Panic: The Untold Story of the 2008 Financial Crisis
Ultimately, the people – the homeowners – over 10 million – would be sacrificed and not a single Wall St. Banker went to jail.
Disgraced and Disbarred: Why Are Former Judges and Lawyers Working as Mediators in Our Courts?
Lawyer Calvin Curtis Stole Over $13M Sentenced to 8 Years in Jail. He Wants a Favor from The Florida Bar.
April 2022 Foreclosure Stay Raises Serious Questions as to ‘Divorce Status’ Of Tim and Jennifer Howard
Rewind 2008: The Home Snatchers Stole Millions of Homes, Lives and Citizen’s Trust By Unimaginable Fraud
VICE on HBO looks at factors that led to the 2008 financial crisis and the efforts made by then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Federal Reserve Bank of New York President Timothy Geithner, and Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke to save the United States from an economic collapse.
The feature-length documentary explores the challenges these men faced, as well as the consequences of their decisions.
Ultimately, the people – the homeowners – over 10 million – would be sacrificed and not a single Wall St. Banker went to jail.
“It’s not based on any particular data point, we just wanted to choose a really large number.”
— a Treasury Department spokeswoman explaining how the $700 billion number was chosen for the initial bailout.
Rewind 2008: The Home Snatchers Stole Millions of Homes, Lives and Citizen’s Trust By Unimaginable Fraud
Wall Street and the Government decided, if they were to make it through the Greatest Depression, they’d have to spin their biggest lie in the history of the United States of America. It worked.
Invasion of the Home Snatchers
How foreclosure courts are helping big banks screw over homeowners
NOV 10, 2010 | REPUBLISHED BY LIT: DEC 4, 2021
The foreclosure lawyers down in Jacksonville had warned me, but I was skeptical. They told me the state of Florida had created a special super-high-speed housing court with a specific mandate to rubber-stamp the legally dicey foreclosures by corporate mortgage pushers like Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan Chase.
This “rocket docket,” as it is called in town, is presided over by retired judges who seem to have no clue about the insanely complex financial instruments they are ruling on — securitized mortgages and labyrinthine derivative deals of a type that didn’t even exist when most of them were active members of the bench.
Their stated mission isn’t to decide right and wrong, but to clear cases and blast human beings out of their homes with ultimate velocity. They certainly have no incentive to penetrate the profound criminal mysteries of the great American mortgage bubble of the 2000s, perhaps the most complex Ponzi scheme in human history — an epic mountain range of corporate fraud in which Wall Street megabanks conspired first to collect huge numbers of subprime mortgages, then to unload them on unsuspecting third parties like pensions, trade unions and insurance companies (and, ultimately, you and me, as taxpayers) in the guise of AAA-rated investments.
Selling lead as gold, shit as Chanel No. 5, was the essence of the booming international fraud scheme that created most all of these now-failing home mortgages.
Indymac “Liar Loans” An audit found 87% fraudulent. Federal Courts are protecting OneWest and Wall St Banks by attempting to steal the elder Burkes Home.
— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) November 27, 2021
Looting Main Street
The rocket docket wasn’t created to investigate any of that. It exists to launder the crime and bury the evidence by speeding thousands of fraudulent and predatory loans to the ends of their life cycles, so that the houses attached to them can be sold again with clean paperwork.
The judges, in fact, openly admit that their primary mission is not justice but speed.
One Jacksonville judge, the Honorable A.C. Soud, even told a local newspaper that his goal is to resolve 25 cases per hour.
Given the way the system is rigged, that means His Honor could well be throwing one ass on the street every 2.4 minutes.
Foreclosure lawyers told me one other thing about the rocket docket. The hearings, they said, aren’t exactly public.
“The judges might give you a hard time about watching,” one lawyer warned. “They’re not exactly anxious for people to know about this stuff.”
Inwardly, I laughed at this — it sounded like typical activist paranoia. The notion that a judge would try to prevent any citizen, much less a member of the media, from watching an open civil hearing sounded ridiculous.
Fucked-up as everyone knows the state of Florida is, it couldn’t be that bad. It isn’t Indonesia. Right?
Well, not quite.
When I went to sit in on Judge Soud’s courtroom in downtown Jacksonville, I was treated to an intimate, and at times breathtaking, education in the horror of the foreclosure crisis, which is rapidly emerging as the even scarier sequel to the financial meltdown of 2008:
Invasion of the Home Snatchers II.
In Las Vegas, one in 25 homes is now in foreclosure.
In Fort Myers, Florida, one in 35.
In September, lenders nationwide took over a record 102,134 properties; that same month, more than a third of all home sales were distressed properties.
All told, some 820,000 Americans have already lost their homes this year, and another 1 million currently face foreclosure.
Throughout the mounting catastrophe, however, many Americans have been slow to comprehend the true nature of the mortgage disaster. They seemed to have grasped just two things about the crisis:
One, a lot of people are getting their houses foreclosed on.
Two, some of the banks doing the foreclosing seem to have misplaced their paperwork.
For most people, the former bit about homeowners not paying their damn bills is the important part, while the latter, about the sudden and strange inability of the world’s biggest and wealthiest banks to keep proper records, is incidental.
Just a little office sloppiness, and who cares?
Those deadbeat homeowners still owe the money, right?
“They had it coming to them,” is how a bartender at the Jacksonville airport put it to me.
But in reality, it’s the unpaid bills that are incidental and the lost paperwork that matters.
It turns out that underneath that little iceberg tip of exposed evidence lies a fraud so gigantic that it literally cannot be contemplated by our leaders, for fear of admitting that our entire financial system is corrupted to its core — with our great banks and even our government coffers backed not by real wealth but by vast landfills of deceptively generated and essentially worthless mortgage-backed assets.
You’ve heard of Too Big to Fail — the foreclosure crisis is Too Big for Fraud.
Think of the Bernie Madoff scam, only replicated tens of thousands of times over, infecting every corner of the financial universe. The underlying crime is so pervasive, we simply can’t admit to it — and so we are working feverishly to rubber-stamp the problem away, in sordid little backrooms in cities like Jacksonville, behind doors that shouldn’t be, but often are, closed.
And that’s just the economic side of the story.
The moral angle to the foreclosure crisis — and, of course, in capitalism we’re not supposed to be concerned with the moral stuff, but let’s mention it anyway — shows a culture that is slowly giving in to a futuristic nightmare ideology of computerized greed and unchecked financial violence.
The monster in the foreclosure crisis has no face and no brain.
The mortgages that are being foreclosed upon have no real owners. The lawyers bringing the cases to evict the humans have no real clients. It is complete and absolute legal and economic chaos.
No single limb of this vast man-eating thing knows what the other is doing, which makes it nearly impossible to combat — and scary as hell to watch.
What follows is an account of a single hour of Judge A.C. Soud’s rocket docket in Jacksonville.
Like everything else related to the modern economy, these foreclosure hearings are conducted in what is essentially a foreign language, heavy on jargon and impenetrable to the casual observer.
It took days of interviews with experts before and after this hearing to make sense of this single hour of courtroom drama. And though the permutations of small-time scammery and grift in the foreclosure world are virtually endless — your average foreclosure case involves homeowners or investors being screwed at least five or six creative ways — a single hour of court and a few cases is enough to tell the main story.
Because if you see one of these scams, you see them all.
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— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) November 22, 2021
It’s early on a sunny Tuesday morning when I arrive at the chambers of Judge Soud, one of four rotating judges who preside over the local rocket docket.
These special foreclosure courts were established in July of this year, after the state of Florida budgeted $9.6 million to create a new court with a specific mandate to clear 62 percent of the foreclosure cases that were clogging up the system.
Rather than forcing active judges to hear thousands of individual cases, this strategy relies on retired judges who take turns churning through dozens of cases every morning, with little time to pay much attention to the particulars.
What passes for a foreclosure court in Jacksonville is actually a small conference room at the end of a hall on the fifth floor of the drab brick Duval County Courthouse. The space would just about fit a fridge and a pingpong table.
At the head of a modest conference table this morning sits Judge Soud, a small and fussy-looking man who reminds me vaguely of the actor Ben Gazzara.
On one side of the table sits James Kowalski, a former homicide prosecutor who is now defending homeowners.
A stern man with a shaved head and a laconic manner of speaking, Kowalski has helped pioneer a whole new approach to the housing mess, slowing down the mindless eviction machine by deposing the scores of “robo-signers” being hired by the banks to sign phony foreclosure affidavits by the thousands.
For his work on behalf of the dispossessed, Kowalski was recently profiled in a preposterous Wall Street Journal article that blamed attorneys like him for causing the foreclosure mess with their nuisance defense claims.
The headline: “Niche Lawyers Spawned Housing Fracas.”
On the other side of the table are the plaintiff’s attorneys, the guys who represent the banks.
On this level of the game, these lawyers refer to themselves as “bench warmers” — volume stand-ins subcontracted by the big, hired-killer law firms that work for the banks.
One of the bench warmers present today is Mark Kessler, who works for a number of lenders and giant “foreclosure mills,” including the one run by David J. Stern, a gazillionaire attorney and all-Universe asshole who last year tried to foreclose on 70,382 homeowners.
Which is a nice way to make a living, considering that Stern and his wife, Jeanine, have bought nearly $60 million in property for themselves in recent years, including a 9,273-square-foot manse in Fort Lauderdale that is part of a Ritz-Carlton complex.
Kessler is a harried, middle-aged man in glasses who spends the morning perpetually fighting to organize a towering stack of folders, each one representing a soon-to-be-homeless human being. It quickly becomes apparent that Kessler is barely acquainted with the names in the files, much less the details of each case.
“A lot of these guys won’t even get the folders until right before the hearing,” says Kowalski.
When I arrive, Judge Soud and the lawyers are already arguing a foreclosure case; at a break in the action, I slip into the chamber with a legal-aid attorney who’s accompanying me and sit down. The judge eyes me anxiously, then proceeds.
He clears his throat, and then it’s ready, set, fraud!
Judge Soud seems to have no clue that the files he is processing at a breakneck pace are stuffed with fraudulent claims and outright lies.
“We have not encountered any fraud yet,” he recently told a local newspaper. “If we encountered fraud, it would go to [the state attorney], I can tell you that.”
But the very first case I see in his court is riddled with fraud.
Kowalski has seen hundreds of cases like the one he’s presenting this morning.
It started back in 2006, when he went to Pennsylvania to conduct what he thought would be a routine deposition of an official at the lending giant GMAC.
What he discovered was that the official — who had sworn to having personal knowledge of the case — was, in fact, just a “robo-signer” who had signed off on the file without knowing anything about the actual homeowner or his payment history.
(Kowalski’s clients, like most of the homeowners he represents, were actually making their payments on time; in this particular case, a check had been mistakenly refused by GMAC.)
Following the evidence, Kowalski discovered what has turned out to be a systemwide collapse of the process for documenting mortgages in this country.
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— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) November 25, 2021
If you’re foreclosing on somebody’s house, you are required by law to have a collection of paperwork showing the journey of that mortgage note from the moment of issuance to the present.
You should see the originating lender (a firm like Countrywide) selling the loan to the next entity in the chain (perhaps Goldman Sachs) to the next (maybe JP Morgan), with the actual note being transferred each time.
But in fact, almost no bank currently foreclosing on homeowners has a reliable record of who owns the loan; in some cases, they have even intentionally shredded the actual mortgage notes.
That’s where the robo-signers come in.
To create the appearance of paperwork where none exists, the banks drag in these pimply entry-level types — an infamous example is GMAC’s notorious robo-signer Jeffrey Stephan, who appears online looking like an age-advanced photo of Beavis or Butt-Head — and get them to sign thousands of documents a month attesting to the banks’ proper ownership of the mortgages.
This isn’t some rare goof-up by a low-level cubicle slave: Virtually every case of foreclosure in this country involves some form of screwed-up paperwork.
“I would say it’s pretty close to 100 percent,”
says Kowalski. An attorney for Jacksonville Area Legal Aid tells me that out of the hundreds of cases she has handled, fewer than five involved no phony paperwork.
“The fraud is the norm,” she says.
Kowalski’s current case before Judge Soud is a perfect example.
The Jacksonville couple he represents are being sued for delinquent payments, but the case against them has already been dismissed once before. The first time around, the plaintiff, Bank of New York Mellon, wrote in Paragraph 8 that “plaintiff owns and holds the note” on the house belonging to the couple.
But in Paragraph 3 of the same complaint, the bank reported that the note was “lost or destroyed,” while in Paragraph 4 it attests that “plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain possession of the promissory note because its whereabouts cannot be determined.”
The bank, in other words, tried to claim on paper, in court, that it both lost the note and had it, at the same time. Moreover, it claimed that it had included a copy of the note in the file, which it did — the only problem being that the note (a) was not properly endorsed, and (b) was payable not to Bank of New York but to someone else, a company called Novastar.
Now, months after its first pass at foreclosure was dismissed, the bank has refiled the case — and what do you know, it suddenly found the note. And this time, somehow, the note has the proper stamps.
“There’s a stamp that did not appear on the note that was originally filed,” Kowalski tells the judge. (This business about the stamps is hilarious. “You can get them very cheap online,” says Chip Parker, an attorney who defends homeowners in Jacksonville.)
The bank’s new set of papers also traces ownership of the loan from the original lender, Novastar, to JP Morgan and then to Bank of New York.
The bank, in other words, is trying to push through a completely new set of documents in its attempts to foreclose on Kowalski’s clients.
There’s only one problem: The dates of the transfers are completely fucked.
According to the documents, JP Morgan transferred the mortgage to Bank of New York on December 9th, 2008. But according to the same documents, JP Morgan didn’t even receive the mortgage from Novastar until February 2nd, 2009 — two months after it had supposedly passed the note along to Bank of New York.
Such rank incompetence at doctoring legal paperwork is typical of foreclosure actions, where the fraud is laid out in ink in ways that make it impossible for anyone but an overburdened, half-asleep judge to miss.
“That’s my point about all of this,”
Kowalski tells me later.
“If you’re going to lie to me, at least lie well.”
The dates aren’t the only thing screwy about the new documents submitted by Bank of New York.
Having failed in its earlier attempt to claim that it actually had the mortgage note, the bank now tries an all-of-the-above tactic.
“Plaintiff owns and holds the note,” it claims, “or is a person entitled to enforce the note.”
Soud sighs. For Kessler, the plaintiff’s lawyer, to come before him with such sloppy documents and make this preposterous argument — that his client either is or is not the note-holder — well, that puts His Honor in a tough spot.
The entire concept is a legal absurdity, and he can’t sign off on it.
With an expression of something very like regret, the judge tells Kessler,
“I’m going to have to go ahead and accept [Kowalski’s] argument.”
Now, one might think that after a bank makes multiple attempts to push phony documents through a courtroom, a judge might be pissed off enough to simply rule against that plaintiff for good.
As I witness in court all morning, the defense never gets more than one chance to screw up. But the banks get to keep filing their foreclosures over and over again, no matter how atrocious and deceitful their paperwork is.
Thus, when Soud tells Kessler that he’s dismissing the case, he hastens to add:
“Of course, I’m not going to dismiss with prejudice.” With an emphasis on the words “of course.”
Instead, Soud gives Kessler 25 days to come up with better paperwork.
Kowalski fully expects the bank to come back with new documents telling a whole new story of the note’s ownership.
“What they’re going to do, I would predict, is produce a note and say Bank of New York is not the original note-holder, but merely the servicer,” he says.
This is the dirty secret of the rocket docket
The whole system is set up to enable lenders to commit fraud over and over again, until they figure out a way to reduce the stink enough so some judge like Soud can sign off on the scam.
“If the court finds for the defendant, the plaintiffs just refile,” says Parker, the local attorney.
“The only way for the caseload to get reduced is to give it to the plaintiff. The entire process is designed with that result in mind.”
Now all of this — the obviously cooked-up documents, the magically appearing stamp and the rest of it — may just seem like nothing more than sloppy paperwork. After all, what does it matter if the bank has lost a few forms or mixed up the dates?
The homeowners still owe what they owe, and the deadbeats have no right to keep living in a house they haven’t paid for.
But what’s going on at the Jacksonville rocket docket, and in foreclosure courts all across the country, has nothing to do with sloppiness.
All this phony paperwork was actually an essential part of the mortgage bubble, an integral element of what has enabled the nation’s biggest lenders to pass off all that subprime lead as AAA gold.
In the old days, when you took out a mortgage, it was probably through a local bank or a credit union, and whoever gave you your loan held on to it for life.
If you lost your job or got too sick to work and suddenly had trouble making your payments, you could call a human being and work things out.
It was in the banker’s interest, as well as yours, to make a modified payment schedule.
From his point of view, it was better that you pay something than nothing at all.
But that all changed about a decade ago, thanks to the invention of new financial instruments that magically turned all these mortgages into high-grade investments.
Now when you took out a mortgage, your original lender — which might well have been a big mortgage mill like Countrywide or New Century — immediately sold off your loan to big banks like Deutsche and Goldman and JP Morgan.
The banks then dumped hundreds or thousands of home loans at a time into tax-exempt real estate trusts, where the loans were diced up into securities, examined and graded by the ratings agencies, and sold off to big pension funds and other institutional suckers.
Even at this stage of the game, the banks generally knew that the loans they were buying and reselling to investors were shady.
A company called Clayton Holdings, which analyzed nearly 1 million loans being prepared for sale in 2006 and 2007 by 23 banks, found that nearly half of the mortgages failed to meet the underwriting standards being promised to investors.
Citigroup, for instance, had 29 percent of its loans come up short, but it still sold a third of those mortgages to investors.
Goldman Sachs had 19 percent of its mortgages flunk the test, yet it knowingly hawked 34 percent of the risky deals to investors.
D. Keith Johnson, the head of Clayton Holdings, was so alarmed by the findings that he went to officials at three of the main ratings agencies — Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch’s — and tried to get them to properly evaluate the loans.
“Wouldn’t this information be great for you to have as you assign risk levels?” he asked them.
(Translation: Don’t you ratings agencies want to know that half these loans are crap before you give them a thumbs-up?)
But all three agencies rejected his advice, fearing they would lose business if they adopted tougher standards. In the end, the agencies gave large chunks of these mortgage-backed securities AAA ratings — which means “credit risk almost zero.”
Since these mortgage-backed securities paid much higher returns than other AAA investments like treasury notes or corporate bonds, the banks had no trouble attracting investors, foreign and domestic, from pension funds to insurance companies to trade unions.
The demand was so great, in fact, that they often sold mortgages they didn’t even have yet, prompting big warehouse lenders like Countrywide and New Century to rush out into the world to find more warm bodies to lend to.
In their extreme haste to get thousands and thousands of mortgages they could resell to the banks, the lenders committed an astonishing variety of fraud,
from falsifying income statements to making grossly inflated appraisals to misrepresenting properties to home buyers.
Most crucially, they gave tons and tons of credit to people who probably didn’t deserve it, and why not?
These fly-by-night mortgage companies weren’t going to hold on to these loans, not even for 10 minutes.
They were issuing this credit specifically to sell the loans off to the big banks right away, in furtherance of the larger scheme to dump fraudulent AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities on investors.
If you had a pulse, they had a house to sell you.
As bad as Countrywide and all those lenders were, the banks that had sent them out to collect these crap loans were a hundred times worse.
To sell the loans, the banks often dumped them into big tax-exempt buckets called REMICs, or Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits. Each one of these Enron-ish, offshore-like real estate trusts spelled out exactly what kinds of loans were supposed to be in the pool, when they were to be collected, and how they were to be managed.
In order to both preserve their tax-exempt status and deserve their AAA ratings, each of the loans in the pool had to have certain characteristics. The loans couldn’t already be in default or foreclosure at the time they were sold to investors.
If they were advertised as nice, safe, fixed-rate mortgages, they couldn’t turn out to be high-interest junk loans. And, on the most basic level, the loans had to actually exist.
In other words, if the trust stipulated that all the loans had to be collected by August 2005, the bank couldn’t still be sticking in mortgages months later.
Yet that’s exactly what the banks did. In one case handled by Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, a homeowner refinanced her house in 2005 but almost immediately got into trouble, going into default in December of that year.
Yet somehow, this woman’s loan was placed into a trust called Home Equity Loan Trust Series AE 2005-HE5 in January 2006 — five months after the deadline for that particular trust.
The loan was not only late, it was already in foreclosure — which means that, by definition, whoever the investors were in AE 2005-HE5 were getting shafted.
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— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) November 24, 2021
Why does stuff like this matter?
Because when the banks put these pools together, they were telling their investors that they were putting their money into tidy collections of real, performing home loans.
But frequently, the loans in the trust were complete shit. Or sometimes, the banks didn’t even have all the loans they said they had. But the banks sold the securities based on these pools of mortgages as AAA-rated gold anyway.
In short, all of this was a scam — and that’s why so many of these mortgages lack a true paper trail.
Had these transfers been done legally, the actual mortgage note and detailed information about all of these transactions would have been passed from entity to entity each time the mortgage was sold.
But in actual practice, the banks were often committing securities fraud (because many of the mortgages did not match the information in the prospectuses given to investors) and tax fraud (because the way the mortgages were collected and serviced often violated the strict procedures governing such investments).
Having unloaded this diseased cargo onto their unsuspecting customers, the banks had no incentive to waste money keeping “proper” documentation of all these dubious transactions.
“You’ve already committed fraud once,” says April Charney, an attorney with Jacksonville Area Legal Aid. “What do you have to lose?”
Sitting in the rocket docket, James Kowalski considers himself lucky to have won his first motion of the morning.
To get the usually intractable Judge Soud to forestall a foreclosure is considered a real victory, and I later hear Kowalski getting props and attaboys from other foreclosure lawyers.
In a great deal of these cases, in fact, the homeowners would have a pretty good chance of beating the rap, at least temporarily, if only they had lawyers fighting for them in court.
But most of them don’t.
In fact, more than 90 percent of the cases that go through Florida foreclosure courts are unopposed.
Either homeowners don’t know they can fight their foreclosures, or they simply can’t afford an attorney.
These unopposed cases are the ones the banks know they’ll win — which is why they don’t sweat it if they take the occasional whipping.
That’s why all these colorful descriptions of cases where foreclosure lawyers like Kowalski score in court are really just that — a little color.
The meat of the foreclosure crisis is the unopposed cases; that’s where the banks make their money. They almost always win those cases, no matter what’s in the files.
This becomes evident after Kowalski leaves the room.
“Who’s next?” Judge Soud says. He turns to Mark Kessler, the counsel for the big foreclosure mills. “Mark, you still got some?”
“I’ve got about three more, Judge,” says Kessler.
Kessler then drops three greenish-brown files in front of Judge Soud, who spends no more than a minute or two glancing through each one.
Then he closes the files and puts an end to the process by putting his official stamp on each foreclosure with an authoritative finality:
Each one of those kerchunks means another family on the street.
There are no faces involved here, just beat-the-clock legal machinery.
Watching Judge Soud plow through each foreclosure reminds me of the scene in Fargo where the villain played by Swedish character actor Peter Stormare pushes his victim’s leg through a wood chipper with that trademark bored look on his face.
Mechanized misery and brainless bureaucracy on the one hand, cash for the banks on the other.
FACING THE TURNCOATS
An Incredible True Story.
“The significant and distressing difference is the Burkes battle is not just with the opposing parties, but with the judicial machinery itself.”
IT’S TIME.@WSJ @nytimes @Reuters @SupremeCourt_TX @flcourts #txlege #appellatetwitter pic.twitter.com/ORqzoqOuaP
— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) November 20, 2021
What’s sad is that most Americans who have an opinion about the foreclosure crisis don’t give a shit about all the fraud involved. They don’t care that these mortgages wouldn’t have been available in the first place if the banks hadn’t found a way to sell oregano as weed to pension funds and insurance companies.
They don’t care that the Countrywides’ of the world pushed borrowers who qualified for safer fixed-income loans into far more dangerous adjustable-rate loans, because their brokers got bigger commissions for doing so.
They don’t care that in the rush to produce loans, people were sold houses that turned out to have flood damage or worse, and they certainly don’t care that people were sold houses with inflated appraisals, which left them almost immediately underwater once housing prices started falling.
The way the banks tell it, it doesn’t matter if they defrauded homeowners and investors and taxpayers alike to get these loans.
All that matters is that a bunch of deadbeats aren’t paying their fucking bills.
“If you didn’t pay your mortgage, you shouldn’t be in your house — period,” is how Walter Todd, portfolio manager at Greenwood Capital Associates, puts it.
“People are getting upset about something that’s just procedural.”
Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JP Morgan, is even more succinct in dismissing the struggling homeowners that he and the other megabanks scammed before tossing out into the street.
“We’re not evicting people who deserve to stay in their house,” Dimon says.
There are two things wrong with this argument. (Well, more than two, actually, but let’s just stick to the two big ones.)
The first reason is: It simply isn’t true.
Many people who are being foreclosed on have actually paid their bills and followed all the instructions laid down by their banks. In some cases, a homeowner contacts the bank to say that he’s having trouble paying his bill, and the bank offers him loan modification. But the bank tells him that in order to qualify for modification, he must first be delinquent on his mortgage.
“They actually tell people to stop paying their bills for three months,” says Parker.
The authorization gets recorded in what’s known as the bank’s “contact database,” which records every phone call or other communication with a homeowner. But no mention of it is entered into the bank’s “number history,” which records only the payment record.
When the number history notes that the homeowner has missed three payments in a row, it has no way of knowing that the homeowner was given permission to stop making payments. “One computer generates a default letter,” says Kowalski. “Another computer contacts the credit bureaus.”
At no time is there a human being looking at the entire picture.
Which means that homeowners can be foreclosed on for all sorts of faulty reasons: misplaced checks, address errors, you name it. This inability of one limb of the foreclosure beast to know what the other limb is doing is responsible for many of the horrific stories befalling homeowners across the country.
Patti Parker, a local attorney in Jacksonville, tells of a woman whose home was seized by Deutsche Bank two days before Christmas. Months later, Deutsche came back and admitted that they had made a mistake: They had repossessed the wrong property.
In another case that made headlines in Orlando, an agent for JP Morgan mistakenly broke into a woman’s house that wasn’t even in foreclosure and tried to change the locks.
Terrified, the woman locked herself in her bathroom and called 911. But in a profound expression of the state’s reflexive willingness to side with the bad guys, the police made no arrest in the case. Breaking and entering is not a crime, apparently, when it’s authorized by a bank.
The second reason the whole they still owe the fucking money thing is bogus has to do with the changed incentives in the mortgage game.
In many cases, banks like JP Morgan are merely the servicers of all these home loans, charged with collecting your money every month and paying every penny of it into the trust, which is the real owner of your mortgage.
If you pay less than the whole amount, JP Morgan is now obligated to pay the trust the remainder out of its own pocket. When you fall behind, your bank falls behind, too. The only way it gets off the hook is if the house is foreclosed on and sold.
That’s what this foreclosure crisis is all about: fleeing the scene of the crime.
Add into the equation the fact that some of these big banks were simultaneously betting big money against these mortgages — Goldman Sachs being the prime example — and you can see that there were heavy incentives across the board to push anyone in trouble over the cliff.
Things used to be different.
Asked what percentage of struggling homeowners she used to be able to save from foreclosure in the days before securitization,
Charney is quick to answer.
“Most of them,” she says. “I seldom came across a mortgage I couldn’t work out.”
In Judge Soud’s court, I come across a shining example of this mindless rush to foreclosure when I meet Natasha Leonard, a single mother who bought a house in 2004 for $97,500.
Right after closing on the home, Leonard lost her job. But when she tried to get a modification on the loan, the bank’s offer was not helpful.
“They wanted me to pay $1,000,” she says. Which wasn’t exactly the kind of modification she was hoping for, given that her original monthly payment was $840.
“You’re paying $840, you ask for a break, and they ask you to pay $1,000?” I ask.
“Right,” she says.
Leonard now has a job and could make some kind of reduced payment. But instead of offering loan modification, the bank’s lawyers are in their fourth year of doggedly beating her brains out over minor technicalities in the foreclosure process.
That’s fine by the lawyers, who are collecting big fees.
And there appears to be no human being at the bank who’s involved enough to issue a sane decision to end the costly battle.
“If there was a real client on the other side, maybe they could work something out,” says Charney, who is representing Leonard.
In this lunatic bureaucratic jungle of securitized home loans issued by transnational behemoths, the borrower-lender relationship can only go one of two ways: full payment, or total war.
Watch the video, made for the purpose of public interest as congress aligns with ochlocracy.@SenatorDurbin @ewarren @uscourts @WSJopinion @ReutersLegal @netflix @IMDb #SCOTUS pic.twitter.com/8RLKSaGvhM
— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) December 2, 2021
The extreme randomness of the system is exemplified by the last case I see in the rocket docket.
While most foreclosures are unopposed, with homeowners not even bothering to show up in court to defend themselves, a few pro se defendants — people representing themselves — occasionally trickle in.
At one point during Judge Soud’s proceeding, a tallish blond woman named Shawnetta Cooper walks in with a confused look on her face.
A recent divorcee delinquent in her payments, she has come to court today fully expecting to be foreclosed on by Wells Fargo. She sits down and takes a quick look around at the lawyers who are here to kick her out of her home.
“The land has been in my family for four generations,” she tells me later. “I don’t want to be the one to lose it.”
Judge Soud pipes up and inquires if there’s a plaintiff lawyer present; someone has to lop off this woman’s head so the court can move on to the next case.
But then something unexpected happens: It turns out that Kessler is supposed to be foreclosing on her today, but he doesn’t have her folder.
The plaintiff, technically, has forgotten to show up to court.
Just minutes before, I had watched what happens when defendants don’t show up in court: kerchunk! The judge more or less automatically rules for the plaintiffs when the homeowner is a no-show.
But when the plaintiff doesn’t show, the judge is suddenly all mercy and forgiveness. Soud simply continues Cooper’s case, telling Kessler to get his shit together and come back for another whack at her in a few weeks.
Having done this, he dismisses everyone.
Stunned, Cooper wanders out of the courtroom looking like a person who has stepped up to the gallows expecting to be hanged, but has instead been handed a fruit basket and a new set of golf clubs.
I follow her out of the court, hoping to ask her about her case. But the sight of a journalist getting up to talk to a defendant in his kangaroo court clearly puts a charge into His Honor, and he immediately calls Cooper back into the conference room.
Then, to the amazement of everyone present, he issues the following speech:
“This young man,” he says, pointing at me, “is a reporter for Rolling Stone. It is your privilege to talk to him if you want.” He pauses. “It is also your privilege to not talk to him if you want.”
I stare at the judge, open-mouthed. Here’s a woman who still has to come back to this guy’s court to find out if she can keep her home, and the judge’s admonition suggests that she may run the risk of pissing him off if she talks to a reporter.
Worse, about an hour later, April Charney, the lawyer who accompanied me to court, receives an e-mail from the judge actually threatening her with contempt for bringing a stranger to his court.
Noting that “we ask that anyone other than a lawyer remain in the lobby,” Judge Soud admonishes Charney that “your unprofessional conduct and apparent authorization that the reporter could pursue a property owner immediately out of Chambers into the hallway for an interview, may very well be sited [sic] for possible contempt in the future.”
Let’s leave aside for a moment that Charney never said a word to me about speaking to Cooper.
And let’s overlook entirely the fact that the judge can’t spell the word cited.
The key here isn’t this individual judge — it’s the notion that these hearings are not and should not be entirely public. Quite clearly, foreclosure is meant to be neither seen nor heard.
After Soud’s outburst, Cooper quietly leaves the court.
Once out of sight of the judge, she shows me her file. It’s not hard to find the fraud in the case.
For starters, the assignment of mortgage is autographed by a notorious robo-signer — John Kennerty, who gave a deposition this summer admitting that he signed as many as 150 documents a day for Wells Fargo.
In Cooper’s case, the document with Kennerty’s signature on it places the date on which Wells Fargo obtained the mortgage as May 5th, 2010. The trouble is, the bank bought the loan from Wachovia — a bank that went out of business in 2008.
All of which is interesting, because in her file, it states that Wells Fargo sued Cooper for foreclosure on February 22nd, 2010.
In other words, the bank foreclosed on Cooper three months before it obtained her mortgage from a nonexistent company.
There are other types of grift and outright theft in the file.
As is typical in many foreclosure cases, Cooper is being charged by the bank for numerous attempts to serve her with papers.
But a booming industry has grown up around fraudulent process servers; companies will claim they made dozens of attempts to serve homeowners, when in fact they made just one or none at all. Who’s going to check?
The process servers cover up the crime using the same tactic as the lenders, saying they lost the original summons.
From 2000 to 2006, there was a total of 1,031 “affidavits of lost summons” here in Duval County; in the past two years, by contrast, more than 4,000 have been filed.
LIT respectfully wishes to remind y’all over there at Congress – you are now fully aware of the poison and ochlocracy pervading Texas Federal Courts, incl. Circuit COA5, incl. the #SB8 debacle and the @WSJ article re failure to recuse/disclose and much more. Please ACT NOW. pic.twitter.com/GKtTuzJNev
— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) November 4, 2021
Cooper’s file contains a total of $371 in fees for process service, including one charge of $55 for an attempt to serve process on an “unknown tenant.”
But Cooper’s house is owner-occupied — she doesn’t even have a tenant, she tells me with a shrug.
If Mark Kessler had had his shit together in court today, Cooper would not only be out on the street, she’d be paying for that attempt to serve papers to her nonexistent tenant.
Cooper’s case perfectly summarizes what the foreclosure crisis is all about.
Her original loan was made by Wachovia, a bank that blew itself up in 2008 speculating in the mortgage market. It was then transferred to Wells Fargo, a megabank that was handed some $50 billion in public assistance to help it acquire the corpse of Wachovia.
And who else benefited from that $50 billion in bailout money?
Billionaire Warren Buffett and his Berkshire Hathaway fund, which happens to be a major shareholder in Wells Fargo.
It was Buffett’s vice chairman, Charles Munger, who recently told America that it should “thank God” that the government bailed out banks like the one he invests in, while people who have fallen on hard times — that is, homeowners like Shawnetta Cooper — should “suck it in and cope.”
Look: It’s undeniable that many of the people facing foreclosure bear some responsibility for the crisis. Some borrowed beyond their means. Some even borrowed knowing they would never be able to pay off their debt, either hoping to flip their houses right away or taking on mortgages with low initial teaser rates without bothering to think of the future.
The culture of take-for-yourself-now, let-someone-else-pay-later wasn’t completely restricted to Wall Street. It penetrated all the way down to the individual consumer, who in some cases was a knowing accomplice in the bubble mess.
But many of these homeowners are just ordinary Joes who had no idea what they were getting into. Some were pushed into dangerous loans when they qualified for safe ones.
Others were told not to worry about future jumps in interest rates because they could just refinance down the road, or discovered that the value of their homes had been overinflated by brokers looking to pad their commissions.
And that’s not even accounting for the fact that most of this credit wouldn’t have been available in the first place without the Ponzi-like bubble scheme cooked up by Wall Street, about which the average homeowner knew nothing — hell, even the average U.S. senator didn’t know about it.
At worst, these ordinary homeowners were stupid or uninformed — while the banks that lent them the money are guilty of committing a baldfaced crime on a grand scale.
These banks robbed investors and conned homeowners, blew themselves up chasing the fraud, then begged the taxpayers to bail them out.
And bail them out we did:
We ponied up billions to help Wells Fargo buy Wachovia, paid Bank of America to buy Merrill Lynch, and watched as the Fed opened up special facilities to buy up the assets in defective mortgage trusts at inflated prices.
And after all that effort by the state to buy back these phony assets so the thieves could all stay in business and keep their bonuses, what did the banks do?
They put their foot on the foreclosure gas pedal and stepped up the effort to kick people out of their homes as fast as possible, before the world caught on to how these loans were made in the first place.
Why don’t the banks want us to see the paperwork on all these mortgages?
Because the documents represent a death sentence for them.
According to the rules of the mortgage trusts, a lender like Bank of America, which controls all the Countrywide loans, is required by law to buy back from investors every faulty loan the crooks at Countrywide ever issued.
Think about what that would do to Bank of America’s bottom line the next time you wonder why they’re trying so hard to rush these loans into someone else’s hands.
When you meet people who are losing their homes in this foreclosure crisis, they almost all have the same look of deep shame and anguish.
Nowhere else on the planet is it such a crime to be down on your luck, even if you were put there by some of the world’s richest banks, which continue to rake in record profits purely because they got a big fat handout from the government.
That’s why one banker CEO after another keeps going on TV to explain that despite their own deceptive loans and fraudulent paperwork, the real problem is these deadbeat homeowners who won’t pay their fucking bills.
And that’s why most people in this country are so ready to buy that explanation.
Because in America, it’s far more shameful to owe money than it is to steal it.
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Who is Presiding Judge Andrea Gundersen, Mortgage Foreclosure Division, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit?
Judge Gundersen presides over all foreclosures in Broward County. She has been referred to JQC, asking that she be removed from the bench.
FL Honest Lending Report
REPUBLISHED BY LIT: JUL 5, 2021
After orchestrating one of the largest consumer frauds in American history, the banking industry continues the unethical and illegal servicing and foreclosure practices that were uncovered during the “robo-signing” scandal which eventually led to the $25b settlement with 49 State Attorneys General in 2012.
While some of the unethical practices regarding origination were curbed after the settlement, unethical servicing and fraudulent foreclosures continue to plague homeowners.
Floridians for Honest Lending (FHL) reviewed several hundred foreclosure complaints filed in 2019 by Bank of America, the Bank of New York Mellon, and JP Morgan Chase in the Eleventh and Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Courts that comprise Miami-Dade and Broward counties respectively. Upon that review, FHL found 369 foreclosure complaints were filed with rubber-stamped blank endorsements with signatures of David Spector, Laurie Meder, Michele Sjolander, and Cynthia Riley, whose names became synonymous with the robo-signing scandal. Of those, 325 were loans originated by Countrywide, the disgraced mortgage company that was bought by Bank of America in 2008.
In addition, FHL found that in Miami-Dade alone, 310 homes had been sold at auction since January 2019 that included these same rubber-stamped blank endorsements from these same rubber-stamped blank endorsements, 21 of which were sold during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The fraudulent rubber-stamped blank endorsements are used to establish standing and the banks’ right to foreclose on homeowners, the same homeowners that were sold predatory loans and pushed into foreclosure with unethical servicing practices.
It was discovered after the $25b National Mortgage Settlement that Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase continued to submit forged documents, now relying on forgery and perjury, in foreclosures across the nation.
Unfortunately, the banks’ reckless greed left millions of properties with mortgages and promissory notes corrupted and the chain of title on those properties broken, putting trial court judges in an uncomfortable position of either taking the banking industry to task for these forged documents or kicking a family out of their home.
Unfortunately, with little scrutiny from the media, legislators, or regulators, our court system has heavily favored the latter.
In fact, FHL’s review found that in Broward county, 217 of the 219 foreclosure complaints filed in 2019 that included fraudulent rubber stamps were assigned to Judge Andrea Gundersen.
Of these cases assigned to Judge Gundersen, 126 of them have been closed, none of which were ruled in favor of the defendant.
Currently, Judge Gundersen presides over all foreclosures in Broward County.
She was reassigned from Family Court and does not have prior experience in foreclosure litigation.
Since her reassignment, defense attorneys have filed motions for judicial disqualification against Judge Gundersen for allowing attorneys for Bank of America to misrepresent the law and argue that “fraud on the court” is allowed in foreclosure because of a “litigation privilege” and ordering the defendant to pay the Bank’s attorney’s fees for challenging the fraud.
In April 2021, Judge Gundersen granted nineteen motions for disqualification in cases she presided over.
The clients have referred Judge Gundersen to the Judicial Qualifications Commission asking that she be removed from the bench.
These fraudulent foreclosures impact real people like Ana Rodriguez, an 82-year-old homeowner who was a former Cuban political prisoner, who now faces eviction because she was sold a predatory loan by Countrywide.
It impacts people like Mrs. Marie Williams-James who never missed a mortgage payment but Bank of America foreclosed on her anyway and Mr. and Mrs. Simpson who were working on a mortgage modification when the Judge refused the bank’s motion for continuance and forced the Simpsons into a fraudulent foreclosure judgment.
There is a new foreclosure crisis looming due to the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. As we get the pandemic under control, the federal government will be under increased pressure from the banking industry to lift the FHFA moratorium for federally-backed mortgages from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
That moratorium only protects borrowers who had strong enough credit scores to qualify for government-backed mortgages. The elderly, communities of color, and first-time homebuyers who took subprime mortgages are not protected by any moratorium and are still being evicted during the pandemic.
The issue of fraudulent foreclosures must be resolved before this new crisis begins. This is an issue that demands action at the local, state, and federal levels from legislators, regulators, and our judicial system.
We cannot continue to allow fraud in our justice system for the convenience of the banking industry and at the expense of homeowners’ American Dream.
Floridian for Honest Lending is a project of Opportunity For All Floridians, a 501c4 non-profit organization. We believe that our system will only work with transparency, honesty, and accountability. Our research can be found here.
Each complaint filed by the banks’ attorneys is linked in the second column. The forged rubber stamps can usually be found on the promissory notes that are included in the exhibits.
Below you can also find a sample of the varied David Spector signatures.
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Ocwen and CFPB’s Failed Mediation is Merely a Delay Tactic
Ocwen’s staged failed settlement related to the lawsuit filed by the CFPB in 2017 against the $3 billion dollar admonished mortgage servicer.
Ocwen’s counsel at Goodwin Law are rogues. CFPB’s counsel are the same. They work together to cut deals where the public are falsely led to believe the government watchdog is protecting their interests. That would be fake news.
Recent events in the Burke’s attempts to intervene has shown it’s rotten all around, right up to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. If you want to read the case and background, we suggest you start at the beginning, as documented by LIT.
The matter is far from conclusion, there’s a lot of dirty laundry to be cleaned up. Judge Ken “Magic” Marra is the remaining immediate stumbling block – who should have retired in January but they don’t know what to do as the Burke’s are lurking. LIT will keep y’all updated on this as matters progress.
Friday, Feb 19, 2021
It’s eerily quiet on the docket. Nothing to report of material concern.
Ocwen Financial Comments on Conclusion of Failed Mediation With the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
| Source: Ocwen Financial Corp.
WEST PALM BEACH, Fla., Jan. 06, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ocwen Financial Corporation (NYSE: OCN) (“Ocwen” or the “Company”), a leading non-bank mortgage servicer and originator, today issued the following statement in response to the mediator’s notice that the Company’s court-ordered mediation with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) had concluded. The parties were unable to reach a settlement related to the lawsuit filed by the CFPB in 2017 against the Company regarding certain legacy servicing activities.
“We are disappointed that settlement discussions with the CFPB did not resolve this matter, in particular since we have resolved all state regulatory actions filed against Ocwen in April 2017, most recently through a settlement reached with the State of Florida in October 2020. We engaged with the Bureau in good faith throughout the course of mediation and numerous related discussions and took all actions in an attempt to reach a fair and reasonable resolution. We remain steadfast in our belief that the CFPB’s claims regarding Ocwen’s past servicing practices are unsubstantiated and the Bureau’s settlement demands do not reflect the merits of this case. While we remain committed to attempting to resolve this matter prior to trial, our pending motion for summary judgment filed on June 5, 2020 supports our position on this matter, and we will continue to vigorously defend ourselves going forward.”
The Company increased its legal and regulatory accrual related to the CFPB matter by $13.1 million in the fourth quarter of 2020 resulting from its efforts to resolve the matter in mediation.
About Ocwen Financial Corporation
Ocwen Financial Corporation (NYSE: OCN) is a leading non-bank mortgage servicer and originator providing solutions through its primary brands, PHH Mortgage and Liberty Reverse Mortgage. PHH Mortgage is one of the largest servicers in the country, focused on delivering a variety of servicing and lending programs. Liberty is one of the nation’s largest reverse mortgage lenders dedicated to education and providing loans that help customers meet their personal and financial needs. We are headquartered in West Palm Beach, Florida, with offices in the United States and the U.S. Virgin Islands and operations in India and the Philippines, and have been serving our customers since 1988. For additional information, please visit our website (www.ocwen.com).
This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. These forward-looking statements may be identified by a reference to a future period or by the use of forward-looking terminology. Forward-looking statements are typically identified by words such as “expect”, “believe”, “foresee”, “anticipate”, “intend”, “estimate”, “goal”, “strategy”, “plan” “target” and “project” or conditional verbs such as “will”, “may”, “should”, “could” or “would” or the negative of these terms, although not all forward-looking statements contain these words. Forward-looking statements by their nature address matters that are, to different degrees, uncertain. We are in the midst of a period of capital markets volatility and experiencing significant changes within the mortgage lending and servicing ecosystem which have magnified such uncertainties. Readers should bear these factors in mind when considering such statements and should not place undue reliance on such statements.
Forward-looking statements involve a number of assumptions, risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially. In the past, actual results have differed from those suggested by forward looking statements and this may happen again. Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those suggested by the forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, uncertainty relating to the future impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, including with respect to the response of the U.S. government, state governments, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac, and together with Fannie Mae, the GSEs), the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) and regulators, as well as the potential for ongoing disruption in the financial markets and in commercial activity generally, increased unemployment, and other financial difficulties facing our borrowers; impacts on our operations resulting from employee illness, social distancing measures and our shift to greater utilization of remote work arrangements; the adequacy of our financial resources, including our sources of liquidity and ability to sell, fund and recover servicing advances, forward and reverse whole loans, and HECM and forward loan buyouts and put backs, as well as repay, renew and extend borrowings, borrow additional amounts as and when required, meet our MSR or other asset investment objectives and comply with our debt agreements, including the financial and other covenants contained in them; increased servicing costs based on increased borrower delinquency levels or other factors; our ability to collect anticipated tax refunds, including on the timeframe expected; the future of our long-term relationship and remaining servicing agreements with New Residential Investment Corp. (NRZ), our ability to execute an orderly and timely transfer of responsibilities in connection with the previously disclosed termination by NRZ of the PMC subservicing agreement, including our ability to respond to any concerns raised by regulators, lenders and other contractual counterparties in connection with such transfer; our ability to timely adjust our cost structure and operations as the loan transfer process is being completed in response to the previously disclosed termination by NRZ of the PMC subservicing agreement; our ability to continue to improve our financial performance through cost re-engineering efforts and other actions; our ability to continue to grow our origination business and increase our origination volumes in a competitive market and uncertain interest rate environment; uncertainty related to claims, litigation, cease and desist orders and investigations brought by government agencies and private parties regarding our servicing, foreclosure, modification, origination and other practices, including uncertainty related to past, present or future investigations, litigation, cease and desist orders and settlements with state regulators, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), State Attorneys General, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Department of Justice or the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and actions brought under the False Claims Act regarding incentive and other payments made by governmental entities; adverse effects on our business as a result of regulatory investigations, litigation, cease and desist orders or settlements and related responses by key counterparties, including lenders, the GSEs and Ginnie Mae; our ability to comply with the terms of our settlements with regulatory agencies, as well as general regulatory requirements, and the costs of doing so; increased regulatory scrutiny and media attention; any adverse developments in existing legal proceedings or the initiation of new legal proceedings; our ability to interpret correctly and comply with liquidity, net worth and other financial and other requirements of regulators, the GSEs and Ginnie Mae, as well as those set forth in our debt and other agreements; our ability to comply with our servicing agreements, including our ability to comply with our agreements with, and the requirements of, the GSEs and Ginnie Mae and maintain our seller/servicer and other statuses with them; our ability to fund future draws on existing loans in our reverse mortgage portfolio; our servicer and credit ratings as well as other actions from various rating agencies, including the impact of prior or future downgrades of our servicer and credit ratings; as well as other risks and uncertainties detailed in Ocwen’s reports and filings with the SEC, including its annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2019 and its current and quarterly reports since such date. Anyone wishing to understand Ocwen’s business should review its SEC filings. Our forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made and, we disclaim any obligation to update or revise forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
|June Campbell||Dico Akseraylian|
|T: (856) 917-3190||T: (856) 917-0066|
|E: firstname.lastname@example.org||E: email@example.com|
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McAllister is the US Atty for Kansas. He clerked for the Hon. Clarence Thomas. Now he’s using his law professor skillset to threaten LIT’s constitutional rights. When judges behave unconstitutionally they ain’t judges McAllister. They are Outlaws in Robes. https://t.co/EPIxbahRlZ https://t.co/m6jaibNlrg pic.twitter.com/qg1bs0WW3u
— LawsInTexas (@lawsintexasusa) January 7, 2021
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