the specific rules of conduct and the suspension order in this proceeding.

The evidence may not even support a mitigating factor when determining the sanction.

A Comment on the two experts

It is not uncommon in Bar proceedings for lawyers to provide expert testimony that includes explanations of some area of specialized law.

For example, in the Herman case both sides presented experts on bankruptcy law.

This type of testimony would usually be inadmissible under the formal rules of evidence in a typical trial.

See Lee Cnty. v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 711 So. 2d 34, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)

(“Expert testimony is not admissible concerning a question of law. Statutory construction is a legal determination to be made by the trial judge, with the assistance of counsels’ legal arguments, not by way of ‘expert opinion.’”).

But in this case, Mr. Strems retained Professor Timothy P. Chinaris as an expert on the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Bar responded by hiring Professor Anthony Alfieri.

(T575-76, 722).

Predictably, Professor Chinaris provided expert opinions on these rules that helped Mr. Strems, and Professor Alfieri provided opinions that helped the Bar.

Professor Chinaris believed that Rule 4-1.17 applied only to transfers for consideration to lawyers “outside” the firm, and he concluded that the three employed associates were inside the firm such that a 100% transfer to them did not invoke the rule.

(R-Ex-9, p. 4).

He supported his interpretation not with the text of the rule, but with a comment discussing the fact that attorney-client privilege did not bar preliminary discussions involved in such a transaction with an outside lawyer.

The Referee adopted this legal reasoning.

(ROR p.112-114).

But the comment does not suggest that the rule applies only when there might be an attorney-client privilege issue.

Instead, the rule is drafted to protect the client and to make sure the client is not treated like a “commodity.”

Professor Chinaris’s opinion as a forensic expert does not seem to give the clients their due.

Professor Alfieri had a longer report and a longer explanation as to why he believed that Rule 4-1.17 did apply in this context.

(TFB-Ex. 1 p. 27).

But the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct are simply a subset of rules of law.

Lawyers are called upon to read them carefully and obey them.

This Court reviews the rules de novo to determine whether they apply to a set of facts or not.

See The Florida Bar v. Brownstein, 953 So. 2d 502, 510 (Fla. 2007).

The undersigned frankly questions whether this “testimony” by experts, not addressing issues of fact, but rather addressing legal conclusions that are reviewed de novo by this Court, is a proper subject for testimony.

It reads more like closing arguments from the witness stand than evidence.

It might be better for this Court simply to indicate that such testimony is not a necessary or proper part of a disciplinary proceeding.


Mr. Strems should be found guilty of contempt and of violations of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.

This Court has inherent contempt powers that, in this context, are expressly incorporated into the general rules of procedure for disciplinary proceedings.

See The Florida Bar v. Ross, 732 So. 2d 1037, 1041 (Fla. 1998); Rule 3-7.11(f).

The Bar recognizes that a finding of guilt in this contempt proceeding requires proof that Mr. Strems “intentionally and willfully” violated the terms of the order.

See The Florida Bar v. Forrester, 916 So.2d 647, 650 (Fla. 2005).

A violation does not require Mr. Strems to admit his guilt, and it can be established by circumstantial evidence.

Id. at 652.

The standard emergency suspension order entered by this Court on June 9, 2020, required Mr. Strems “to immediately furnish a copy of Respondent’s suspension order to all clients.”

The Referee found that the delay until July 1, 2020, to send out a copy of the order was not such a long delay as to violate the requirement of immediacy, and the Bar is not challenging that ruling in this review.

The Referee seemed to believe that the actual content of Mr. Strems’ letter sending a copy of suspension order to his clients would be of no concern to this Court so long as it attached a copy of his suspension order.

But the Bar submits that any licensed lawyer would know that an emergency suspension order is an exceptional and very serious matter.

The order to furnish a copy of the suspension order to clients does not mandate the precise method by which the order is delivered, but any lawyer would know that it must be provided in a manner that is not deceptive.

Given the requirements of Rule 4-1.4 that a lawyer “shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation,” the requirement to furnish a copy of the suspension order to a client normally includes a concomitant duty to accurately explain to the client the legal effect of this order.

But Mr. Strems sandwiched his statement revealing his suspension to his clients in the middle of a marketing letter for the reconstituted law firm, written mostly in the third person, assuring them that another lawyer would continue for them ”without any change.”

He told his clients they had no reason for concern, despite the concerns that caused this Court to enter the emergency suspension.

He intermingled the notice of his suspension with the law firm’s explanation, in the third person, of the total transfer of ownership to three unnamed attorneys.

The Bar submits that the undisputed facts in this case demonstrate an intentional and willful disregard for this Court’s order to provide the order to the client.

That intentional disregard was designed to protect Mr. Strems’ buy-out.

Even if this Court concludes that the conduct is not violative of its order, as explained earlier, the evidence clearly demonstrates a violation of Rule 4-1.4 (communication), Rule 4-1.17(b) (failure to provide the proper notice of the sale), and Rule 4-8.4(c) (misrepresentation to client).

The Petition expressly discussed the violation of Rule 4-1.17.

Rule 4-1.4 and Rule 4-8.4 were not expressly discussed in the petition.

But the failures to communicate with the clients and the misrepresentations to the client were directly related to what was and was not communicated to clients as a result of the suspension order.

They were discussed in Professor Alfieri’s report, which was disclosed prior to the final hearing.

(TFB-Ex. A).

Professor Chinaris discussed both of these violations in his direct examination prior to Professor Alfieri’s testimony.

(T629-631, 642-643).

Thus, the two additional violations were “within the scope of the conduct and rule violations specifically charged.”

The Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 1999).

For purposes of due process, Mr. Strems had notice and had an opportunity to be heard. Paraphrasing Fredericks, “because [Mr. Strems] was made aware of the conduct alleged by the Bar to be unethical and had the opportunity to be heard as to this conduct, there was no violation of due process.”

Id. at 1254.

The Referee’s recommendations on these violations were based primarily on her legal determination that the transaction was not a sale.

The facts of what was and was not communicated to the clients in the letter are undisputed.

The Bar submits that the letter delivering the suspension order contained misrepresentations designed to secure a client base for the reconstituted law firm, and it failed to communicate both the right to retain other counsel and the circumstances that might warrant the client to consider that option.

Mr. Strems should be found guilty of these three violations.


The Court should either impose the sanction in this case in conjunction with Case No. SC20-806, Case No. SC20-842, and Case No. SC20-1739, or the issue of the proper sanction should be remanded to the Referee for consideration following this Court’s determination of guilt.

The Referee is recommending that the sanction in this case be “concurrent” with the sanction in the other pending cases.

The Bar agrees with this recommendation to the extent that it suggests that this Court should simply impose a single sanction for the conduct in all three cases.

See The Florida Bar v. Inglis, 660 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1995);

The Florida Bar v. Greenspahn, 396 So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. 1981)

(“Under the peculiar facts of this matter, however, we determine the appropriate discipline from the totality of the conduct as though all of the charges had been presented to us in one proceeding.”).

The Bar is already recommending disbarment in those three cases. These violations would add incrementally to the sanction for those cases.

The four proceedings collectively demonstrate a lawyer who devised improper methods to obtain homeowners’ signatures on 25% contingency fee contracts without any direct discussions with the client about a need for representation and often before the homeowners had an objective reason to believe they needed an attorney to handle their insurance claims.

Then he created a law firm structure that did not adequately communicate with the clients and could not handle the onslaught of lawsuits that he filed, leading to sanctions and Kozel orders against the lawyers he employed.

When it came time for settlement, relying on the improper language of his contract, he negotiated global settlements that maximized his payment, and minimized the clients’ returns.

And when this Court entered its emergency suspension, rather than sending his clients a straight-forward letter explaining his suspension, he sent a letter from the law firm explaining that there should be no reason for them to be concerned, and that he would no longer be involved at the firm because other lawyers had become its shareholders.

He did not tell the clients the whole story or tell them they had a right to retain new counsel.

He did not tell them this information because then there could be insufficient money to pay his buy-out from the firm.

Mr. Strems’ numerous, strategic violations of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct warrant permanent disbarment.

However, if the Court decides that a separate sanction is appropriate in this case, this Court should not rely upon the Referee’s hypothetical evaluation and should remand for a proper sanction hearing.

The Bar submits that there is a dishonest or selfish motive associated with the misconduct in this proceeding that would warrant more than a public reprimand – especially if the three pending cases were treated as prior disciplinary offenses.

See §3.2(b) (1) & (2), Florida’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions;

The Florida Bar v. Patterson, SC19-2070, 2021 WL 5832861, at *6 (Fla. 2021) (overlapping prior discipline);

The Florida Bar v. Koepke, 327 So.3d 788, 789 (Fla. 2021) (disbarment for first disciplinary violation).


This Court should reject the Referee’s recommendation for findings of not guilty on the charge of contempt for the reasons explained in this brief.

It should find Mr. Strems guilty of contempt, as well as guilty of violations of Rules 4-1.4, 4-1.17, and 4-8.4(c).

It should impose a combined sanction in this proceeding and the three pending proceedings of permanent disbarment.

It should award the Bar its costs.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Chris W. Altenbernd
Chris W. Altenbernd, Esq.
Florida Bar No: 197394
501 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 1700
Tampa, FL 33602
(813) 221-1500; Fax No: (813) 222-3066

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When the World’s Bankers and Governments Are Behavin’ Like Thieves and Criminals, It Really Is Time to Object, Vociferously

The appalling greed and corruption is playing out live since 2008 and without any accountability to the people. One Percenters are completely immune and laughing At You.



Ukrainian who made appearance in Trump impeachment saga accused by U.S. of stealing, laundering billions

AUG 6, 2020 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MAY 17, 2022

The Justice Department on Thursday accused a Ukrainian oligarch who has been considered an ally of Ukraine’s president of stealing billions of dollars from a bank he once owned, then using a vast array of companies to launder that money in the United States and all over the world.

In a civil forfeiture complaint seeking to seize commercial properties in Kentucky and Texas, the Justice Department alleged that Ihor Kolomoisky and his business partner, Gennadiy Boholiubov, stole so much from PrivatBank that Ukraine’s national bank had to give the institution a $5.5 billion bailout “to stave off economic crisis for the whole country.”

Kolomoisky, one of Ukraine’s richest men, has ties to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and he played a role in the events that led to President Trump’s impeachment last year. He made a fortune in the rough-and-tumble capitalism that swept Ukraine after the Soviet Union’s collapse, amassing assets including airlines and financial institutions, and created a larger-than-life image for himself, going by the nickname “Benya,” and keeping a shark aquarium in his office.

Kolomoisky and Boholiubov were the two major owners of PrivatBank before it was nationalized in response to the fraud, the Justice Department said, and the men basically used it as a personal account to build a business empire in the United States. They requested money from PrivatBank — which they always received because they were owners — then moved the funds through a network of companies to “thoroughly disguise their nature, source, ownership, and control,” the Justice Department alleged.

Experts have expressed increasing concern that U.S. real estate — including factories and facilities important to American industry — has become a magnet for foreign money, including proceeds of criminal activities abroad. Among Kolomoisky’s and Boholiubov’s purchases were more than 5 million square feet of commercial real estate in Ohio; steel plants in Kentucky, West Virginia and Michigan; a cellphone manufacturing plant in Illinois; and commercial real estate in Texas, the Justice Department alleged. The forfeiture complaints sought to seize a roughly 19.5-acre office park in Dallas and the PNC Plaza building in Louisville.

Michael J. Sullivan, a lawyer for Kolomoisky, said in an email: “Mr. Kolomoisky emphatically denies the allegations in the complaints filed by the Department of Justice.” The allegations, which are not criminal charges, are similar to those in a lawsuit filed by the bank in a Delaware court. A lawyer for Boholiubov did not reply to an email seeking comment.

In a statement written in Russian, Kolomoisky said all the money used to purchase the U.S. properties was his own, received through a deal made with a mining company in 2007 and 2008 and from other businesses that banked with Privatbank.

Kolomoisky also has long been facing a criminal probe by the U.S. attorney’s office in Cleveland for possible money laundering. As a part of that case, the FBI raided the office of Optima Management Group in downtown Cleveland on Tuesday, as well as an Optima office in the Southeast Financial Center building in Miami.

In court documents, the Justice Department alleged Thursday that two Miami-based business associates of Kolomoisky and Boholiubov’s — Mordechai Korf and Uriel Laber — helped acquire and manage the oligarchs’ holdings in the United States, which often bear some version of the name “Optima.” Optima Ventures at one point became the “largest holder of commercial real estate in Cleveland,” using stolen funds to buy major downtown office buildings and a hotel, the Justice Department alleged.

Last year, Marc Kasowitz, a New York lawyer who also represents Trump, signed on to represent Kolomoisky and Boholiubov in the Delaware case. He did not immediately respond to a request for comment Thursday.

Under Ukraine’s last president, Petro Poroshenko, the government nationalized Privatbank, alleging that Kolomoisky and one of his business partners had defrauded the bank of billions of dollars. Kolomoisky denied those charges but decamped from Kyiv to Israel, where he also holds citizenship. He retained political power in Ukraine through his business holdings, which include a major Ukrainian television station.

Kolomoisky is seen as an ally to Zelensky, who was an actor before his election, starring in a comedy show that aired on Kolomoisky’s network. Zelensky’s election was widely seen as a boon for Kolomoisky, particularly after the new president made Kolomoisky’s personal lawyer the head of his administration. Some in the United States were suspicious of Zelensky’s ties to the mogul, thinking the connection ran counter to Zelensky’s promises to pursue an anti-corruption and reformist agenda.

Since then, however, Zelensky has not supported returning control of Privatbank to the oligarch, and he fired that top aide. Still, Kolomoisky has been comfortable enough with Ukraine’s current leadership that he returned from a self-imposed exile in Tel Aviv and is again based in Kyiv, where he maintains connections to members of the presidential administration.

In spring 2019, when Trump’s personal attorney Rudolph W. Giuliani embarked on a mission to press Zelensky to assist Trump by opening politically charged investigations into former vice president Joe Biden and his son, Giuliani’s associates met with Kolomoisky to request that Giuliani get a sit-down with the rising Ukrainian politician.

Giuliani associates Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman met with Kolomoisky in April 2019 in Tel Aviv, and, by all accounts, the meeting did not go well.

Giuliani associates claimed to have sway with both foreign billionaires and Trump administration officials

After the meeting, the two ­Florida-based business executives accused Kolomoisky of physically threatening them and filed a lawsuit against him in Ukraine. Parnas and Fruman, who assisted Giuliani in his Ukraine project, were charged in the United States with campaign finance violations last year. They have denied any wrongdoing.

Giuliani has said he provided legal advice to Parnas and Fruman in their fight against Kolomoisky. He also tweeted repeatedly about his displeasure with Kolomoisky in May 2019 just as he was pressuring Zelensky to assist Trump with a Biden investigation. At one point, Giuliani complained that Zelensky was being advised by “Kolomoisky’s representatives and enemies of President Trump.”

Meanwhile, a lawyer for Kolomoisky has told The Post that during the Tel Aviv meeting, Parnas and Fruman claimed that they could get top U.S. officials, including Vice President Pence and then-Energy Secretary Rick Perry, to travel to Ukraine around the time of Zelensky’s May 2019 inauguration — if Kolomoisky paid them several hundred thousand dollars. Kolomoisky did not pay the money, instead throwing the two men out of his office, his lawyer has said.

The attorney, Bruce Marks, told The Post that Kolomoisky had predicted to friends at the time: “This is going to end up in a bad scandal.”

Ukraine arrests ex-PrivatBank official as U.S. prioritizes criminal probe of former owners

FEB 26, 2021 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: MAY 17, 2022

The National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) has arrested the former deputy chairman of a Ukrainian bank at the heart of an FBI criminal investigation as he attempted to fly abroad in the latest sign Kyiv is taking steps to tackle corruption and lawlessness.

Volodymyr Yatsenko was detained at Boryspil Airport in Kyiv on February 22 after investigators forced the pilot of the private jet he was traveling on to land, the bureau announced in a tweet.

Mr. Yatsenko, who was on his way to Vienna after reportedly being tipped off about his arrest, was charged with the embezzlement of funds at PrivatBank, once the nation’s largest lender.

More arrests of management could follow, the Kyiv Post reported.

The FBI is investigating the two owners of PrivatBank – Ihor Kolomoisky and Gennadiy Boholiubov – in connection with accusations that more than $5 billion was stolen from the lender through fraudulent loans and that the money was then laundered.

In a move that made international headlines, Ukraine was forced to nationalize PrivatBank in 2016 and pump more than $5 billion into the lender in order to stave off its bankruptcy.

The U.S. accuses Messrs. Kolomoisky and Boholiubov of using some of the laundered proceeds to buy assets in the U. S., ranging from metals companies to commercial properties, with the help of two American associates based in Miami.

The Justice Department last year filed three civil forfeiture lawsuits in a Florida court against a U.S. real estate holding controlled by the two tycoons and run by the associates.

However, a judge agreed last week with a Justice Department request to temporarily suspend the civil forfeiture proceedings amid concerns it could harm the criminal investigation against the Ukrainian businessmen and their two American partners.

“Allowing [the tycoons] to conduct discovery would expose the identities of witnesses who have provided and will provide information and testimony in both the civil forfeiture actions and the criminal investigation,” the Justice Department said in its February 19 filing.

“If that occurs, the confidential informants may cease providing information, and, to the extent they are not reachable through process in the United States, they may make themselves unavailable for future testimony. Potential sources of information who have not yet been interviewed by the government would likely be deterred from coming forward” the Justice Department said in its filing.

The tycoons deny the accusations and neither Ukraine nor the United States has filed criminal charges against them.

Mr. Kolomoisky is one of the most influential tycoons in Ukraine and the U.S. government’s investigation into his activities is being closely followed.

The billionaire owns key media, energy, and metals assets and is believed to have outsized influence over the administration of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Mr. Kolomoisky’s TV stations backed Mr. Zelenskyy’s successful presidential bid.

The U.S., one of Ukraine’s biggest backers financially and militarily, has repeatedly expressed concern about oligarchic influence over the nation’s government and economy.

Washington has also complained about the lack of investigations into corrupt tycoons and officials and has tied some aid to improvements in judicial reform.

The arrest of Mr. Yatsenko, who was flying on a private plane owned by Mr. Kolomoisky, is the latest in a series of moves by Kyiv to tackle cases that resonate with the U.S.

Mr. Zelenskyy last week approved sanctions on Viktor Medvedchuk, a tycoon and lawmaker with close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Mr. Medvedchuk was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2014 for undermining democracy in Ukraine.

On February 2, Mr. Zelenskyy sanctioned three television stations believed to be owned by Mr. Medvedchuk. In late January he announced an investigation into Ukrainian individuals accused of interfering in the 2020 U.S. presidential elections.

The moves come after President Joe Biden was inaugurated on January 20. Mr. Biden knows Ukraine well, having served as the point man to Kyiv while serving as vice president from 2009 to 2017.

Political analysts say Mr. Zelenskyy is seeking to win over the Biden administration after a difficult relationship with the Trump administration caused by the 2019 impeachment investigation.


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